Ngassa v. Gonzales

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1182
ROGER NGASSA,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals. (A96-282-705)
Submitted: August 16, 2006 Decided: September 7, 2006
Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bokwe G. Mofor, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner. Peter D.
Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, James A. Hunolt, Senior
Litigation Counsel, Song E. Park, Office of Immigration Litigation,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Roger Ngassa, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) order
affirming without opinion the immigration judge’s order denying
Ngassa’s applications for asylum, withholding from removal and
withholding under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Ngassa
claims he met his burden of proof. He also claims any
discrepancies noted by the immigration judge were minor. In
addition, he claims persons similarly situated to him are being
persecuted. We deny the petition for review.
The INA authorizes the Attorney General to confer asylum
on any refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2000). It defines a refugee
as a person unwilling or unable to return to his native country
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
(2000). An applicant has the burden of demonstrating his
eligibility for asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2006); Gonahasa v.
INS, 181 F.3d 538, 541 (4th Cir. 1999). Credibility findings are
reviewed for substantial evidence. A trier of fact who rejects an
applicant’s testimony on credibility grounds must offer specific,
cogent reasons for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th
Cir. 1989). We accord broad, though not unlimited, deference to
credibility findings supported by substantial evidence. Camara v.
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Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004). A determination
regarding eligibility for asylum is conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings
of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(2000). We will reverse the Board “only if the evidence presented
was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find
the requisite fear of persecution.” Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325
n.14 (4th Cir. 2002). We find the immigration judge’s negative
credibility finding was supported by substantial evidence. We
further find the evidence was not so compelling as to warrant
reversal.
“To qualify for withholding of removal, a petitioner must
show that he faces a clear probability of persecution because of
his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 324 n.13
(4th Cir. 2002) (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984)).
To qualify for protection under the Convention Against Torture, a
petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that “it is more
likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the
proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2006).
Having conducted our review, we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the finding that Ngassa failed to meet these standards.
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We accordingly deny the petition for review. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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