United States v. Woodson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4989
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
NORVEL LEE WOODSON, a/k/a Woody,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Irene C. Berger,
District Judge. (5:09-cr-00191-1)
Submitted: March 25, 2011 Decided: April 11, 2011
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dana F. Eddy, THE EDDY LAW OFFICE, Charleston, West Virginia,
for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney,
John J. Frail, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Norvel Lee Woodson pled guilty to distribution of
cocaine. The district court sentenced him to 151 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Woodson contends that his guilty plea
was involuntary because his attorney was ineffective for failing
to advise him of the consequences of his plea in light of the
applicability of the career offender provisions of the
Sentencing Guidelines. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
In the absence of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea,
this court reviews the validity of the guilty plea pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 for plain error. See United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). As part of the
plea agreement, the Government agreed not to file an information
as to prior convictions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 851 (2006). In
preparing the presentence report, the probation officer
determined that Woodson qualified as a career offender and
therefore the applicable guideline sentencing range was enhanced
to 151 to 188 months.
At sentencing, Woodson objected to application of the
enhancement, noting that counsel had not advised him regarding
the career offender enhancement based on counsel’s mistaken
belief that the Government’s agreement not to file a § 851
information also meant that the career offender guideline would
not apply. The district court overruled this objection, noting
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that the career offender provision and § 851 were entirely
different. The court then sentenced Woodson to 151 months, the
bottom of the applicable guidelines range.
To warrant relief on his claim that counsel’s
ineffective assistance resulted in an involuntary plea, Woodson
must show that counsel’s conduct “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness[,]” and that he was thereby
prejudiced. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694
(1984). To demonstrate prejudice, Woodson must establish “‘a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.’” Hooper v. Garraghty, 845 F.2d 471, 475 (4th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
During the Rule 11 colloquy, the district court
clearly informed Woodson that he was subject to a maximum
sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. Woodson stated that he
understood this penalty. The Rule 11 transcript reveals no
evidence that Woodson was confused by this information. To the
contrary, this information was also stated in Woodson’s plea
agreement, which Woodson signed and acknowledged that he read
and understood. As we explained in United States v. Lambey, 974
F.2d 1389, 1395 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc):
[I]f the information given by the court at the Rule 11
hearing corrects or clarifies the earlier erroneous
information given by the defendant’s attorney and the
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defendant admits to understanding the court’s advice,
the criminal justice system must be able to rely on
the subsequent dialogue between the court and the
defendant.
Woodson bears the burden of demonstrating that he was prejudiced
by any deficiency in his counsel’s performance, and in this
case, he has failed to carry that burden of showing prejudice.
See United States v. Foster, 68 F.3d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1995).
Woodson relies on Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d
15 (4th Cir. 1975), to argue that he was prejudiced by counsel’s
failure to advise him as to the career offender enhancement. In
Hammond, counsel erroneously advised his client that he faced a
90-year sentence, when in reality the client faced, at most, a
55-year sentence. The clerk of the court repeated this error
during the Rule 11 hearing, and this error was not corrected by
the district court. On appeal, we vacated Hammond’s guilty plea
because counsel’s erroneous advice had been “corroborated by the
information supplied by the court[.]” Id. at 19.
In Lambey, the district court provided the defendant
with the correct statement of his sentencing exposure during the
Rule 11 colloquy, thereby correcting the erroneous advice
previously given by the defendant’s counsel. The circumstances
here are aligned with those in Lambey — counsel failed to
provide advice, but the court corrected this failure by
providing Woodson with the correct information during the Rule
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11 colloquy. The holding in Lambey therefore dictates the
outcome of this appeal, and Woodson’s reliance on Hammond is
misplaced.
Finding no prejudice, we need not reach the question
of whether Woodson’s counsel was in fact deficient.
Accordingly, we affirm Woodson’s conviction and sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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