United States v. Cabrera

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4628
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SALVADOR SANTANA CABRERA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00323-WO-1)
Submitted: April 20, 2011 Decided: May 2, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley E. Rand, United States Attorney, Michael F. Joseph,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury found Salvador Santana Cabrera 1 guilty of misuse
of a social security number in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 408(a)(7)(B) (2006) and identity theft in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006). Santana appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal under
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. Santana claims that he was convicted upon
insufficient evidence and that the Government’s theory of the
case fails to meet the legal elements of 42 U.S.C.
§ 408(a)(7)(B). 2 We affirm.
This court reviews a district court’s denial of a Rule
29 motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v.
Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). A defendant
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy
burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir.
1997). The verdict of a jury must be sustained “if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
verdict is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Smith, 451
1
Although he was indicted under the name “Salvador Santana
Cabrera,” the record indicates that the defendant is known by
the surname of “Santana” and we will therefore refer to him as
such.
2
Because Santana’s conviction under 42 U.S.C.
§ 408(a)(7)(B) is necessary to sustain his conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), a reversal of the former would dictate a
reversal of the latter.
2
F.3d at 216 (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is
“evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). An appellate court must be mindful that
“[t]he jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of
the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence
presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “Reversal for insufficient evidence is
reserved for the rare case where the prosecution’s failure is
clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that substantial evidence sustains the
verdict below.
Santana’s legal argument is that using the social
security number assigned to another person in the other person’s
true name does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B). We have
previously stated that “[t]he elements of that offense are that
the defendant (1) falsely represented a number to be her social
security number (2) with the intent to deceive another person
(3) for the purpose of obtaining something of value.” United
States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1152 (4th Cir. 1995).
Under the Government’s theory of the case, Santana
represented himself at a bank as Miguel Santiago, applied for a
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loan naming Santiago as the personal guarantor, and furnished
Santiago’s social security number in conjunction with the
application. Thus, Santana, with the intent to deceive the
bank, falsely represented that the social security number was
assigned to him (that is, his physical person), when in fact it
was assigned to Santiago, in order to obtain a loan. Such
conduct satisfies the elements of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B).
See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 472 F.3d 1038, 1039-40 (8th
Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United States v. Soape, 169 F.3d 257,
260-61, 269 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Teitloff, 55 F.3d
391 (8th Cir. 1995).
We therefore affirm Santana’s convictions. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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