United States v. Jackson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4976
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
QUINCY FONTAL JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:05-cr-01150-CMC)
Submitted: April 11, 2007 Decided: August 15, 2007
Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John H. Hare, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States
Attorney, Jane B. Taylor, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Quincy Fontal Jackson pled guilty by plea agreement to
possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and (D) (2000) (Count
One), and knowingly using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of
a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
(2000) (Count Two). Jackson reserved the right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, wherein
he argued the evidence seized from his vehicle was obtained after
an illegal detention and questioning and without probable cause.
The district court sentenced Jackson to a total of 106 months of
imprisonment. Jackson appealed, contending the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress because he was detained,
questioned, and searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Finding no error, we affirm.
This court reviews the factual findings underlying the
denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 193
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 134 (2005). The evidence is
construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.
1998).
Trooper Bird lawfully stopped Jackson for following
another vehicle too closely in violation of South Carolina law.
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Observation of any traffic violation, no matter how minor, gives an
officer probable cause to stop the driver. United States v. Hassan
El, 5 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 1993). A stop for a traffic
violation, “does not become unreasonable merely because the officer
has intuitive suspicions that the occupants of the car are engaged
in some sort of criminal activity.” Id. A routine and lawful
traffic stop permits an officer to detain the motorist to request
a driver’s license and vehicle registration, to run a computer
check, and to issue a citation. Id. To further detain the driver
requires a reasonable suspicion on the part of the investigating
officer that criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Brugal,
209 F.3d 353, 358 (4th Cir. 2000).
Jackson contends that Trooper Bird unlawfully detained
him beyond the traffic stop with questions about his travel plans,
his arrest record, and contraband in the vehicle because Bird had
no reasonable suspicion to continue to question him. Trooper Bird
articulated the following reasons why he suspected criminal
activity was afoot: (1) Jackson provided vague information about
the length of his stay in Atlanta; (2) Jackson was driving a rental
car and had been doing so for three weeks; (3) Jackson appeared
nervous and deceptive and would not look Bird in the eye when
answering questions; and (4) Jackson eventually volunteered that he
had a prior drug conviction. Moreover, Bird explained that in his
experience in drug interdiction, Atlanta was a source city for drug
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trafficking and drug traffickers frequently drove rental vehicles.
Therefore, Bird drew an inference based on these observations and
the cumulative evidence that Jackson was carrying contraband.
Nevertheless, Bird did not arrest Jackson at this time,
but instead, merely asked Jackson for consent to search his
vehicle. Jackson gave his consent more than once. As the district
court noted, nothing in the record indicates that Jackson’s consent
was involuntary as Jackson had been arrested more than once and had
experience with the criminal justice system, asked about probable
cause, and told Trooper Bird that he was a businessman. The
circumstances were not coercive, deceptive, or intimidating. The
encounter remained consensual because Jackson voluntarily
cooperated with Trooper Bird. See United States v. Weaver, 282
F.3d 302, 309-10 (4th Cir. 2002). Moreover, Bird did not search
the car but instead called for backup, and the backup officer
conducted a canine search when he arrived. The canine sniff
alerted the officers to the same area of the vehicle twice. A
canine search conducted during a lawful traffic stop that reveals
no information other than the location of contraband does not
violate the Fourth Amendment. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 409 (2005). The positive dog alert also provided probable
cause for the search of Jackson’s vehicle. Id.Accordingly, the district court properly denied Jackson’s
motion to suppress, and we therefore affirm Jackson’s conviction
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and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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