Document Info

DocketNumber: 10-5126

Judges: Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Motz

Filed Date: 4/27/2011

Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-5126
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    TERRY DEWAYNE COMPTON,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Virginia, at Abingdon.   James P. Jones, District
    Judge. (1:02-cr-00098-jpj-pms-1)
    Submitted:   April 15, 2011                 Decided:   April 27, 2011
    Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Brian J. Beck,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Abingdon, Virginia, for
    Appellant.   Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Jennifer
    R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon,
    Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Terry    Dewayne    Compton      appeals    from   the   twenty-one-
    month sentence he received upon the revocation of his supervised
    release.    For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    Compton pleaded guilty in 2002 to knowingly possessing
    stolen mail, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1708
     (2006).                  In 2003,
    Compton was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment and three
    years’ supervised release.             Compton’s supervised release began
    in September 2007.
    In February 2010, Compton’s probation officer filed a
    revocation       petition,     alleging      several     supervised      release
    violations:      (1) the unauthorized use of a debit card belonging
    to   Kristen     Hammonds, 1    in    violation    of    the   prohibition   on
    committing other crimes; (2) unauthorized travel to Texas, in
    violation of the prohibition on leaving the judicial district
    without    permission;    and    (3)    failing    to   appear   in    Dickerson
    County (Virginia) General Sessions District Court, resulting in
    issuance    of   a   warrant,    in    violation   of    the   prohibition   on
    committing further crimes.            These actions also resulted in the
    revocation of Compton’s state probation, for which the Circuit
    1
    Compton used Ms. Hammonds’ debit card at Wal-Mart on two
    occasions, purchasing a total of $175 worth of goods.
    2
    Court      for    Washington      County        (Virginia)     sentenced       Compton    to
    twenty-four months’ imprisonment.
    The probation officer determined that the most serious
    violation         was   a   Grade     B    violation       which,     coupled    with    his
    category VI criminal history, resulted in a policy statement
    range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment.                                See
    U.S.       Sentencing       Guidelines          Manual     (“USSG”)        §§ 7B1.1(a)(2),
    7B1.4(a)         (2003),    p.s..         At    the     revocation     hearing,    Compton
    admitted the alleged violations. 2                       When queried by the court,
    defense counsel agreed that any sentence the court might impose
    would run consecutive to the previously imposed state sentence.
    The    court     found        that     Compton      had    violated     his
    supervised        release,      adopted        the    policy   statement      calculations
    and the resulting sentencing range, and imposed a twenty-one-
    month      sentence.            The   court          ordered   the    sentence    to     run
    consecutive to any previously imposed sentence.                            The court also
    ordered an additional three-year term of supervised release.
    Relying on the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) (2006) factors that
    informed         its    sentencing        decision,      the   court       explained    that
    Compton was a “constant offender” whose mental impairments and
    limited intellectual capabilities made it difficult to deter him
    2
    The parties did not dispute the probation officer’s
    calculations under the relevant Chapter Seven advisory policy
    statements, and no such issues are raised on appeal.
    3
    from       crime.      Thus,    the    court          opined    that   the       objectives      of
    protecting the public from Compton’s crimes and deterring future
    criminal conduct were best met through incarceration.                                     Compton
    timely appealed from the entry of judgment.
    Compton    first    asserts          the     district        court    committed
    reversible          procedural       error    by        failing      to    respond        to    his
    argument for a concurrent sentence.                          Compton further challenges
    the adequacy of the district court’s explanation for imposing a
    consecutive sentence.
    As the parties acknowledge, the “plainly unreasonable”
    standard set forth in United States v. Crudup, 
    461 F.3d 433
    ,
    437-38 (4th Cir. 2006) controls. 3                           This court will affirm a
    sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is
    within        the     governing        statutory             range     and       not      plainly
    unreasonable.           Crudup,       
    461 F.3d at 439-40
    .           “When    reviewing
    whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must
