National Labor Relations Board v. Alpha Associates

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1991
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Petitioner,
versus
ALPHA ASSOCIATES,
Respondent,
versus
UNITE HERE,
Intervenor.
On Petition for Enforcement of an Order of the National Labor
Relations Board. (11-CA-19638; 11-CA-19828)
Argued: May 23, 2006 Decided: August 18, 2006
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, and Joseph R.
GOODWIN, United States District Judge for the Southern District of
West Virginia, sitting by designation.
Petition granted by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Stephen Clay Keim, FORD & HARRISON, L.L.P., Spartanburg,
South Carolina, for Respondent. Jeffrey James Barham, NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Office of the General Counsel, Washington,
D.C., for Petitioner. ON BRIEF: Arthur F. Rosenfeld, Acting
General Counsel, John E. Higgins, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, John
H. Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy
Associate General Counsel, David Habenstreit, Supervisory Attorney,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) petitions for
enforcement of its decision and order finding that Alpha Associates
(Alpha) violated § 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(5) (West 1998), by refusing to bargain
with the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees
(UNITE or union). For the reasons set forth below, we grant the
Board’s petition for enforcement.
I.
Alpha manufactures and sells fabrics and composites for use in
thermal insulation and other products. In the spring of 2001,
Alpha purchased a facility in North Charleston, South Carolina
whose production and maintenance unit employees were represented by
UNITE. On April 10, 2001, a UNITE representative informed Alpha
that UNITE was the longtime representative of those employees and
requested bargaining. Alpha did not respond. On July 2, UNITE
filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging, in part, that Alpha
was a successor employer obliged to recognize and bargain with the
union. See NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272,
278-81 (1972). The charge was withdrawn when Alpha advised the
Board that it had “elected to recognize and bargain with [UNITE].”
J.A. 86.
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Alpha negotiated with UNITE for approximately one year.
During this period, the union filed two additional unfair labor
practice charges against Alpha, both of which it later withdrew.
However, beginning in March 2002, Alpha laid off six employees
without notice or bargaining. Despite Alpha’s failure to bargain
with UNITE regarding the layoffs, Alpha and UNITE continued
negotiations. In July 2002, Alpha granted an unbargained wage
increase. At this point, UNITE filed a fourth unfair labor
practice charge, and bargaining ceased. In January 2003, UNITE
filed yet another charge, this one alleging refusal to bargain.
In March 2003, the Board consolidated the charges and
scheduled a hearing. Before the Board, Alpha conceded the
challenged actions but argued that it had no legal obligation to
negotiate with UNITE because its earlier recognition of the union
was invalid. On May 31, 2005, the Board held that Alpha was
“precluded [under § 10(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(b) (West
1998), and equitable estoppel principles] from challenging either
the validity of its prior voluntary recognition of the Union or the
appropriateness of the recognized unit.” J.A. 103. The Board now
petitions for enforcement of its order.
II.
We must uphold the Board’s factual findings if they are
supported by substantial evidence, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e) (West
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1998); the same is true of its application of the law to the facts,
see WXGI, Inc. v. NLRB, 243 F.3d 833, 840 (4th Cir. 2001).
Equitable estoppel precludes one party from asserting rights
“he otherwise would have had against another when his own conduct
renders assertion of those rights contrary to equity.” Int’l Paper
Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411, 417-18
(4th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the labor
context, equitable estoppel involves four elements: knowledge,
intent, mistaken belief, and detrimental reliance. See Red Coats,
Inc. & Local 82, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 328 N.L.R.B. 205, 206
(1999). When, as here, the employer seeks to withdraw recognition
from a union, the Board additionally considers whether “the
estopped party, by its actions, has obtained a benefit.” Id. at
207 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that
Alpha is equitably estopped from denying the validity of its
recognition of the union.* Alpha responded to the July 2001 unfair
labor practice charge by unambiguously declaring that it had
“elected to recognize and bargain with [UNITE].” J.A. 86. Alpha’s
knowledge and intent are thus clear. It is equally clear that
UNITE relied on this representation to its detriment by withdrawing
the original unfair labor practice charge. And, Alpha benefitted
*
Because we conclude that Alpha is equitably estopped from
challenging its voluntary recognition of UNITE, we need not
consider whether § 10(b) applies.
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from its recognition of the union by avoiding a disruptive union
organizing campaign or costly litigation. Alpha cannot now
challenge its earlier recognition as invalid. As the Board aptly
observed, “the policies of the Act are not served by allowing
[Alpha] to use the process of voluntary recognition to gain a
benefit, only to cast off this process when it does not achieve
what it desires in negotiations.” Id. at 105 (internal quotation
marks & alterations omitted).
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we grant the Board’s petition
for enforcement.
PETITION GRANTED
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