Demetriades v. Bryant

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-1951
PETER DEMETRIADES; MICHELE DEMETRIADES,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
PAUL DAVID BRYANT, JR.; SHARON K. BRYANT,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. Glen M. Williams, Senior
District Judge. (1:09-cv-00025-gmw-pms)
Submitted: July 15, 2010 Decided: July 23, 2010
Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Peter and Michele Demetriades, Appellants Pro Se. Edward G.
Stout, BRESSLER, CURCIO & STOUT, Bristol, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Peter and Michele Demetriades appeal the district
court’s order adopting the report and recommendation of the
magistrate judge granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees
Paul and Sharon Bryant. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Appellants and Appellees entered into a transaction in
2003 wherein Appellees agreed to convey, and Appellants agreed
to purchase, a parcel of land described in the purchase
agreement as “2100 Industrial Park Dr., Bristol, Tennessee.”
This address was inaccurate; the actual address of the property
is “2100 Industrial Blvd., Bristol, Tennessee.” Several months
later, Appellants breached the agreement by failing to make
payments on the purchase, and in January 2005, a Tennessee state
court issued a judgment against them in the amount of their
missed installment payments and for repairs of the premises.
In February 2009, some four years after losing in
Tennessee state court, Appellants commenced an action in the
district court alleging that the erroneous address of the
property in the purchase agreement constituted fraud on the part
of Appellees under Virginia law. They demanded monetary and
injunctive relief. The magistrate judge recommended granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellees on statute of limitations
grounds, and the district court adopted that recommendation.
Appellants noted a timely appeal.
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This court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo.
Howard v. Winter, 446 F.3d 559, 565 (4th Cir. 2006). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the
choice of law rules of the forum state. CACI Int’l, Inc. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2009).
In Virginia, procedural rules are governed by the law of the
forum state. Jones v. R.S. Jones & Assocs., Inc., 431 S.E.2d
33, 34 (Va. 1993). The two-year statute of limitations for
fraud in Virginia, found at Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) is
procedural, and therefore applies in this diversity action. *
In fraud cases under Virginia law, the statute of
limitations begins to run when the fraud was discovered, or when
it could have reasonably been discovered through due diligence.
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249(1). Thus, while Appellants claim that
they did not discover the mistaken address until 2007, the
record reveals that they had ample opportunity to notice the
*
We reject the Appellants’ contention that Virginia’s five-
year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions is
applicable to their claim.
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discrepancy as early as 2003, when they signed the purchase
agreement. Because the street sign and address on the property
itself indicate that the property was located on “Industrial
Blvd.” and not “Industrial Park Dr.,” a person exercising due
diligence could have discovered the discrepancy no later than
upon taking occupancy of the premises. The record is silent on
exactly when appellants entered the premises, but they did so no
later than September 2004, when they were told to vacate for
failure to make payments under the purchase agreement. The two
year statute of limitations therefore began to run no later than
in September 2004, and Appellants did not commence this action
in district court until 2009 — well after the expiration of the
Virginia statute of limitations for fraud cases.
We have reviewed the record and find no basis for tolling
or suspension of the statute of limitations under Virginia law.
The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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