    first      determine        whether   it     is       unreasonable        at    all.”      United
    States       v.    Thompson,    
    595 F.3d 544
    ,       546   (4th    Cir.        2010);   see
    United States v. Moulden, 
    478 F.3d 652
    , 656 (4th Cir. 2007).                                      A
    3
    To the extent that Compton asks this court to revisit the
    standard of review of revocation sentences established in
    Crudup, we decline the invitation.     One panel of this court
    cannot “overrule or reconsider a precedent set by another
    panel.”   United States v. Najjar, 
    300 F.3d 466
    , 486 n.8 (4th
    Cir. 2002).
    4
    supervised        release       revocation        sentence         is         procedurally
    reasonable if the district court considered the Chapter Seven
    advisory policy statements and the § 3553(a) factors applicable
    to the proceeding.            See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e) (2006); Crudup, 
    461 F.3d at 439
    .
    We       reject    Compton’s       challenges     to        the     procedural
    reasonableness of his sentence.                The district court committed no
    procedural      error    in    ordering    that    Compton’s        twenty-one-month
    sentence be served consecutive to his previously imposed state
    sentence.        The policy statement set forth in USSG § 7B1.3(f)
    specifically states that —
    Any term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation
    of . . . supervised release shall be ordered to be
    served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment
    that the defendant is serving, whether or not the
    sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from
    the conduct that is the basis of the revocation
    of . . . supervised release.
    Thus, in imposing a consecutive sentence, the district court
    deferred to this advisory policy statement.                         Such deference,
    while not required, was more than proper.                      See Thompson, 
    595 F.3d at 547
    ; see also Moulden, 
    478 F.3d at 656-57
    .                             We further
    reject Compton’s contention that the district court needed to
    more    fully     explain      why   it    adhered       to   this        clear      policy
    statement,       because      such   a    position       places      an       unwarranted
    obligation      on    sentencing     courts.      See,    e.g.,      Rita       v.   United
    States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356-57 (2007) (“[W]hen a judge decides
    5
    simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so
    will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.”).
    This court recognized in Thompson that it would “be
    hard-pressed       to     find       any        explanation           for       within-range,
    revocation sentences insufficient given the amount of deference
    we   afford    district        courts         when        imposing    these        sentences.”
    Thompson, 
    595 F.3d at 547
    .                    Here, the district court explained
    that the need to protect the public and to deter Compton from
    future    crimes        supported         a     sentence          within        the    properly
    calculated policy statement range.                         Accordingly, we discern no
    procedural error in the district court’s explanation.
    Compton       next    argues             the    sentence       is    substantively
    unreasonable       because      it    is       excessive          given     the       underlying
    criminal conduct.          This argument fails, however, because the
    governing statute expressly restricts the sentencing court from
    considering    the       seriousness           of         the    underlying        conduct      in
    determining the violation sentence.                             See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)
    (enumerating    the      § 3553(a)        sentencing            factors     that      should    be
    considered    in    fashioning        a       revocation         sentence,      but    omitting
    § 3553(a)(2)(A) — the          need       for       the     sentence       to     reflect      the
    seriousness of the offense).                  Rather, the revocation sentence is
    designed to punish the defendant’s failure to abide by the terms
    of his supervised release.                    Crudup, 
    461 F.3d at 438
    .                       Here,
    Compton   admitted        to    six       violations            of   the       terms    of     his
    6
    supervised release, which reflected Compton’s serious disregard
    for his supervision.
    A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if
    the district court stated “a proper basis” for concluding the
    defendant should receive the sentence imposed.             Crudup, 
    461 F.3d at 440
    .    The    court   plainly    did   so   here.    Accordingly,    we
    conclude that the court’s within-policy statement range sentence
    was substantively reasonable.
    For    the   foregoing    reasons,    we   affirm   the   district
    court’s revocation judgment.           We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
    in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    7