United States v. Kevin Hall

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4300
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KEVIN HALL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:14−cr−00181−JAG−1)
Argued: January 28, 2016 Decided: April 12, 2016
Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Paul Geoffrey Gill, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Richard Daniel
Cooke, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Acting Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Prior to his sentencing for theft of government property,
Kevin Hall submitted a letter of support to the district court,
apparently from his court-ordered Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor.
The district court relied in part on the letter in giving Hall a
sentence well below the advisory Guidelines range. Days later,
after discovering that Hall had forged the letter, the district
court vacated the original sentence and imposed a harsher
sentence. Hall now challenges the district court’s authority to
modify his sentence. Because of the constraints Congress has
placed on district courts’ ability to modify sentences, we are
obligated to vacate and remand for the reimposition of Hall’s
original sentence.
I.
Kevin Hall pleaded guilty to theft of government property.
During the plea hearing, Hall claimed not to have consumed
alcohol or used illegal drugs for several years. Immediately
after the hearing, he declined a urine test and confessed that
just a week earlier he had consumed alcohol and smoked
marijuana. After accepting Hall’s apology for his dishonesty,
the district court ordered Hall to attend substance-abuse-
prevention meetings and obtain a sponsor.
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Five days before his sentencing hearing, Hall filed a
letter purportedly from his sponsor indicating that Hall was
attending meetings regularly and “working the step program.”
J.A. 68. The district court, believing that Hall’s criminal
behavior was strongly influenced by alcohol abuse, relied on the
sponsor’s letter as proof that Hall was putting his addiction
behind him. Accordingly, Hall received a light sentence.
Despite an advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of fifteen
to twenty-one months’ imprisonment, the court sentenced Hall to
three years of probation, with a special condition of thirty
days of intermittent confinement and three months of home
detention with electronic monitoring.
Within a week of sentencing, the district court discovered
that Hall had forged the letter from his sponsor. The court
entered an order vacating the sentence and a show-cause order
for criminal contempt. In a written opinion justifying the
order to vacate, the district court held that it was authorized
to resentence Hall by both the court’s inherent authority and by
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a).
At the resentencing hearing, held eleven days after the
original sentencing hearing, the district court recalculated
Hall’s Guidelines range, revoking a previously granted reduction
for acceptance of responsibility. The new advisory Guidelines
range was twenty-one to twenty-seven months’ imprisonment, and
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the court sentenced Hall to twenty-one months’ imprisonment. At
the request of defense counsel, and with the government’s
approval, the court vacated the show-cause order and canceled
the scheduled contempt proceedings.
This appeal followed.
II.
The issue is whether the district court was authorized to
modify Hall’s sentence, either by the court’s inherent authority
to vacate a judgment procured by fraud, or by Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35(a). As we explain below, whether the
district court had authority to vacate the original sentence is
a question of jurisdiction, thus our review is de novo. See
United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2008).
Both parties argue that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) forecloses the
district court’s exercise of inherent authority. We agree.
Section 3582(c) bars a district court from modifying a sentence
“unless [1] the Bureau of Prisons moves for a reduction, [2] the
Sentencing Commission amends the applicable Guidelines range, or
[3] another statute or Rule 35 expressly permits the court to do
so.” United States v. Goodwyn, 596 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir.
2010). Accordingly, in Goodwyn, when a district court modified
a sentence without meeting one of these three exceptions, we
held that the district court acted without authority. Id. at
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235-36. The negative implication is clear: “[T]here is no
‘inherent authority’ for a district court to modify a
sentence . . . .” Id. at 235 (quoting United States v.
Cunningham, 554 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2009)); see also United
States v. Mann, 435 F. App’x 254, 255 (4th Cir. 2011) (“In
United States v. Goodwyn, we held that § 3582(c) divests a
district court of jurisdiction to modify a sentence except in
those cases specifically authorized by statute.”). Section
3582(c) creates a jurisdictional bar that leaves no room for the
exercise of inherent authority.
Having determined that there was no inherent authority, we
turn to Rule 35(a), the remaining potential source of authority
for the district court’s action. Under Rule 35(a), “[w]ithin 14
days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that
resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). The question here is whether Hall’s
sentence, marred as it was by fraud, “resulted from . . . clear
error.”
We have explained that the scope of “clear error” under
Rule 35(a) is “extremely narrow.” United States v. Fields, 552
F.3d 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2009). “Congress limited the reach of
Rule 35(a) because it wanted to promote openness and finality in
sentencing.” Id. at 405. Accordingly, the Rule is limited to
“cases in which an obvious error or mistake has occurred in the
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sentence, that is, errors which would almost certainly result in
a remand of the case to the trial court for further action.”
United States v. Ward, 171 F.3d 188, 191 (4th Cir. 1999)
(quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory committee’s 1991 note).
This court has not decided whether a fraud on the court
constitutes “clear error.” Here, we need not answer the
question comprehensively. It is enough to say that Hall’s
forgery is not the type of fraud that we have held in similar
circumstances warrants setting aside a final judgment.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3), a district
court has the power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the
court.” “Fraud on the court is . . . limited to the more
egregious forms of subversion of the legal process . . . that we
cannot necessarily expect to be exposed by the normal adversary
process.” Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1357 (4th Cir. 1982). “Perjury and
fabricated evidence,” however, do not fall in this category;
they “are evils that can and should be exposed” by an opposing
party, “and the legal system encourages and expects litigants to
root them out as early as possible.” Id.; see also Fox ex rel.
Fox v. Elk Run Coal Co., 739 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2014)
(“Fraud on the court [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(d)(3)] is not your ‘garden-variety fraud.’” (quoting George
P. Reintjes Co. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 71 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.
6
1995))). Consequently, we do not permit these preventable
frauds to override the finality of judgments.
What we have said about fraud on the court in the context
of Rule 60(d)(3) is applicable in this case as well. While it
would sometimes be impractical for the government to test the
authenticity of every letter of support submitted by a defendant
during sentencing, the government had several reasons to test
this letter. First, after Hall lied during the plea hearing,
the government was on notice that Hall was prepared to deceive
the court. Second, the sponsor was court ordered. The
sponsor’s views were thus likely to be especially important to
the district court. Third, under the circumstances, the letter
was suspicious on its face. Though it purported to come from
the owner of a contracting company, it was crudely handwritten
on a plain sheet of paper without letterhead. Finally, the
letter was filed five days before the sentencing hearing,
leaving the government adequate time to contact the sponsor.
Taken together, these facts demonstrate that the government
could reasonably have discovered Hall’s forgery. We do not
believe that “clear error” under Rule 35(a) encompasses this
situation.
We are keenly aware that Hall’s action strikes at the heart
of the district court’s truth-finding function, and it may be
that in a case in which the government could not have reasonably
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discovered the fraud, we would be compelled to reach a different
conclusion. But this is not that case. Moreover, as the
government notes in its brief, it is not left without remedies;
the government may still pursue “a new felony prosecution for
what defendant did during the proceedings in the district
court.” Appellee’s Br. 35.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court
lacked authority to vacate its original sentence. Accordingly,
we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for Hall’s
original sentence to be reinstated.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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