United States v. Ireshia Summers

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4609
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
IRESHIA DONTE SUMMERS, a/k/a Eric Summers,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:13-cr-00006-H-2)
Submitted: May 30, 2017 Decided: July 6, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven P. Hanna, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ireshia Donte Summers appeals the 240-month sentence imposed by the district
court upon resentencing following the vacatur of Summers’ original armed career
criminal sentence in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (holding
that residual clause of Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012),
is unconstitutionally vague). Summers’ attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning the calculation of Summers’ base offense
level. Summers filed a pro se supplemental brief. The Government has moved to
dismiss the appeal as barred by the appeal waiver in Summers’ plea agreement. We
dismiss the appeal.
We review de novo the validity of an appeal waiver. United States v. Copeland,
707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013). A defendant’s waiver is valid if he agreed to it
“knowingly and intelligently.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir.
2010). An appeal waiver generally is enforceable “if the record establishes that the
waiver is valid and that the issue being appealed is within the scope of the waiver.”
United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Upon review of the plea agreement and the transcript of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
hearing, we conclude that Summers knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal
and that the sentencing issues Summers seeks to raise on appeal fall squarely within the
scope of his waiver of appellate rights. Moreover, in accordance with Anders, we have
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reviewed the record for any potentially meritorious issues that fall outside the scope of
the waiver and have found none. * See Copeland, 707 F.3d at 530. Accordingly, we grant
the Government’s motion and dismiss the appeal.
This court requires that counsel inform Summers, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Summers requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Summers. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
*
We have reviewed the issues Summers raised in his pro se brief and conclude
that he is not entitled to relief.
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