United States v. Snyder

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-5090
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
FRANK D. SNYDER,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 04-5122
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
STEFAN VALENTI MOSLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge. (CR-
03-194)
Submitted: April 26, 2006 Decided: June 9, 2006
Before LUTTIG,1 MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
No. 04-5090 affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded; No.
04-5122 affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Elita C. Amato, Washington, D.C., Joseph J. Gigliotti, Silver
Spring, Maryland, for Appellants. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Deborah Johnston, Chan Park, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
1
Judge Luttig was a member of the original panel but did not
participate in this decision. This opinion is filed by a quorum of
the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
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PER CURIAM:
Frank D. Snyder and Stefan Valenti Mosley appeal their
convictions and sentences for conspiracy to distribute narcotics in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2000).
Mosley also appeals his conviction and sentence for being a felon
in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2000). Finding no reversible error with Mosley’s conviction and
sentence, we affirm. We affirm Snyder’s conviction, but we vacate
his sentence and remand for resentencing in light of United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
Snyder first claims that the district court erred in
denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. We review the
denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. United
States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 136 (4th Cir. 2001). A verdict
must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view
most favorable to the Government, to support it. Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Substantial evidence is defined as
“that evidence which ‘a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Newsome, 322
F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94
F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir. 1996)). In resolving issues of
substantial evidence, we do not weigh evidence or reassess the
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factfinder’s assessment of witness credibility. United States v.
Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 2002).
To prove conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000), the
Government must prove an agreement to violate a federal drug law,
the defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and the defendant’s
willing participation. United States v. Strickland, 245 F.3d 368,
384-85 (4th Cir. 2001). A defendant may be convicted of conspiracy
without knowing all the conspiracy’s details, as long as he joins
the conspiracy understanding its unlawful nature and willfully
joins in the plan on at least one occasion. Burgos, 94 F.3d at
857. Once the existence of a conspiracy is established, only a
slight link between a defendant and the conspiracy is needed to
support a conviction. United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1147
(4th Cir. 1992). The knowledge and participation elements of
conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Strickland,
245 F.3d at 385.
While Snyder concedes the existence of a drug conspiracy
led by Mosley, he claims the evidence of his drug activity does not
link him to Mosley’s conspiracy. However, the Government presented
sufficient testimonial and written evidence to prove that Snyder
participated in the conspiracy. The Government also presented
sufficient evidence that Snyder possessed cocaine on or around
February 24, 2003. The district court correctly denied Snyder’s
motion for judgment of acquittal.
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Snyder also contends the district court erred when it
denied his motion for severance. We review the denial of a
pretrial ruling on a motion for severance for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Rivera, 412 F.3d 562, 571 (4th Cir. 2005).
Generally, individuals indicted together should be tried together
and “[a] defendant is not entitled to severance merely because
separate trials would more likely result in acquittal, or because
the evidence against one defendant is not as strong as that against
the other.” Strickland, 245 F.3d at 384. A defendant must instead
“show prejudice . . . [c]onvictions should be sustained if it may
be inferred from the verdicts that the jury meticulously sifted the
evidence.” United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir.
1987).
Snyder claims that evidence only related to Mosley
prejudiced the jury against him. However, Snyder is unable to
prove any actual prejudice and only claims the potential prejudice
of the jury grouping him together with Snyder’s actions. Claims of
potential prejudice generally are addressed through limiting
instructions to the jury. See Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S.
534, 539 (1993); United States v. Hayden, 85 F.3d 153, 160 (4th
Cir. 1996). The district court specifically instructed the jury to
deliberate upon each defendant and each count separately. Snyder
did not suffer prejudice simply because the evidence was stronger
against Mosley than against him. See Strickland, 245 F.3d at 384;
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United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1999). The
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Snyder’s
motion for severance.
Snyder next claims that the district court erred when it
admitted evidence of two incidents in 1998. We review a district
court’s decision regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734,
744 (4th Cir. 1996). Such discretion is abused only when a
district court has acted “arbitrarily or irrationally.” United
States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 974 (4th Cir. 1994).
