United States v. Blunt

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4270
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICHARD BLUNT, aka Bridgett Blunt,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (2:01-cr-00388-PMD-35)
Submitted: July 8, 2008 Decided: July 23, 2008
Before MICHAEL, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary Gordon Baker, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. John Charles Duane, Eric John
Klumb, Assistant United States Attorneys, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Richard Blunt appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to twenty-four
months of imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are
no meritorious issues for appeal but suggesting that Blunt should
have received notice that the district court was considering
imposing a sentence above the advisory guideline range and that the
sentence is unreasonable. Blunt was advised of his right to file
a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. We affirm.
Counsel suggests that Blunt was entitled to notice of the
district court’s intent to vary upwardly from the advisory
guideline range of eight to fourteen months. However, Rule 32.1 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs supervised
release revocation procedures, does not contain a notice
requirement. We therefore find that the district court committed
no significant procedural error by failing to provide notice. See
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); United States v.
Leonard, 483 F.3d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In revoking supervised
release, the district court is not required to give the parties
notice that it is contemplating a sentence outside the Guidelines
range . . . .”); cf. Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198,
2202-03 (2008) (holding that district court not required to provide
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notice of its intent to vary from guideline range under Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32(h), in original sentencing proceedings).
Counsel next questions whether Blunt’s sentence is
reasonable. While the sentence Blunt received is ten months above
the advisory sentencing guideline range, it is within the
applicable statutory maximum sentence. Moreover, our review of the
record leads us to conclude that the district court sufficiently
considered the statutory factors and explained its reasons for
imposing a sentence above the advisory guideline range. See Gall,
128 S. Ct. at 597. We therefore find that the sentence imposed
upon revocation of supervised release is not plainly unreasonable.
See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-39 (4th Cir. 2006)
(providing standard), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1813 (2007); see
also United States v. Finley, __ F.3d __, __, 2008 WL 2574457, at
*5, *9 (4th Cir. June 30, 2008) (No. 07-4690).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment revoking
Blunt’s supervised release and imposing a twenty-four-month
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform the client, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If the client requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
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withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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