DocketNumber: Nos. 96-1786, 96-1934
Citation Numbers: 113 F.3d 504
Judges: Carolina, Duffy, Luttig, Williams
Filed Date: 5/14/1997
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/4/2024
Reversed by published opinion. Judge LUTTIG wrote the opinion, in which Judges WILLIAMS and DUFFY joined.
OPINION
The National Labor Relations Board held that petitioner American Protective Services, Inc. unlawfully withdrew its final offer for a collective bargaining agreement prior to acceptance by the Union, because the withdrawal repudiated an agreed-upon ratification procedure and because the withdrawal came at a time when the Union’s vote on ratification was complete. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and deny enforcement of the Board’s order.
I.
In August of 1992, American Protective Services (“the Company”) and the International Union of Security Officers (“the Union”) began collective bargaining over successor agreements for five units of employees for which collective bargaining agreements either had expired or were soon going to expire. The Union declined to accept the Company’s “last, best and final” offers for each of the five units, although it agreed to submit the offers to the employees for votes, with a recommendation that the employees reject the offers. For purposes of this litigation, the Company and the Union stipulated that “[i]t was understood by the parties that, if the employees ratified the agreements, in accordance with the Union’s ratification pro
After the Union’s initial mailing of ratification ballots to the employees, the Union discovered that a significant number of employees had not received ballots. J.A. at 38-39. Even after extending the deadline for receipt of ballots, the Union continued to have problems with the voting. Therefore, the Union’s vice president, Robert Ulreich, requested the assistance of the Company. The Company, although not obligated to do so, agreed to provide mailing labels for all of the employees in the five units and to assist in mailing out the ballots if the Union would agree to certain conditions, including that the ballots would be counted by a state or federal mediator and that they would be counted no later than December 7. The Union agreed to these terms and the parties jointly sent out the ballots on or about November 25.
On Friday, December 4, Stan Ohman, an employee in unit 3, filed a decertification petition to decertify the Union as the collective-bargaining representative for unit 3. The petition stated that there were approximately 200 employees in unit 3 and that the petition was signed by the requisite 30 percent or more of that unit’s employees. Therefore, the Board’s Regional Office docketed the decertification petition.
In response, the Company sent a letter that same day to Union Vice President Ulreich notifying him that the Company was withdrawing its offer for unit 8 but would make a new proposal within ten days. Also that same day, the Company notified the mediator of its withdrawal of the offer and requested that the mediator not count the ratification ballots for unit 3.
The ALJ dismissed the complaint in its entirety, finding that, in light of the decertification movement, it was reasonable for the Company to withdraw its contract offer for the purpose of “considering” whether to
II.
Both Supreme Court dicta and the Board’s own precedent establish that an employer is generally permitted to act upon its good-faith doubts regarding a union’s majority status by withdrawing a contract offer before it is accepted by the union. See Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 1754, 1759, 135 L.Ed.2d 64 (1996) (assuming without deciding that a company can “act on [its] preacceptance doubts” regarding the union’s majority status by “withdraw[ing] its offer to allow it time to investigate while it continue[s] to fulfil its duty to bargain in good faith with the Union”); Loggins Meat Co., 206 NLRB 303, 307-08 (1973) (holding, even in the absence of doubts about the union’s majority status, that the employer’s withdrawal of a collective bargaining agreement offer after the. union voted to accept it but before that acceptance had been communicated did not constitute an unfair labor practice). Therefore, the Board’s ruling in this case can be affirmed only if the particular circumstances surrounding the Company’s withdrawal establish bad faith or a refusal to bargain. The Board concluded that such circumstances exist here because the Company repudiated the ratification agreement and because the Company withdrew its offer at a time when the ratification process was substantially complete because all of the ballots had been cast. In both respects, the Board erred. Moreover, no other special circumstances warrant an exception in this case to the general rule that an employer can withdraw an offer at any time prior to acceptance by the union because of its good-faith doubts regarding the union’s majority status.
There is no support in the record for the Board’s conclusion that the Company abrogated the ratification “agreement” by withdrawing the offer and requesting that the mediator not count the ballots. The ratification agreement provided that the ballots would be counted by a mediator “no later than December 7,” J.A. at 47, and the stipulation of the parties states that “[i]t was understood by the parties that, if the employees ratified the agreements, in accordance with the Union’s ratification procedures, they would enter into a binding contract(s).” J.A. at 47. The Board’s own opinion states that the record does not include a copy of the ratification agreement and that the stipulation of facts does not provide additional clarifying information. J.A. at 47. Thus, the record reflects only that the parties agreed to a procedure by which the Union could accept the offer, and that the parties agreed to enter into a binding contract “if the employees ratified the agreements” according to that procedure. Neither the agreement to have the ballots counted no later than December 7 nor the agreement that the parties would enter a binding contract if the Union did, in fact, accept the offer in any way establishes that the Company bound itself to keep the offer open until the December 7 date. Therefore, the Company did not violate the ratification agreement by withdrawing its offer prior to acceptance.
The Board concedes that abrogation of a ratification agreement “generally will not constitute bargaining in bad faith” because ratification is an internal union matter and not a mandatory subject of bargaining. J.A. at 48. Thus, the Board is forced to rely
The Board’s own precedent in Loggins Meat Co., 206 NLRB 303 (1973), demonstrates that even a withdrawal after a union has voted to accept an offer does not establish bad faith so long as the offer was withdrawn before acceptance was communicated. The only maimer in which the Board can even purport to distinguish the case at hand from Loggins is on the grounds that here the Company had made a ratification agreement and had selected the December 7 deadline. However, as discussed above, the ratification agreement in no way obligated the Company to keep the offer open until December 7, and therefore cannot provide a basis for distinguishing Loggins.
Because an employer is generally permitted to act on its good-faith doubts regarding a union’s majority status by withdrawing a collective bargaining agreement offer prior to acceptance by the union, and because there are no special circumstances suggesting bad faith by the company here, the judgment of the Board is reversed and the cross-petition for enforcement of the Board’s order is denied.
REVERSED.
.On December 14, the Board's Regional Office notified Ohman that his petition included an insufficient number of signatures because there were, in fact, approximately 500 to 600 employees in unit 3, rather than approximately 200 employees as Ohman stated in his decertification petition. The Regional Office gave Ohman until December 18 to obtain the requisite signatures. Although Ohman did obtain the requisite signatures by that deadline, the Regional Office has not processed the petition because of the filing of the instant case. The insufficiency of the original petition does not affect the good faith of the Company’s actions because the Board's Regional Office docketed the petition and, according to the ALJ, "there is no evidence [that the Company] knew the number of employees who had signed the decertification petition and, based on the face of the petition, [the Company] could have believed that a sufficient number of the approximately 200 employees, who Petitioner Ohman stated constituted the bargaining unit, had signed the petition, so as to meet the 30-percent requirement for a unit of approximately 576.” J.A. at 41.
. The Company also withdrew its offers for units 4 and 5, but the legality of the withdrawal for those units is not in issue because it was resolved by settlement agreement. J.A. at 39 n. 6.
. Section 8(a) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;” and “(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).