United States v. Ira Henderson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4040
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
IRA JAMES HENDERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:12-cr-00038-BO-1)
Submitted: September 27, 2013 Decided: October 8, 2013
Before KING, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven H. Jesser, STEVEN H. JESSER, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.C.,
Skokie, Illinois, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United
States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-
McKinney, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ira James Henderson appeals the 180-month armed career
criminal sentence imposed by the district court following his
guilty plea to possession of a firearm after conviction of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9), 924(a)(2) (2006), and possession of a
firearm with obliterated serial number, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(k), 924(a)(1)(B) (2006). On appeal, Henderson
contends that the district court erred in sentencing him as an
armed career criminal. Finding no error, we affirm.
Henderson contends that the district court erred in
counting as a predicate offense for armed career criminal
purposes his District of Columbia robbery conviction, for which
he received a ten-year sentence of imprisonment under the
Federal Youth Corrections Act (“FYCA”), because he was sentenced
as a juvenile, not an adult, and the Government did not prove he
carried a weapon during the crime. * Pursuant to the Armed Career
Criminal Act, a person convicted under § 922(g)(1) who has
sustained three or more prior convictions for violent felonies
or serious drug offenses “shall be . . . imprisoned not less
than fifteen years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A violent felony
*
Henderson does not dispute that he committed the crime or
that a District of Columbia robbery conviction would qualify as
a violent felony if committed by an adult.
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is any crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment,
or “any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or
carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would
be punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an
adult,” that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). “What constitutes a conviction of
[a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment] shall
be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in
which the proceedings were held.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(20) (2006).
“Thus, if the state prosecutes an individual as an adult, . . .
the first part of the ‘violent felony’ definition applies; if
the state prosecutes as a juvenile, then the second part
applies.” United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 156 (4th Cir.
1993).
“The general rule in [the District of Columbia] is
that a person accused of committing a delinquent act before his
or her eighteenth birthday — which act would be criminal if
committed by an adult — is accorded non-criminal treatment in
the Family Division of the Superior Court.” Logan v. United
States, 483 A.2d 664, 667 (D.C. 1984); see D.C. Code § 11-
1101(a)(13) (2001); D.C. Code § 16-2301(3) (2001). We conclude
that there was sufficient evidence in the record from which the
district court could conclude that the District of Columbia
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prosecuted Henderson as an adult, not as a juvenile. We also
conclude that the mere fact that Henderson was sentenced for the
crime under the FYCA does not demonstrate that he was treated as
a juvenile. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433-
34 (1974) (explaining purpose of FYCA); see also id. at 434 n.9
(“The [FYCA] is ordinarily not applied to convicted persons
under the age of 18, who are eligible for sentencing under the
provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act[.]” (citation
omitted)).
Thus, because it is evident that the District of
Columbia prosecuted Henderson as an adult and sentenced him to
more than one year of imprisonment for the robbery, the district
court was not required to find that Henderson used or carried a
weapon during an act of juvenile delinquency. See Lender, 985
F.2d at 156. Moreover, because Henderson has not challenged the
district court’s finding that the robbery qualified as a violent
felony, nor has he challenged the other two convictions included
as predicate offenses, the district court did not err in
sentencing him as an armed career criminal.
Accordingly, we deny Henderson’s pro se motion to
strike the opening brief and to appoint new counsel, and we
affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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