Victor Fernandes v. Paul Craine

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1298
VICTOR FERNANDES,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
PAUL CRAINE,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD; DALE ANONSEN; JASON HUGGINS,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Stephanie A. Gallagher, Magistrate
Judge. (8:10-cv-00752-SAG)
Submitted: July 15, 2013 Decided: August 20, 2013
Before KING, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael P. Coyle, CHAIFETZ & COYLE, Columbia, Maryland, for
Appellant. Marc P. Hansen, County Attorney, Charles L.
Frederick, Associate County Attorney, Edward B. Lattner, Chief,
Division of Human Resources & Appeals, COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
FOR THE COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Victor Fernandes, having obtained a favorable jury verdict
in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action against police
officer Paul Craine, challenges the district court’s denial of
his request for an extension of time to file a motion for
attorney’s fees. See Fernandes v. Craine, No. 8:10-cv-00752 (D.
Md. Feb. 27, 2013), ECF No. 78 (the “Opinion”). 1 As explained
below, we vacate and remand.
On December 7, 2012, at the conclusion of a trial in the
District of Maryland, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Fernandes on his § 1983 excessive force claim, awarding $12,700
in compensatory damages. Because he was the prevailing party,
Fernandes was entitled to seek attorney’s fees. 2 The applicable
local rule required Fernandes to file any fee motion within
fourteen days of the entry of judgment, which occurred on
December 10, 2012. See D. Md. R. 109.2. The parties agree
that, accounting for the intervening Christmas holiday, the
deadline for submission of such a motion was December 26, 2012.
1
By agreement of the parties, the trial was conducted by a
United States magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
2
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which provides, in pertinent
part, that “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision
of [§ 1983] . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney’s fee.”
3
Fernandes’s lawyer did not learn of the judgment until
December 27, 2012 — one day too late — because the Notice of
Electronic Filing (“NEF”) heralding the judgment had been
diverted to his email system’s “junk mail” folder. 3 On that
date, Fernandes moved for a one-day extension of the deadline,
simultaneously filing his fee request and a memorandum in
support thereof. In his extension motion, Fernandes urged the
district court to find that his neglect in filing a timely fee
motion could be excused under the federal rules.
The district court denied Fernandes’s motions, explaining
that the lawyer’s failure to meet the filing deadline amounted
to nothing more than “run of the mill inattentiveness.” Opinion
10. More specifically, the court observed that Fernandes’s
lawyer, an “experienced litigator,” should have known that the
federal courts generally enter a judgment contemporaneously
with, or shortly following, the return of a verdict. Id.
Therefore, according to the court, the lawyer should have
monitored the status of the case by way of the court’s
electronic docket or by contacting his opposing counsel.
3
On appeal, Craine suggests that the record does not
support the lawyer’s explanation concerning misdelivery of the
NEF. In the proceedings below, however, “Craine [did] not
argue, and [the district court did] not find, that counsel for
Mr. Fernandes acted in bad faith.” Opinion 9.
4
We review the denial of a motion to extend a filing
deadline for abuse of discretion. See Thompson v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 76 F.3d 530, 534 (4th Cir. 1996). “An error
of law by a district court is by definition an abuse of
discretion.” Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144,
150 (4th Cir. 2002).
A party seeking an extension after missing a filing
deadline must demonstrate that failure to act within the
specified time was the result of “excusable neglect.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). Whether neglect is “excusable” has been
described by the Supreme Court as “at bottom an equitable
[inquiry], taking account of all relevant circumstances,”
including the following: (1) the danger of prejudice to the
non-movant; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact
on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including
whether it was in the reasonable control of the movant; and (4)
whether the movant acted in good faith. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co.
v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993).
We have stressed that the third Pioneer factor — the reason
for the delay — is the “most important.” Thompson, 76 F.3d at
534. 4 The sole reason for Fernandes’s tardy submission was the
4
It is apparent that the second Pioneer factor (length and
impact of delay) and the fourth Pioneer factor (good faith) tend
to favor Fernandes. As for the first Pioneer factor
(Continued)
5
email malfunction described above. In Robinson v. Wix
Filtration Corp., LLC, we considered the responsibilities of
counsel under arguably similar circumstances. See 599 F.3d 403(4th Cir. 2010). Because of various computer problems,
Robinson’s lawyer failed to receive electronic notice of the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment prior to its award. On
appeal, we ruled that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Robinson’s motion to vacate the summary
judgment. As we emphasized, however, the critical consideration
was that the lawyer was aware of his computer troubles and made
the “strategic decision” to remain “willfully blind to whether
the opposing side had filed a dispositive motion.” Id. at 409.
Importantly, we declined to impose a “general duty to monitor
dockets,” limiting our ruling to the straightforward conclusion
that “counsel cannot make the calculated choice to take no
action with respect to his electronic inaccessibility . . . and
then avail himself of discretionary relief from the consequences
of that choice.” Id. at 410-11.
In contrast to Robinson, there is nothing in this record
suggesting that Fernandes’s lawyer was aware of any computer
(prejudice), Craine does not appear to have shown that his
ability to respond to the fee motion was compromised by
Fernandes’s one-day delay.
6
problems, that he was willfully blind to the status of the
electronic docket, or that he made a strategic choice to remain
ignorant of the district court’s judgment. Absent such a
circumstance, requiring Fernandes’s lawyer to “stay apprised of
the status of his case” by manually checking the docket would
engender a general duty to monitor — the very obligation
Robinson rejected. See Opinion 10. Thus, on the most important
Pioneer factor, the court contravened our precedent, committing
a legal error that, by definition, constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the district court’s
decision and remand for such other and further proceedings as
may be appropriate. 5 We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials submitted and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
5
Fernandes makes two other contentions on appeal: (1) that
Craine’s subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict reset the time for filing a fee motion, and (2) that the
district court abused its discretion in declining to suspend the
local rules on a showing of good cause. In light of our
disposition of this appeal, we need not reach or assess either
of those theories.
7