Reaching Hearts International, Inc. v. Prince George's County

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-2281
REACHING HEARTS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY; COUNTY COUNCIL OF PRINCE GEORGE’S
COUNTY, Sitting As The District Council,
Defendants - Appellants.
--------------------------------------
KATHLEEN O. DUGAN; MICHAEL F. DUGAN; DAVID RIDGWAY; MARY
RIDGWAY,
Amici Supporting Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge.
(8:05-cv-01688-RWT)
Argued: January 28, 2010 Decided: March 3, 2010
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: William Walter Wilkins, NEXSEN PRUET, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellants. Ward Baldwin Coe, III, GALLAGHER,
EVELIUS & JONES, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Kirsten E. Small, NEXSEN PRUET, Greenville, South
Carolina; Rajesh A. Kumar, Peggie N. McWhorter, Upper Marlboro,
Maryland, for Appellants. David W. Kinkopf, Brian T. Tucker,
GALLAGHER, EVELIUS & JONES, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee. G. Macy Nelson, Ann MacNeille, LAW OFFICES OF G. MACY
NELSON, Towson, Maryland, for Amici Supporting Appellants.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Reaching Hearts International, Inc. (“Reaching Hearts”), a
Seventh Day Adventist congregation, purchased property in Prince
George’s County, Maryland (“the County”) on which it intended to
build a church and related facilities. The property’s zoning
permitted churches as a matter of right. However, Reaching
Hearts was unable to obtain a change in the sewer and water
classification for portions of the property. The denial of
reclassification effectively prohibited the church’s planned
development of a worship center. Many other properties received
approval for sewer and water reclassifications in 2003 and 2005,
but Reaching Hearts — the only church property — was denied such
a reclassification.
After multiple unsuccessful administrative applications and
appeals, Reaching Hearts filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that the
County had violated its rights under the Equal Protection Clause
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”). 1 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. Reaching Hearts
prevailed on both claims in a seven-day jury trial, obtaining an
1
The relevant facts are adequately summarized in the
district court’s thorough opinion. See Reaching Hearts Int’l,
Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 584 F. Supp. 2d 766 (D. Md.
2008).
3
award of $3,714,822.36 in damages and an injunction against the
County as to future discriminatory treatment. The County filed
a timely appeal and our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
On appeal, the County argues that the district court should
have granted its request for judgment as a matter of law on both
the Equal Protection and RLUIPA claims, or — in the alternative
— that multiple deficiencies in the proceedings below
necessitate a new trial. Because our review of the record
reveals no error requiring reversal, we affirm the judgment of
the district court.
I.
The County’s initial argument that the district court erred
in denying it judgment as a matter of law against Reaching
Hearts is reviewed de novo. 2 Our analysis of this issue is,
however, greatly circumscribed by the applicable standard of
review. See Dotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 292 (4th Cir.
2009). Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate if any
2
Because all aspects of this case are ripe for
adjudication, we reject the County’s jurisdictional argument.
See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1982); Flying
J Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 2008);
see also Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529
U.S. 1, 13 (2000).
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reasonable jury, “viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to” Reaching Hearts, would necessarily find in the
County’s favor. Id. In determining whether the evidence
supports “only one reasonable verdict,” id. (quotation omitted),
we refrain from making “credibility determinations or weigh[ing]
the evidence,” as these are “jury functions, not those of a
judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 150 (2000).
We have reviewed the record, disregarded “all evidence
favorable" to the County that the jury was “not required to
believe,” id. at 151, and cannot say that the district court
erred in denying the County’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law. Viewed in the light most favorable to Reaching Hearts, the
evidence presented at trial of the County’s anti-church animus
was very strong. The evidence thus supports the jury’s
conclusion that (1) the County intentionally discriminated
against Reaching Hearts on a prohibited ground, and (2) the
County imposed or implemented a land use regulation in a manner
that imposed a substantial burden on Reaching Heart’s religious
exercise, without satisfying the standard of strict scrutiny.
Our conclusion in this regard is not altered by the
County’s assertion that the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel barred Reaching Hearts from introducing as
evidence the County’s denial of the 2003 water and sewage
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category change application. Assuming, but specifically not
deciding, that the district court erred in allowing the jury to
consider the denial of the 2003 application, this error was
harmless. “Considering the record as a whole,” in the light
most favorable to Reaching Hearts, “there is overwhelming
evidence” that the County discriminated against the church on
religious grounds. Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Inc., 36
F.3d 336, 356 (4th Cir. 1994). “That evidence would have been
sufficient without” consideration of the County’s denial of the
2003 application, a fact which “almost surely did not affect the
outcome of the case.” 3 Id. (quotation omitted).
The County, in the alternative, contends that multiple
evidentiary and instructional errors by the district court
necessitate a new trial. We disagree. Our review of these
claims, at least to the extent the County’s arguments were
preserved below, is for an abuse of discretion. See Buckley v.
Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306, 317, 322 (4th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 564 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009). Even if we
3
Even if we were to accept the County’s argument that
Reaching Hearts was barred from instituting a RLUIPA claim
because it failed to include this claim in the mandamus action
filed in Maryland state court, but see Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d
820, 824 (5th Cir. 1989), Reaching Hearts also prevailed on its
equal protection claim. Prevailing on that ground is
independently sufficient to support the damages award and
injunctive remedy Reaching Hearts obtained below.
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were to conclude the district court erred on any of the
evidentiary claims the County now argues, reversal is
appropriate only if the County demonstrates sufficient resulting
prejudice. See Buckley, 538 F.3d at 317, 322. Given the
strength of Reaching Hearts’ evidence, the County has failed to
show that any plausible error committed by the district court
was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial, i.e., that
an error-free trial was likely to result in a different outcome
in this case. 4 See Muhammad v. Kelly, 575 F.3d 359, 375 (4th
Cir. 2009).
The County’s arguments relating to the scope of damages and
injunctive relief awarded by the district court are also
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Robles v. Prince
George’s County, 302 F.3d 262, 271 (4th Cir. 2002); Tuttle v.
Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 703 (4th Cir. 1995).
We thus “give the benefit of every doubt to the judgment of the
trial judge.” Robles, 302 F.3d at 271 (quotation omitted).
After considering the evidence and the arguments presented
below, we cannot say that the district court’s remedial rulings
were “outside the range of choices permitted.” Evans v. Eaton
4
The County is “‘entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect
one,’ for there are no perfect trials.” McDonough Power Equip.,
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) (quoting Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973)). In this case, we
are persuaded that the trial was fair.
7
Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, 514 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir.
2008) (quotation omitted).
Thus, having found no reversible error in any of the
challenged actions of the district court, we affirm the judgment
of the district court.
AFFIRMED
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