United States v. Manoj Jha

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4717
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MANOJ KUMAR JHA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Ellen L. Hollander, District Judge.
(1:12-cr-00595-ELH-1)
Submitted: March 31, 2015 Decided: June 4, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Daniel J. Wright, LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL J. WRIGHT, Rockville,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Martin J. Clarke, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Manoj Kumar Jha was convicted of
three counts of wire fraud, one count of mail fraud, one count
of falsification of records, and one count of theft from a
federal program. The district court sentenced Jha to 36 months’
imprisonment on each count to run concurrently, and ordered
restitution in the amount of $68,078.31 to the National Science
Foundation and $37,648 to the Department of Defense. Jha
appeals, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress evidence and statements, denial of his request for a
hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and
denial of his motion in limine by which he sought to exclude
evidence of the content of a slide presentation shown during a
workshop he attended. Jha also challenges the district court’s
determination of the amount of loss, and the restitution order.
Finding no error by the district court, we affirm.
Jha moved to suppress evidence discovered as a result of
the execution of a search warrant concerning his work email
address when the search warrant affidavit purported to establish
probable cause to search one address, but the warrant itself
listed a different email address. No relevant evidence was
discovered as a result of the execution of this search warrant.
Rather, the Government acquired the email evidence it sought
from another source. Thus, any error by the district court in
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denying Jha’s motion to suppress evidence recovered from his
work email account was harmless. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547
U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)).
Next, Jha challenges the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress evidence discovered during the search of his
residence, arguing that the search warrant directed to his
business was overly broad because the scope of the search was
not limited to the basement of his home, from where he operated
his business. Because all public documentation as to Jha’s
company lists his home address as the address for the business,
without limitation such as floor designation or suite number, we
find no error in the district court’s determination that the
search warrant satisfied the requirement that it describe with
particularity the place to be searched. See U.S. Const. amend.
IV; United States v. Owens, 848 F.2d 462, 463 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that search warrant satisfies the particularity
requirement if the description enables an officer to ascertain
and identify the place to be searched with reasonable effort).
We also find no error by the district court in denying
Jha’s request for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978). Jha asserted that the special agent, in
seeking a search warrant, failed to inform the magistrate judge
of the two different work email addresses Jha used and also
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failed to inform the magistrate judge that Jha’s business was
operated only from the basement of the home.
To warrant a Franks hearing, the defendant must show that
the officer seeking a warrant omitted facts from the affidavit
with the intent to mislead or with reckless disregard to whether
the affidavit is misleading. United States v. Tate, 524 F.3d
449, 454 (4th Cir. 2008). In light of the agent’s testimony
presented at the suppression hearing, the district court
concluded that the agent exercised due diligence to determine
the current email address for Jha at his place of employment and
also to determine the particular address for Jha’s company. We
find no clear error in the district court’s findings that there
was no intent to deceive or reckless disregard for the truth
with respect to the search warrant affidavit for the email
account or for the residence. See United States v. Allen, 631
F.3d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 2011) (providing standard).
Jha also challenges the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress statements he made during the execution of
the search warrant at his home. He contends that he was “in
custody” and therefore should have been given the Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings prior to being
interviewed by the agents.
The district court, considering the totality of the
circumstances, concluded that Jha was not in custody at the
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time, see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984), and
that his statements were voluntary and therefore were
admissible. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir.
2012), we agree with the district court’s determination that the
circumstances of Jha’s interview are distinguishable from those
in United States v. Hashime, 734 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir. 2013)
(finding defendant in custody in home during search warrant
after officers entered the home with great show of force, got
Hashime out of bed at gun point, led him downstairs and outside
in his boxer shorts, and then separated him from his family and
interviewed him for three hours in a small basement room), and
that Jha was not in custody at the time of the interview.
Accordingly, the district court appropriately denied the motion
to suppress Jha’s statements.
Jha asserts that the district court erred by denying his
motion in limine by which he sought to exclude evidence of the
content of a slide presentation shown during a workshop he
attended. The district court’s decision as to the admissibility
of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir. 2011). The
challenged evidence was relevant to Jha’s knowledge of the
qualifications for the grant for which he had applied. Because
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Jha was charged with misrepresenting his qualifications in an
application for grant money submitted after the date of the
presentation, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling that this evidence was admissible.
Next, Jha challenges the 14-level enhancement to his
offense level based on the district court’s determination that
the amount of loss attributed to his crimes exceeded $400,000.
The Government asserted that actual loss was $200,000 and
intended loss was $500,000; Jha disputes that there was any
actual loss.
The amount of loss for sentencing purposes “is the greater
of actual loss or intended loss.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1), cmt. n.3(A) (2013). Notwithstanding the
actual loss amount, we conclude that the district court
appropriately determined that the intended loss from Jha’s
scheme was $500,000 based on Jha’s conduct in having drafted the
Phase II grant application seeking to secure a grant in the
amount of $500,000, using the same information and false
representations he used in the prior two grant applications.
Accordingly, the court did not err in determining the loss
amount. See United States v. Allmendinger, 706 F.3d 330, 341
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2747 (2013).
Lastly, Jha challenges the restitution order imposed by the
district court. The district court’s restitution order is
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reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Leftwich,
628 F.3d 665, 667 (4th Cir. 2010). However, where, as here, the
defendant did not object to the amount of restitution ordered,
review is for plain error. United States v. Seignious, 757 F.3d
155, 160 (4th Cir. 2014).
Jha argued that he provided technical research reports in
exchange for the award of grant money and therefore the
Government did not sustain any loss as a result of his conduct.
However, as the district court determined, the grant money was
not paid to Jha in exchange for his research reports, but rather
to promote collaborative research between small businesses and
research facilities. Also, as a result of Jha’s student stipend
scheme, research funds from the Department of Defense alloted
for research purposes were instead diverted to Jha’s personal
benefit. We find that the district court did not commit error,
much less plain error, in finding that Jha defrauded two
government agencies and in the determination of the amount of
restitution owed. See Seignious, 757 F.3d at 162.
We affirm Jha’s conviction and sentence. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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