Benson v. Thompson Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-2285
TRUDY BENSON,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
and
LYNN MIMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMPSON CADILLAC-OLDSMOBILE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 06-2325
TRUDY BENSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
LYNN MIMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMPSON CADILLAC-OLDSMOBILE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:04-cv-00237-F)
Argued: May 14, 2008 Decided: July 23, 2008
Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and Jackson L. KISER,
Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Lyn Karen Broom, TEAGUE, ROTENSTREICH, STANALAND, FOX &
HOLT, LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Thompson Cadillac-
Oldsmobile, Inc. Anthony Mark Brannon, HAIRSTON, LANE, BRANNON,
PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Trudy Benson. ON BRIEF: Paul A.
Daniels, TEAGUE, ROTENSTREICH, STANALAND, FOX & HOLT, LLP,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Thompson Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc.
James E. Hairston, HAIRSTON, LANE, BRANNON, PLLC, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Trudy Benson.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Defendant Thompson Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc. (“TCO”) appeals
from an adverse judgment, entered after a jury trial conducted in
the Eastern District of North Carolina, in favor of plaintiff Trudy
Benson on a hostile work environment claim pursued under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 In particular, TCO contends that
the district court erred in (1) denying its motion for judgment as
a matter of law; (2) awarding back pay; and (3) awarding attorneys’
fees. See Benson v. Thompson Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., No. 5:04-
cv-00237-F (E.D.N.C. July 18, 2006) (denying TCO’s motion for
judgment as matter of law, granting Benson’s motion for back pay,
and denying her motion for front pay) (the “Order”); Benson v.
Thompson Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., No. 5:04-cv-00237-F (E.D.N.C.
Oct. 31, 2006) (awarding attorneys’ fees and calculating back pay
award) (the “Award”).2 Benson has cross-appealed, contending that
the court erred in declining to award front pay. As explained
below, we are satisfied that the district court properly resolved
these contentions, and thus affirm on the reasoning of its Order
and Award.
1
The district court awarded summary judgment to TCO on
claims asserted by a second plaintiff, Lynn Mims, who has not
appealed.
2
The Order is found at J.A. 1353-90, and the Award is found
at J.A. 1502-18. (Citations to “J.A. __” refer to the contents of
the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.)
3
I.
A.
Benson was employed by TCO, an automobile dealership in
Raleigh, North Carolina, from approximately March 15, 2001, until
April 1, 2003, after having worked as a mortgage lender for sixteen
years at a bank located near the dealership.3 Benson was first
hired by TCO as a sales staff member and later promoted to Finance
and Insurance (“F&I”) manager. When Benson was hired in the sales
department, she was the only female employed in such a position at
TCO. Benson excelled in her sales position and, on April 15, 2002,
became the first female F&I manager at TCO.
Despite her success at TCO, Benson had a difficult
relationship with certain of her co-workers — specifically Dallas
Britt, another F&I manager, and Wes Smith, the sales manager. As
explained more fully in the Order, Britt exhibited a bad attitude
toward women in the workplace — exemplified by his habit of
referring to women in authority as “bitches.” Britt also indicated
to Benson that he opposed her promotion to F&I manager and would
have preferred that a former male employee be hired for the
position. Although equal to Benson in terms of authority, Britt
threatened to fire Benson and told her that he was responsible for
3
We view the trial evidence in the light most favorable to
Benson, as the prevailing party, and draw all reasonable inferences
in her favor. A Helping Hand, LLC v. Balt. County, 515 F.3d 356,
365 (4th Cir. 2008).
4
personnel decisions at TCO. Benson said that Britt prevented her
from receiving important training during her transition to the F&I
department and had demonstrated a pattern of blaming her for his
errors.
Similarly, Smith, TCO’s sales manager, attempted to exercise
supervisory authority over Benson several times a week, despite the
fact that he and Benson were considered as equals within TCO’s
corporate structure. Benson demonstrated at trial that Smith had
humiliated her in front of a long-time customer and told her, on
another occasion, that she was fired. Benson explained that,
although Smith was rude to everyone at TCO, his behavior was worse
toward its few female employees.
Although Benson did not complain to TCO management after every
hostile incident, she did bring her problems with Britt and Smith
to the attention of TCO’s management on several occasions. For
example, Benson testified that
I did talk to Mr. Campbell[, TCO’s general manager,] on
occasions and Mr. Campbell would redirect my attention to
his focus for my future at Thompson. He would always say
to me, Trudy, why do you let these guys get to you? You
know, you’ve got a future here. I see you being —
moving on up to a sales manager. One day you may even
have my job. Don’t . . . listen to them. He said
they’re envious of you, you’ve already accomplished more
than they’ll ever accomplish.
