Larry Green v. Theodis Beck

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-7279
LARRY K. GREEN, a/k/a Said Abdullah Hakim,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
THEODIS BECK; MICHAEL T. BELL; SANDRA F. THOMAS; PAUL
TAYLOR; CORR OFFICER O'NEAL; GEORGE KENWORTHY,
Superintendent,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (5:10-ct-03003-D)
Submitted: August 20, 2013 Decided: August 27, 2013
Before GREGORY, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Larry Keith Green, Appellant Pro Se. Oliver Gray Wheeler,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Larry Green appeals from the district court’s orders
granting Appellees’ motions to dismiss in part and granting
Appellee O’Neal’s motion for summary judgment in Green’s 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) suit. On appeal, Green pursues only his
claims that (1) Appellees violated his First Amendment rights by
failing to recognize his legal name (Said Abdullah Hakim), which
had been changed for religious reasons, and by failing to issue
him an ID card in that name, and (2) Appellees retaliated
against him for filing grievances regarding these actions.
Addressing primarily the claims against Michael Bell,
Administrator of Pender Correction Institution; Sandra Thomas,
Superintendent of Lumberton Correctional Institution; and Paul
Taylor, Assistant Superintendent of Lumberton, we affirm in part
and vacate in part for the reasons discussed below.
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless, “after accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and drawing all
reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the
plaintiff’s favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot
prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to
relief.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th
Cir. 1999). Although a pro se litigant’s pleadings must be
liberally construed, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007),
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the complaint must contain sufficient facts “to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).
It generally impinges upon a prisoner’s constitutional
rights for prison officials to condition an inmate’s receipt of
prison services upon the forfeiture of a religious right. Ali
v. Dixon, 912 F.2d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1990). “[T]he first
amendment protects an inmate’s right to legal recognition of an
adopted religious name.” Barrett v. Virginia, 689 F.2d 498, 503
(4th Cir. 1982). As a result, an inmate’s First Amendment free
exercise rights are violated if he is “forced to acknowledge his
religiously offensive name” as a precondition of receiving
benefits or services to which he is entitled. Ali, 912 F.2d at
90.
The First Amendment protects religious free exercise
itself, such that it is generally improper for a state actor to
force a person to “‘choose between following the precepts of
[his] religion and forfeiting [governmental] benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of [his] religion
on the other hand.’” Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404
(1963)) (ellipsis omitted). First Amendment injury therefore
occurs whenever an inmate is compelled to forfeit his free
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exercise rights, not simply whenever some further harm befalls
him as a result of his forfeiture. An inmate does not need to
demonstrate that some additional harm befell him subsequent to
being forced to acknowledge a religiously-offensive name; the
fact that he was forced to acknowledge that name is itself the
injury that is relevant to the First Amendment claim. See Ali,
912 F.2d at 90. To succeed on a claim of retaliation, the
prisoner must allege “that the retaliatory act was taken in
response to the exercise of a constitutionally protected right
or that the act itself violated such a right.” See Adams v.
Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994).
The district court dismissed Defendants Bell, Thomas,
and Taylor, finding that Green failed to “plausibly allege[] a
claim for supervisory liability.” Specifically, the court found
that, at most, these Defendants failed to investigate grievances
which is insufficient to state a constitutional claim. A
supervisor can only be held liable for the failings of a
subordinate under certain narrow circumstances. See Love-Lane
v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782-83 (4th Cir. 2004) (no respondeat
superior liability under § 1983); Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d
228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001). Specifically, a plaintiff cannot
maintain a claim against a supervisor unless the plaintiff
alleges “that the supervisor had actual or constructive
knowledge that his subordinate[s were] engaged in conduct that
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posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional
injury” to plaintiff, “the supervisor’s response to the
knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference
to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,”
and “there was an affirmative causal link between the
supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury
suffered by the plaintiff.” Randall v. Prince George’s County,
Md., 302 F.3d 188, 206 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In his amended complaint, Green averred that he mailed
Thomas (the Superintendent of Lumberton) a letter, with
supporting documentation, requesting that his ID be changed to
reflect his legal name. Thomas ignored the letter and then,
together with Bell and Taylor, engaged in retaliation against
Green. Bell personally altered medical records and restrictions
resulting in a rapid decline in Green’s health and a retaliatory
transfer. In addition, the Defendants ordered subordinates
throughout the prison to take various actions against Green.
As an initial matter, we find that the district court
erred in analyzing the issue as one strictly of supervisory
liability. Green clearly alleged personal actions and inactions
on the part of these Appellees, as well as their subordinates.
As such, the district court should also have addressed the issue
of whether Green properly stated a constitutional claim that
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these Appellees violated his First Amendment rights and/or
retaliated against him.
According to Appellees, Green’s name has not been
changed because he did not go through proper channels.
Appellees did not dispute that Green had a constitutional right
to have his legal name on his ID, but they averred instead that
Green should have applied to the Warden or the facility head and
provided supporting documentation. However, this is precisely
what Green alleged that he did. In his amended complaint, he
stated that he made such a request, and the actual letter to
Thomas was filed in Green’s (untimely) response to summary
judgment.
Accordingly, Green averred (and eventually provided
documentary proof) that, after filing numerous grievances
regarding the prison’s failure to recognize his legal name, he
was informed that the prison’s procedure required him to
petition the facility head (Thomas). Green claims that when he
did so, however, Thomas ignored him and then organized Taylor
and Bell to retaliate against him. On the basis of these
allegations, we conclude that Green’s amended complaint states a
claim against Thomas that she violated Green’s First Amendment
rights by maliciously refusing to process his properly supported
request for a name change.
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Regarding Thomas, Taylor, and Bell’s alleged
retaliation, the district court did not err in finding that
Green failed to state a claim with regard to these allegations.
Green did allege that these Appellees worked together to
transfer him and improperly charge him with infractions in
retaliation for Green’s attempt to have his legal name
recognized. However, the only personal actions alleged
regarding retaliation by these Appellees was that Bell altered
medical records in an attempt to have Green transferred.
Besides this action, Green conclusorily alleges that Thomas,
Taylor, and Bell used subordinates to effectuate the retaliation
and to harm Green’s health although he provided no specifics.
While Green averred that he was given the wrong medication, he
noted that it could have been a “mistake.” Green alleged no
statements by Defendants or other evidence purporting to show
that these Defendants were acting together and directing others
to act in retaliation for his request of a name change. Thus,
we find that his allegations of retaliation are speculative and
insufficient to state a claim, and we therefore affirm the
district court’s dismissal of Green’s retaliation claims.
With regard to the remaining Appellees, we affirm the
district court’s orders for the reasons stated by the district
court. Green v. Beck, No. 5:10-ct-03003-D (E.D.N.C. Feb. 14 &
Oct. 31, 2011; May 15, 2012). Based on the foregoing, we vacate
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the district court’s dismissal of Green’s claim that Thomas
violated his First Amendment rights and remand for further
proceedings on this claim. We affirm the remainder of the
district court’s orders. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
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