At trial, a police detective testified that in October
1998 he observed Snyder participating in hand-to-hand drug
transactions near Burnside Avenue in Palmer Park, Maryland.
Another police officer testified that in November 1998 during a
traffic stop on a car driven by Snyder he observed cocaine stuck to
the passenger side door. Snyder objected to this evidence as
inadmissable prior bad acts evidence under Fed. R. Crim. P. 404(b).
Rule 404(b) only applies to acts extrinsic to the crime charged.
Where testimony is admitted as to acts intrinsic to the crime
charged, and is not admitted solely to demonstrate bad character,
it is admissible. United States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 88 (4th Cir.
1996). Acts are intrinsic when they are “inextricably intertwined
or both acts are part of a single criminal episode or the other
acts were necessary preliminaries to the crime charged.” Id. The
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indictment charged an ongoing narcotics conspiracy from 1998 to
2003 involving the sale of cocaine on the streets of Palmer Park.
The evidence places Snyder at a location where drug transactions
were occurring early in the time frame of the conspiracy. The
district court did not abuse its discretion because the evidence
was inextricably intertwined with the drug conspiracy as it arose
out of the same series of transactions as the charged offense.
Snyder and Mosley finally claim that the district court
improperly sentenced them under Booker. In Booker, the Supreme
Court concluded the mandatory manner in which the federal
sentencing guidelines required courts to impose sentencing
enhancements based on facts found by the judge by a preponderance
of the evidence violated the Sixth Amendment. Booker, 125 S. Ct.
at 746, 750. Because they preserved this claim by objecting under
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), our review is for
harmless error. See United States v. Rodriguez, 433 F.3d 411, 415-
16 (4th Cir. 2006).
Mosley claims the district court erred by sentencing him
under the pre-Booker mandatory guidelines framework. While the
district court sentenced him under the then-mandatory sentencing
guidelines, “Booker did nothing to alter the rule that judges
cannot depart below a statutorily provided minimum sentence. . . .
[A] district court has no discretion to impose a sentence outside
of the statutory range established by Congress for the offense of
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conviction.” United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th
Cir. 2005). As Mosley had two prior felony drug convictions, he
was subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment under 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Because the district court sentenced Mosley
pursuant to the mandatory statutory requirement, no error occurred
under Booker.
For Snyder, the jury specifically found drug quantities
of a total of at least five kilograms of cocaine, fifty grams or
more of cocaine base, and one kilogram of PCP. Based on the jury’s
findings, Snyder should only have received a base offense level of
thirty-two under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(4)
(2004). At sentencing, the district court found quantities of
drugs far in excess of the level necessary for a base offense level
of thirty-eight under USSG § 2D1.1(c)(1). The district court also
used judicially found facts not found by the jury to enhance
Snyder’s sentence two offense levels for possession of a firearm
under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). The district court’s factual findings
increased Snyder’s sentencing range from 168 to 210 months to 360
months to life imprisonment. Snyder’s 360 month sentence thus
exceeds the sentence that could have been imposed based only on the
facts found by the jury. In light of Booker, we vacate Snyder’s
sentence and remand the case for resentencing.2 Although the
2
Just as we noted in United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540,
545 n.4 (4th Cir. 2005), “[w]e of course offer no criticism of the
district judge, who followed the law and procedure in effect at the
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sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory, Booker makes clear
that a sentencing court must still “consult [the] Guidelines and
take them into account when sentencing.” 125 S. Ct. at 767. On
remand, the district court should first determine the appropriate
sentencing range under the Guidelines, making all factual findings
appropriate for that determination. See United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying Booker on plain error
review). The court should consider this sentencing range along
with the other factors described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000), and
then impose a sentence. Id. If that sentence falls outside the
Guidelines range, the court should explain its reasons for the
departure as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (2000). Id. The
sentence must be “within the statutorily prescribed range and . . .
reasonable.” Id. at 546-47.
Accordingly, we affirm Mosley’s conviction and sentence.
We affirm Snyder’s conviction. In light of Booker, we vacate
Snyder’s sentence and remand for resentencing. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
No. 04-5090 AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
No. 04-5122 AFFIRMED
time” of Snyder’s sentencing.
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