Sangafio v. Holder

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-2255
ABIY BERECHA MAMMO,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: April 29, 2010 Decided: May 14, 2010
Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jason A. Dzubow, MENSAH & DZUBOW, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for
Petitioner. Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Susan
Houser, Senior Litigation Counsel, Steven F. Day, Office of
Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Abiy Berecha Mammo, a native and citizen of Ethiopia,
petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“Board”) affirming without opinion the immigration
judge’s order denying Mammo’s applications for asylum,
withholding of removal and withholding under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes
the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a), (b) (2006). It defines a refugee as a person
unwilling or unable to return to his native country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
“Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death,
torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one
of the enumerated grounds . . . .” Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d
171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.
2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2009), and can establish
refugee status based on past persecution in his native country
on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)
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(2009). “An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject
of past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of
persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.
2004). Without regard to past persecution, an alien can
establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected
ground. Id.“Withholding of removal is available under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3) if the alien shows that it is more likely than not
that her life or freedom would be threatened in the country of
removal because of her race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Gomis v.
Holder, 571 F.3d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1048 (2010). “This is
a more stringent standard than that for asylum . . . . [and],
while asylum is discretionary, if an alien establishes
eligibility for withholding of removal, the grant is mandatory.”
Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353-54 (4th Cir.
2006) (internal citations omitted) (alteration added).
Credibility findings are reviewed for substantial
evidence. A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony
on credibility grounds must offer a “specific, cogent reason”
for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Examples of specific and
cogent reasons include inconsistent statements, contradictory
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evidence, and inherently improbable testimony[.]” Tewabe v.
Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Likewise, “the immigration judge
cannot reject documentary evidence without specific, cogent
reasons why the documents are not credible.” Kourouma v.
Holder, 588 F.3d 234, 241 (4th Cir. 2009).
The REAL ID Act of 2005 also amended the law regarding
credibility determinations for applications for asylum and
withholding of removal filed after May 11, 2005, as is the case
here. Such determinations are to be made based on the totality
of the circumstances and all relevant factors, including:
the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the
applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the
applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency
between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral
statements (whenever made and whether or not under
oath, and considering the circumstances under which
the statements were made), the internal consistency of
each such statement, the consistency of such
statements with other evidence of record . . . . and
any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,
without regard to whether an inconsistency,
inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the
applicant’s claim[.]
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006) (emphasis added).
This court accords broad, though not unlimited,
deference to credibility findings supported by substantial
evidence. Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir.
2004). If the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding
is based on speculation and conjecture rather than specific and
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cogent reasoning, however, it is not supported by substantial
evidence. Tewabe, 446 F.3d at 538.
Furthermore, this court may not reverse a finding
regarding the availability of corroborative evidence unless a
reasonable factfinder is compelled to conclude that the
corroborative evidence is unavailable. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)
(2006).
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(2006). This court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence
. . . presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325
n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).
We find substantial evidence supports the adverse
credibility finding, which was based on several discrepancies
noted by the immigration judge and Mammo’s testimonial demeanor.
We further note the record does not compel a different result
with respect to the immigration judge’s findings regarding the
need for additional corroborating evidence. We also note Mammo
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fails to challenge the immigration judge’s alternate finding
that, assuming he was credible, he failed to show past
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution based on a
protected ground. *
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
*
By failing to raise a challenge in his brief to that
portion of the immigration judge’s order denying relief under
the CAT, review is abandoned. See Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318,
326 (4th Cir. 2001); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,
241 (4th Cir. 1999).
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