United States v. Terrell Anderson

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4576
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRELL ANDERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Senior District Judge. (1:20−cr−00033−IMK−MJA−1)
Submitted: October 5, 2022 Decided: January 4, 2023
Before RUSHING and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: L. Richard Walker, First Assistant Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West Virginia; Zoey Vilasuso, Law
Student Intern, United States Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, WEST VIRGINIA
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellant. William
Ihlenfeld, United States Attorney, David J. Perri, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In response to a disturbance at a local motel, Bridgeport West Virginia Police
Department (“BPD”) officers searched and ultimately arrested Terrell Anderson, who was
later convicted of one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2). Anderson appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress evidence seized during his encounter with the officers, including
thousands of dollars of cash and his cell phone. He argues that the officers detained him
without evidence that he had committed or was committing a crime. We hold that the
officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when they detained Anderson, and
that the district court properly denied his motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s judgment.
I.
On January 4, 2020, BPD received a 911 call about a disturbance at a local motel.
Samantha Hoover, the caller, reported that her friend, Anderson, was banging on Hoover’s
motel door and that Hoover wanted him to leave. After receiving this information from
dispatch, Officer Aaron Lantz went to the motel and found Anderson in the parking lot.
Officer Lantz asked Anderson, who appeared visibly agitated, “what was going on.”
Anderson responded that he wanted his belongings from Hoover’s car, but that Hoover
refused to unlock it. Anderson thought that, with the officer’s assistance, he would be able
to get his items from the car and leave.
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Officer Cameron Turner arrived at the motel a few minutes after Officer Lantz.
When Officer Turner arrived, Anderson was yelling and cursing in the parking lot. Officer
Lantz asked Officer Turner to speak with Anderson while Officer Lantz talked to Hoover.
Officer Turner guided Anderson, who was still visibly upset, away from Hoover’s motel
door. Anderson then repeatedly asked Officer Turner if Anderson could approach
Hoover’s car. Officer Turner denied each of Anderson’s requests and ordered Anderson
to stay near him. Anderson complied.
Other uniformed officers also responded to Hoover’s 911 call. During the officers’
investigation, Anderson threatened to break Hoover’s car window, and told Hoover that he
would “see [her] at the house.” After Hoover arrived at the parking lot and opened her car
door, the officers smelled marijuana. The officers received from Hoover consent to search
her car and observed a marijuana paraphernalia device. During the officers’ interview with
Hoover, she told the officers that Anderson had sold her and her family members
marijuana. The officers also interviewed a minor girl who had spent the night in
Anderson’s motel room and who was holding marijuana that Anderson had given her.
Finally, the officers found about $3,120 in cash in Anderson’s sock. Although none of the
officers physically restrained Anderson, each testified that Anderson was not free to leave
during any part of the encounter.
After the officers completed their investigation, the officers arrested Anderson for
possession with intent to deliver marijuana. During the search incident to arrest, the
officers seized Anderson’s cell phone. Later, BPD officers searched Anderson’s cell phone
and found sexually explicit photographs and videos of the minor girl who had spent the
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night in Anderson’s motel room. On August 5, 2020, a grand jury returned a one-count
indictment against Anderson for possession of child pornography.
Anderson moved to suppress evidence of the cash and evidence from the officers’
later search of his cell phone, arguing in relevant part that the officers lacked reasonable
articulable suspicion to detain him. The district court denied Anderson’s motion. 1 The
court concluded that Anderson consented to part of the initial interaction with the officers,
and that the officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The court
also found that the prolonged investigative detention was supported by the officers’
reasonable suspicion. After a jury found Anderson guilty, the district court sentenced him
to 60 months’ imprisonment. Anderson appealed the court’s denial of his motion to
suppress.
II.
On appeal, Anderson argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the cash seized and the evidence from his phone because the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain him. We disagree.
1
The district court referred Anderson’s motion to suppress to a magistrate judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The magistrate judge held a suppression hearing and
issued a report and recommendation (R&R), recommending that the district court deny
Anderson’s motion. Anderson objected to the R&R. Following briefing on Anderson’s
objection, the district court adopted the R&R, overruled Anderson’s objections, and denied
his motion to suppress.
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In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and the district court’s legal conclusions de novo, including the
court’s determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed. United States v. Pulley,
987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 410 (4th Cir.
2008). We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party before
the district court, here, the government, and give weight to permissible inferences drawn
by the law enforcement officers. United States v. Mitchell, 963 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir.
2020); Pulley, 987 F.3d at 376. We will not reverse a lower court’s factual findings “simply
because [we] would have decided the case differently.” Pulley, 987 F.3d at 376. Rather,
we consider “whether, on the entire evidence, [we are] left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quoting United States v. Wooden, 693
F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 2012)).
Anderson contends that the officers detained him without reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, and argues that the district court did not identify any criminal activity
that was occurring or had occurred before his detention. The government counters that the
officers’ initial interaction with Anderson was consensual, and that Anderson was not
detained until Officer Turner told Anderson to sit on the walkway of the motel. The
government also argues that, even if the officers detained Anderson at the beginning of the
encounter, the officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring or had
occurred based on Anderson’s loud behavior and “potential for domestic violence.” We
agree with the government that the officers did not immediately detain Anderson, and
conclude that Officer Turner detained Anderson at the point that he prevented Anderson
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from approaching Hoover’s car. We nevertheless hold that the detention was lawful
because Officer Turner had reasonable suspicion that Anderson was engaging in criminal
activity when Officer Turner detained him.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A seizure occurs when an officer uses physical force or
a show of authority to restrain or terminate an individual’s freedom of movement through
means intentionally applied. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007); Brower v.
Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989). If an officer “do[es] not show an unambiguous
intent to restrain or when an individual’s submission to a show of governmental authority
takes the form of passive acquiescence,” we consider whether “in view of all [of] the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave.” United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 537 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2013)
(alteration in original) (first quoting United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir.
1989) and then quoting Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 255).
When an individual is detained pursuant to a Terry 2 stop, the detention is lawful if
the officer has a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity,” based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Black, 707
F.3d at 539 (first quoting United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 2009) and
then quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). Reasonable suspicion requires less proof than a
2
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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preponderance of the evidence and is a less demanding standard than probable cause.
United States v. Gist-Davis, 41 F.4th 259, 264 (4th Cir. 2022). We consider an officer’s
determination that reasonable suspicion exists by evaluating the totality of the
circumstances, and “give due weight to common sense judgments reached by officers in
light of their experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th
Cir. 2004).
Here, Anderson was not immediately detained when the officers arrived. When
Officer Lantz arrived at the motel, he parked in the middle of the parking lot, got out of his
car, and asked Anderson “what was going on.” Anderson responded and explained that he
wanted to get his belongings from Hoover’s car. During this initial interaction, Officer
Lantz did not tell Anderson he was not free to leave, nor did Officer Lantz demonstrate an
intent to restrain Anderson through physical force or show of authority. Although Officer
Lantz arrived in his police car and was in uniform, the remaining evidence before us
demonstrates that this initial encounter was consensual. See United States v. Jones, 678
F.3d 293, 302 (4th Cir. 2012).
Nonetheless, some encounters with police “that start out as constitutional may . . .
at some unspecified point, cross the line and become an unconstitutional seizure.” Santos
v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 462 (4th Cir. 2013) (omission and
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002)).
In this case, the consensual encounter became a seizure when Officer Turner denied
Anderson’s requests to walk away from the officer to go to Hoover’s car. Officer Turner
told Anderson that he had to stay with him, and Anderson complied. See id. (finding that
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“the consensual encounter became a Fourth Amendment seizure when [the deputy sheriff]
gestured for [the defendant] to remain seated” and the defendant complied).
We hold, however, that this seizure was lawful. Officer Turner had encountered a
“disturbance in progress” at a motel where “an irate male [had been] banging on the doors
and windows trying to get in.” Officer Turner also knew that the female guest in that motel
room, later identified as Hoover, wanted the irate male, Anderson, to leave. When Officer
Turner arrived at the motel, Anderson was in the parking lot and “was extremely upset,”
“was yelling [and] cursing,” and “would[ not] listen to commands.” Because Anderson
“was visibly upset towards” Hoover, Officer Turner guided Anderson away from Hoover’s
door and later, in response to Anderson’s requests to move toward Hoover’s car, ordered
Anderson to stay near him instead. Based on the information Officer Turner received
before he got to the motel and the behavior he observed when he arrived, he was justified
in concluding that Anderson had committed or may have been committing the crime of
disorderly conduct. See W. Va. Code § 61-6-1b(a) (outlining criminal penalties for anyone
who “in a . . . public parking area, . . . disturbs the peace of others by . . . profane, indecent
or boisterous conduct or language”). 3
3
Anderson argues that, as a motel guest, he could lawfully “stand outside the door
of a [m]otel room in an agitated state.” But Officer Turner found Anderson in the parking
lot of the motel. Regardless of whether the motel parking lot constitutes a “public parking
area” within the meaning of West Virginia’s disorderly conduct statute, see W. Va. Code
§ 61-6-1b(b)(3), it was objectively reasonable for Officer Turner to determine that
Anderson, who was swearing and yelling in the motel parking lot about a nearby guest who
had called 911 to report Anderson’s behavior, was subject to and was violating that law.
See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61, 66 (2014) (holding that an objectively
reasonable mistake of law can justify an investigatory stop).
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In addition, after Anderson’s initial detention, the officers found other evidence that
raised suspicion of criminal activity and, thus, supported Anderson’s continued detention.
Anderson made statements about “see[ing Hoover] at the house” and breaking Hoover’s
car window, which the officers perceived as threats. And the officers smelled marijuana
inside Hoover’s car. After receiving Hoover’s consent to search her car, the officers found
marijuana paraphernalia and learned from Hoover that Anderson had sold marijuana to
Hoover and her family members.
Meanwhile, other officers had interviewed the minor girl. The minor told the
officers that she was fifteen, that she had spent the night with Anderson, that Anderson had
asked her to hold and to hide a bag of his marijuana, and that Anderson sold marijuana.
Because the officers had particularized information that Anderson had engaged in criminal
activity, namely, possession with intent to distribute marijuana and contributing to the
delinquency of a minor, the prolonged detention of Anderson was lawful. See United
States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 338 (4th Cir. 2008).
Based on the totality of these circumstances, we hold that Officer Turner had
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify Anderson’s initial detention, and that
the officers did not exceed the permissible scope of the stop.
III.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Anderson’s motion to
suppress. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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