United States v. Robinson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4258
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CARLOS QUANTEL ROBINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:00-cr-00043-FDW-1)
Submitted: January 20, 2010 Decided: February 8, 2010
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Beth Blackwood,
Charlotte, North Carolina; Matthew R. Segal, FEDERAL DEFENDERS
OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Edward R. Ryan, Acting United States Attorney, Amy
E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Quantel Robinson appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
thirty months in prison and six months of supervised release.
On appeal, Robinson claims the district court erred in admitting
hearsay testimony about the quantity of marijuana that he
possessed. Finding no error, we affirm.
In 2000, Robinson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006).
He received a 120-month sentence, followed by three years of
supervised release. In September 2008, about nine months after
Robinson was released from prison, the U.S. Probation Office
submitted a petition alleging Robinson had violated the terms of
his supervision by committing new offenses. The petition, which
followed an August 23, 2008 arrest, stated that Robinson had
been charged with felony possession of marijuana (Violation
One), possession with intent to distribute marijuana (Violation
Two), fleeing and eluding arrest with a motor vehicle (Violation
Three), and resisting a public officer (Violation Four). At the
supervised release revocation hearing, Robinson admitted to
Violations One and Three, and the Government dismissed Violation
Four. Robinson contested only the second violation, claiming
that he possessed marijuana only for personal use.
2
The district court’s decision to admit hearsay
evidence at a supervised release revocation hearing is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d
613, 618 (4th Cir. 2003). Supervised release revocation
hearings are informal proceedings in which the rules of evidence
need not be strictly observed. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3); United
States v. McCallum, 677 F.2d 1024, 1026 (4th Cir. 1982). Thus,
the hearsay nature of evidence does not render its admission
error. Instead, the inquiry focuses on whether the evidence was
sufficiently reliable. McCallum, 677 F.2d at 1026. Hearsay
testimony may be shown to be reliable either by extrinsic
corroborating evidence or indicia of reliability showing the
statement to be inherently reliable. United States v. Huckins,
53 F.3d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1995). However, a court may not
admit unsubstantiated or unreliable hearsay as substantive
evidence at a revocation hearing. Egerstaffer v. Israel, 726
F.2d 1231, 1235 (7th Cir. 1984); Crawford v. Jackson, 323 F.3d
123, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Here, Robinson admitted that he possessed marijuana,
and the investigating officer testified about Robinson’s
behavior and how the marijuana was packaged. The only hearsay
evidence at issue is the officer’s testimony that the state lab
report indicated Robinson possessed 188 grams of marijuana.
Since the exact weight was not at issue, and the investigating
3
officer observed the drugs, we conclude that the district court
did not err in allowing this testimony.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district
court’s judgment revoking Robinson’s supervised release. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4