J.A. 506. Benson also testified that she had complained to
Campbell that “you’ve got a boys club,” a report that offended
Campbell. Id. at 519. Benson believes that this complaint to
5
Campbell “started leading to my termination.” Id. Benson further
testified that “when I went to [Campbell] one day, he said Trudy,
you don’t want to be known as someone who can’t get along with
their peers. So, I thought, okay, I’ll handle it on my own. And
I tried . . . but it got worse and worse.” Id. at 520. At some
point Benson ceased complaining to Campbell, especially regarding
her problems with Britt. This was so because Benson found out that
Britt and Campbell were partners in an outside business venture and
knew that they were close friends. Benson also testified that she
brought her concerns to the attention of Hank Thompson, one of
TCO’s owners, after a particularly upsetting incident with Smith.
On April 1, 2003, Campbell informed Benson that he had to
terminate her employment with TCO because she was not working out
as an F&I manager and because of a straw purchase deal that Benson
allegedly approved. Campbell explained that TCO was concerned
about the straw purchase and its potential effect on TCO’s primary
lender. Benson testified that she was shocked by her termination
and that she had no knowledge of the nature of the straw purchase.
B.
On July 7, 2003, Benson filed a charge against TCO with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), alleging,
inter alia, sex discrimination. On November 21, 2003, the EEOC
notified Benson of her right to sue TCO. On February 23, 2004,
Benson filed a complaint against TCO in the Superior Court of Wake
6
County, North Carolina, and TCO removed the case to the Eastern
District of North Carolina on April 6, 2004. With the district
court’s permission, Benson filed an amended complaint on October
29, 2004, alleging that TCO’s treatment of her violated Title VII.
Specifically, Benson alleged that by “engaging in the
discriminatory acts, practices and conduct described above, TCO has
condoned and/or failed to prevent the maintenance of a sexually .
. . hostile work environment, discriminated against the Plaintiff
in the terms and/or conditions of her employment on the basis of
her sex . . . and retaliated against [her] for complaining about
the discrimination practiced by TCO.” J.A. 37.
TCO moved for summary judgment on December 7, 2005. While the
motion was pending, TCO also moved to dismiss Benson’s Title VII
claims on the basis of certain discovery violations. On March 16,
2006, the district court denied TCO’s summary judgment motion and
its motion to dismiss. See Mims v. Thompson Cadillac-Oldsmobile,
Inc., No. 5:04-cv-00237-F (E.D.N.C. Mar. 16, 2006) (the “Pretrial
Order”).4 However, the court barred Benson “from introducing any
information [at trial] that was not revealed during the course of
discovery.” Pretrial Order 26. The matter proceeded to a jury
trial in April 2006.
At the conclusion of Benson’s trial evidence, TCO moved,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, for judgment as a
4
The Pretrial Order is found at J.A. 328-354.
7
matter of law. The district court granted the motion with respect
to Benson’s request for punitive damages, but reserved ruling on
the balance of the motion until the close of all the evidence.
When TCO renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law at the
close of the evidence, the court denied the motion. The jury
thereafter returned a verdict in favor of Benson, awarding $100,000
in compensatory damages on her sexually hostile work environment
claim.5 The trial court entered judgment accordingly, requested
the parties to submit briefs regarding TCO’s renewed post-trial
motion for judgment as a matter of law, and requested a brief from
Benson regarding back pay. Benson thereafter moved for back pay,
front pay, and interest. TCO submitted another motion and
memorandum on the issue of judgment as a matter of law, by which it
also requested, in the alternative, a remittitur or a new trial.6
On July 18, 2006, the district court entered its Order —
denying TCO’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, but granting
a remittitur of the compensatory damages award to $50,000. By the
5
Because Benson, by way of her pretrial submissions and
proposed jury instructions, led the district court to believe that
she was pursuing only her sexually hostile work environment claim,
the court declined to submit her claims of sexually discriminatory
discharge and retaliation to the jury.
6
Although TCO referred to its post-trial motion as a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we use the terminology of
the present Rule 50 — as used by the district court in its Order
— and refer to the post-trial motion as one for judgment as a
matter of law.
8
Order, the court also granted Benson’s motion for back pay and
denied her motion for front pay. The Order directed Benson to file
a response to the remittitur ruling and requested documentation
regarding earnings in order to make a calculation of back pay.
Benson accepted the remittitur on July 21, 2006, and the court
issued the Award on October 31, 2006, awarding Benson $111,148.76
in back pay, $60,417.25 in attorneys’ fees, plus pre-judgment
interest on her back pay award, and post-judgment interest on the
compensatory damages award.
Final judgment was entered on November 1, 2006. Benson has
timely appealed, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
II.
A.
