United States v. West

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4757
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LETRISTA L. WEST,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (3:06-cr-00412-JRS)
Submitted: July 31, 2008 Decided: September 8, 2008
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James T. Maloney, MALONEY & DAVID, P.L.C., Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Brian L.
Whisler, Assistant United States Attorney, Patrick Robinson, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Letrista L. West appeals from her conviction for bank
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) (2000), and aggravated
identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2000). West
challenges whether sufficient evidence existed to support her
convictions and whether the district court erred in admitting
evidence of other acts of misconduct as res gestae and under Fed.
R. Evid. 404(b). Finding no error, we affirm.
An indictment charged West with bank fraud based on
opening an account with, and the negotiation of a loan from,
SunTrust Bank. The second count, for aggravated identity theft,
was based on the information furnished for the loan. In addition,
the Government sought to introduce evidence of uncharged criminal
activity as res gestae of the crime and under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
The Government sought to introduce evidence that West rented an
apartment in the name of Lourdes Santiago; West obtained a
Citicards credit card in the name of Lourdes Santiago; West
obtained a post office box for the purpose of receiving mail in the
name of Lourdes Santiago; and West opened an account with Dominion
Virginia Power in the name of Lourdes Santiago for the apartment
address and attempted to open an account in the name of her
daughter using Santiago’s information. West moved to exclude the
evidence, arguing that under either res gestae or Rule 404(b), the
Government would need to directly link her as the person furnishing
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Santiago’s information. The court denied the motion. Prior to
closing arguments, West unsuccessfully moved for a judgment of
acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. The jury found West guilty on
both counts, and she received a fourteen-month sentence on count
one and a consecutive twenty-four month sentence on count two.
On appeal, West argues that the district court erred in
admitting the Government’s requested evidence of other crimes and
that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions.
West argues that the district court erred in admitting the evidence
of other crimes because there was an insufficient nexus between
West and the acts and the probative value of the information was
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
This court reviews a district court’s ruling on
admissibility for abuse of discretion. United States v. Queen, 132
F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 1997). The court “will not vacate a
conviction unless [it] find[s] that the district court judge acted
arbitrarily or irrationally.” United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247,
1252 (4th Cir. 1993). Evidence of other acts is not admissible to
prove bad character or criminal propensity, but such evidence is
admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. See Fed.
R. Evid. 404(b); Queen, 132 F.3d at 994-95. Rule 404(b) is an
inclusive rule, allowing evidence of other crimes or acts except
those which tend to prove only criminal disposition. Queen, 132
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F.3d at 994-95; United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th
Cir. 1988). Evidence of prior acts is admissible under Rules
404(b) and Fed. R. Evid. 403 if: (1) the evidence is relevant to
an issue other than the general character of the defendant,
(2) necessary, (3) reliable, and (4) the probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value.
Queen, 132 F.3d at 997. An acceptable purpose for evidence of
other crimes is to prove the immediate context, or res gestae, of
the case. See United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir.
1980). Other bad acts are admissible when they are intimately
connected with and explanatory of the crime charged so that their
proof is appropriate to complete the story of the crime. Id.; see
United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1466 (4th Cir. 1995).
West argues that the fact that Santiago’s information was
furnished to establish credit, a lease, and a utilities account
does not necessarily demonstrate that she was the person who
furnished the information. Considering the entirety of the
evidence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence. See Queen, 132 F.3d at 995.
West advances a similar theory in arguing that there was
insufficient evidence to support the convictions. An appellate
court should affirm a conviction challenged for sufficiency of the
evidence if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
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essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v.
Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir. 1996). A defendant
challenging a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence bears a
“heavy burden,” United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239, 1245 (4th
Cir. 1995), and “a decision [to reverse for insufficient evidence]
will be confined to cases where the prosecution’s failure is
clear.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (footnote
omitted). An appellate court must “consider circumstantial as well
as direct evidence, and allow the government the benefit of all
reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be
established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th
Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
To prove bank fraud, the Government had to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that West
knowingly execute[d], or attempt[ed] to execute, a scheme
or artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets,
securities, or other property owned by, or under the
custody or control of, a financial institution, by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises.
18 U.S.C. § 1344. The elements of aggravated identity theft, 18
U.S.C. § 1028A, are: (1) knowing use, possession, or transfer,
without lawful authority, of the means of identification of another
person and (2) that such conduct occurred during and in relation to
a felony enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c). See United States v.
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Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 215 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 366(2006). In turn, § 1028A(c)(5) defines an enumerated felony to
include “any provision contained in chapter 63 (relating to mail,
bank, and wire fraud).”
After thoroughly reviewing the entire record, we conclude
that in this case there was more than sufficient evidence to
sustain the jury’s verdict. There were numerous indicators that
West was connected to the fraudulent furnishing of Santiago’s
information to obtain the loan and account from SunTrust Bank. We
therefore affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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