United States v. Amaker

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4330
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MONICA L. AMAKER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. David A. Faber, Chief
District Judge. (2:05-cr-00149)
Submitted: April 26, 2007 Decided: April 30, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Timothy P. Lupardus, Pineville, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, Charleston, West
Virginia, John L. File, Assistant United States Attorney, Beckley,
West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Monica L. Amaker was convicted of
possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine
base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000), possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1); possession with intent to distribute morphine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession with intent to
distribute marijuana for remuneration, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West 2000
& Supp. 2006), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000) and 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(a)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). The district court sentenced
Amaker to 300 months in prison. Amaker timely appealed, asserting
that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress the
drugs and firearm seized when police officers conducted an
investigatory stop.
Amaker asserts that the district court should have
suppressed the evidence because the officers lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop her. We disagree. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968), “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry, 392
U.S. at 30). A court reviewing whether officers had reasonable
suspicion at the time of the stop considers the totality of the
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circumstances and does not evaluate the factors in isolation from
each other. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2002).
In this case, officers were patrolling a high crime area
when they spotted a man counting money in an alley on one side of
a bar and grill. They suspected that a drug transaction either had
just occurred or was imminent. While one officer approached the
man, another officer saw Amaker in the back of an alley on the
opposite side of the bar and grill. The officer was in plain
clothes but had his badge fully displayed from a chain around his
neck. When Amaker saw him, she uttered an expletive and began
running away behind the restaurant toward the other alley. Two
more officers, alerted that Amaker was fleeing, gave chase and
apprehended her.
Reasonable suspicion requires more than a hunch but less
than probable cause and may be based on the collective knowledge of
officers involved in an investigation. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123;
see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985). A
suspect’s presence in an area known for criminal activity, while
insufficient by itself to justify a Terry stop, is a relevant
factor in determining reasonable suspicion, as are other factors
such as flight upon noticing the police. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124;
United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 1993).
Under the circumstances of this case, we find no error in
the district court’s conclusion that the officers had sufficient
articulable suspicion to stop Amaker. See United States v. Rusher,
966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992) (providing standard). Amaker
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argues that there were legitimate reasons for a woman such as
herself to flee from an approaching male as she stood with a Luis
Vuitton purse in a dark alley in a high crime area. However, there
were also non-legitimate reasons for such a person to flee, and the
Constitution permits officers to take ambiguous behavior into
account in determining whether reasonable suspicion to conduct a
Terry stop exists. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125-26; United States
v. Smith, 396 F.3d 579, 583-85 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 545 U.S.
1122 (2005). Accordingly, we affirm Amaker’s convictions. We grant
Amaker’s motion to file an oversized joint appendix and dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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