On appeal, TCO first contends that the district court erred in
denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law because Benson
had presented insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find
in her favor on the sexually hostile work environment claim. We
review de novo a district court’s ruling on a Rule 50 motion for
judgment as a matter of law. ABT Bldg. Prods. Corp. v. Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 99, 113 (4th Cir. 2006). “Pursuant to Rule
50, the issue for assessment on appeal is whether there was a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury, viewing
9
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
to find for that party.” Id. Judgment as a matter of law is
warranted only when “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable jury to find for [the nonmoving] party on
that issue.” DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 297 (4th
Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In order to establish her Title VII claim for a hostile work
environment, Benson was obligated to show (1) that she was the
recipient of unwelcome conduct; (2) that such conduct was based on
her gender; (3) that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter her conditions of employment and created an abusive work
environment; and (4) that the conduct was imputable to TCO. Conner
v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 192 (4th Cir.
2000). By its Order, the district court ruled that Benson had
presented sufficient evidence of her hostile work environment
claim. First, the court recognized that Benson had made complaints
to Campbell and others, and that “[b]ased upon her testimony, the
jury was presented with sufficient evidence from which it could
conclude that Plaintiff Benson did not welcome her treatment from
Smith and Britt.” Order 14. Second, the court determined that
Benson had presented sufficient evidence that the unwelcome conduct
was premised on her gender, concluding that Britt’s derogatory
comments about women in authority, his comments to Benson about her
promotion to F&I manager, and other conduct, “viewed in light of
10
[Britt’s] apparent hostility towards women, supports the jury’s
determination that she was subjected to hostile conduct that was
predicated on her gender.” Id. at 15. Next, the court determined
that Benson had established that she had been subjected to severe
and pervasive harassment. Specifically, the court concluded that,
under the evidence,
such conduct occurred frequently throughout her tenure as
F&I Manager, [and] this court cannot allow Defendant
TCO’s motion on the basis that Plaintiff was only
subjected to isolated incidents of offensive behavior.
Rather, based on Plaintiff’s general testimony there was
sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude
that Plaintiff was subjected to frequent, humiliating
conduct which interfered with her work performance.
Id. at 17-18. Finally, in assessing the evidence regarding
Benson’s complaints to Campbell and Thompson, the court concluded
that Benson had “introduced sufficient evidence from which the jury
could find that TCO had actual or constructive knowledge of the
hostile work environment.” Id. at 19.
Having carefully assessed the well-reasoned Order and the
contentions of the parties in this appeal, we are satisfied that
the district court did not err in sustaining the jury award (as
remitted). See Order 11-19.
B.
TCO next contends that the district court erred in making an
award of back pay to Benson, arguing that she failed to mitigate
damages and that the back pay award exceeded the calculations
Benson provided in discovery. We review a district court’s
11
rulings concerning a back pay award for abuse of discretion.
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 651 (4th
Cir. 2002).
Benson requested a back pay award in the sum of $140,000,
based on her approximate annual salary of $70,000 for a two-year
period. In its Order, the court rejected TCO’s contention that
Benson should be denied back pay because of her failure to mitigate
damages, observing that TCO, as the employer, bore the burden of
proving a failure to mitigate. Order 31 (citing Martin v. Cavalier
Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1358 (4th Cir. 1995)). The court
recognized that “from April 21, 2003, until March 18, 2004,
Plaintiff Benson submitted applications for approximately eighty-
two separate positions,” including F&I manager positions at
automobile dealerships, as well as positions at banks, restaurants,
and retail businesses. Id. at 32. The court concluded that,
“[g]iven Plaintiff’s numerous job applications to a variety of
employers, the court cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s efforts were
insufficient to mitigate damages.” Id.
The district court also rejected TCO’s contention that the
Pretrial Order — barring Benson from introducing any evidence that
was not revealed during discovery — precluded an award of back
pay. Concluding that TCO was using the Pretrial Order as “a sword,
not a shield,” the court observed that it had previously denied
TCO’s motion to strike Benson’s claims for damages or, in the
12
alternative, to dismiss the complaint. Order 28-30. Relying on
Supreme Court precedent, the court observed that, in Title VII
actions, “‘backpay should be denied for reasons which, if applied
generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of
eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making
persons whole for injuries suffered from past discrimination.’”
Id. at 29 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421
(1975)). The court then recognized that “‘[t]o deny backpay
because a particular cause has been prosecuted in an eccentric
fashion, prejudicial to the other party, does not offend the broad
purposes of Title VII.’” Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at
424). Thus, the court granted Benson’s request for back pay.
