United States v. Claytor

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5138
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JULIUS CHRISTOPHER CLAYTOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior District
Judge. (CR-05-7)
Submitted: October 25, 2006 Decided: December 5, 2006
Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Weber III, WEBER PEARSON PC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant.
John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney, Edward A. Lustig,
Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Julius Christopher Claytor was convicted by a jury of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000); possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(2000); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000), and was sentenced to a
total of 240 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Claytor raises four
issues. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
First, Claytor argues that the drugs and money found in
his pants pockets should have been suppressed. This court reviews
the district court’s factual findings underlying a motion to
suppress ruling for clear error, and the district court’s legal
determinations de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
699 (1996); United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 275 (4th Cir.
2005). When a suppression motion has been denied, this court
reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government.
United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005).
After having reviewed the transcript of the hearing of the motion
to suppress, the parties’ briefs, and the materials submitted in
the joint appendix, we conclude that the evidence would have been
inevitably discovered by lawful means, and we thus find no
reversible error. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
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Second, Claytor argues that the Government improperly
used race in selecting his jury, in violation of Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Generally, a Batson challenge
consists of three steps: (1) the defendant makes out a prima facie
case of discrimination; (2) the Government offers a race-neutral
explanation; and (3) the trial court decides whether the defendant
has carried his burden and proved purposeful discrimination.
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995). Upon review of the
jury selection transcript, we conclude that the district court did
not clearly err in determining that Claytor did not meet his burden
of proving purposeful discrimination in the jury selection.
Third, Claytor argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and first motion for
a new trial based on insufficient evidence. This court reviews de
novo the district court’s decision to deny a motion for judgment of
acquittal. United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir.
1998). This court reviews the district court’s denial of a motion
for new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Huggins,
191 F.3d 532, 536 (4th Cir. 1999). In evaluating the sufficiency
of the evidence, this court does not review the credibility of
witnesses and assumes that the jury resolved all contradictions in
the testimony in favor of the government. Id.; United States v.
Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989). The reviewing court
must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the prosecution, any reasonable trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). The
reviewing court must consider circumstantial as well as direct
evidence and allow the government the benefit of all reasonable
inferences. United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th
Cir. 1982). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to prove that Claytor
possessed with intent to distribute cocaine; possessed a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; and possessed a firearm as
a convicted felon. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial
of Claytor’s motion for judgment of acquittal and first motion for
a new trial.
Finally, Claytor argues that the district court erred in
denying his second motion for a new trial based on an affidavit
submitted by Monique Preston, in which she recanted portions of her
Grand Jury and trial testimony. When a witness recants testimony
given at trial, a new trial should be granted only when: (1) the
court is reasonably satisfied that the testimony given by a
material witness is false; (2) without the evidence a jury might
have reached a different conclusion; and (3) the party seeking the
new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given
and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until
after the trial. United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 866 (4th
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Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Carmichael, 726 F.2d 158, 160
(4th Cir. 1984) (noting the “[f]indings of the district court made
on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
should not be disturbed except for the most extraordinary
circumstances”). The failure to meet any one of the Wallace test’s
three prongs is fatal. Carmichael, 726 F.2d at 159. Post-trial
recantations of testimony are “looked upon with the utmost
suspicion.” United States v. Johnson, 487 F.2d 1278, 1279 (4th Cir.
1973) (citations omitted). A thorough review of the record reveals
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Claytor’s motion for a new trial. The district court was
reasonably unconvinced by the truthfulness of Preston’s
recantation, and there is no evidence that the jury would have
reached a different conclusion, or that Claytor was taken by
surprise.
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm Claytor’s
conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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