Although the district court made a back pay award, it directed
Benson by its Order to file evidence of her earnings in 2005, and
from January 2006 until April 18, 2006, for the purpose of
determining the amount thereof. In its Award, the court
reconsidered its request for such information, explaining that,
[u]pon further reflection, the court is inclined to agree
with [TCO]. Although the court does not agree that an
award of backpay should be denied outright, the court
does agree that [Benson] should not be able to rely upon
information and documents that were not produced during
discovery. Indeed, that is the essence of the court’s
[Pretrial Order] . . . whereby the court prohibited
[Benson] from introducing any evidence at trial that was
not produced during discovery. . . . Accordingly,
[Benson] may only recover backpay for the time period for
which she provided evidence of earnings at trial: April
1, 2003, until December 31, 2004.
13
Award 4. As a result, the court calculated Benson’s back pay award
predicated on the period from April 1, 2003, to December 31, 2004,
and awarded her back pay in the sum of $111,148.76. Id. at 7.
After assessing the record and the contentions of the parties,
we are satisfied that the back pay award should be affirmed on the
careful reasoning of the district court. See Order 25-34; Award 2-
7.
C.
TCO’s final contention on appeal is that the district court
erred in granting Benson her an attorneys’ fee award in the sum of
$60,417.25. We review an award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of
discretion. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2002).
In this regard, TCO first argues that, because the court should
have overturned the jury verdict, its award of attorneys’ fees
should also be reversed. Because we today sustain the jury
verdict, see supra Part II.A, we readily reject this contention.
TCO also contends, however, that even if the evidence
supported the verdict, the court nonetheless erred in making the
award of attorneys’ fees because the novelty of this case and the
skill required to pursue it did not justify the time and labor
expended by Benson’s lawyers. In particular, TCO takes exception
to compensating two of Benson’s lawyers to “sit at counsel table
during the trial of this case,” proposing instead significant
14
reductions in the reasonable time that should be compensated for
those attorneys. Br. of Appellant 53.
In making the attorneys’ fee award, the district court
carefully examined, as it was obligated to do, several applicable
factors. See Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1075 n.2 (4th Cir. 1986)
(outlining twelve factors which should guide court’s discretion in
calculating fee award, including time and labor required and
novelty and difficulty of questions presented). In its Award, the
district court carefully assessed the relevant aspects of the
factors spelled out by our precedent. It thus determined the
reasonable amount of time expended by the lawyers in handling the
case, as well as the reasonable rates to be applied in making an
award.
The Award also addressed TCO’s contention that the number of
plaintiff’s attorneys involved, especially during the trial, was
excessive and unreasonable. Explaining that Benson was represented
by only one attorney in much of the litigation and that two
additional lawyers entered appearances just before trial, the court
“agree[d] with [TCO] that given the nature of the case, it is
excessive to request attorneys’ fees for three attorneys.” Award
9. Concluding that one of Benson’s lawyers played a “limited role”
in the litigation, “almost exclusively related to the trial,” the
court disallowed the fees of one of her three lawyers. Id. In the
course of its analysis, the court also reduced the number of
15
compensated hours for the other attorneys and reduced the hourly
rate charged by one of them, finally arriving at a total award of
$60,417.25. Id. at 12-16.7
After a thorough review of the record and the Award, we are
unable to disturb the district court’s exercise of its discretion
in this regard. See Award 7-16.
D.
Finally, in her cross-appeal, Benson contends that the
district court erred in declining to make an award of front pay.
Benson asserts that she was fifty-nine years old at the time of
judgment and would have worked at TCO until she was at least
seventy (an additional eleven years), had she not been terminated
for discriminatory reasons. Accordingly, Benson requested front
pay in the sum of $70,000 per year for eleven years. As with back
pay, we review a district court’s rulings regarding front pay for
an abuse of discretion. See Dennis, 290 F.3d at 651.
In its Order, the district court declined to make an award of
front pay to Benson, determining that such an award would be
“unduly speculative.” Order 36. The court concluded that “[n]o
proof was submitted . . . as to Plaintiff Benson’s work expectancy,
the relative success of her business in 2005 or 2006, or the growth
potential for business.” Id. Due to the “utter lack of evidence”
7
The Award reduced the fees requested by Benson from $89,970
to $60,417.25.
16
on the issue, the court thus denied Benson’s request for front pay.
Id.We have carefully examined this issue as well, and we are also
content to affirm the district court’s front pay ruling in favor of
TCO, as explained in the Order. See Order 34-37.
III.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we affirm on the basis of the
district court’s well-reasoned Order and Award.8
AFFIRMED
8
TCO also asserts on appeal that the district court abused
its discretion in permitting Emanuel Joyner, one of Benson’s
witnesses, to testify. After closely examining the record and the
parties’ assertions, we are also satisfied that this contention is
without merit.
17