United States v. Robinson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4900
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEPHEN ROBINSON, a/k/a Lini,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge. (3:08-cr-00042-JPB-DJJ-1)
Submitted: September 29, 2010 Decided: November 5, 2010
Before KING, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen D. Herndon, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Betsy C. Jividen, Acting United States Attorney, Paul T.
Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stephen Robinson appeals his conviction and sentence
for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than
five grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
841(b)(1)(B) (2006). For the following reasons, we affirm.
On appeal, Robinson first argues that the district
court violated his procedural due process rights by failing to
hold a competency hearing prior to trial. “Competency claims
can raise issues of both procedural and substantive due
process.” Beck v. Angelone, 261 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2001).
An allegation, such as Robinson’s, that the district court erred
by failing to order a competency hearing is a procedural
competency claim. Id. Congress has enacted a statutory
framework for addressing competency issues. See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 4241 et seq. Under § 4241(a), a court shall order a
competency hearing if it has “reasonable cause to believe that
the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease
or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that
he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
Id.
In this case, Robinson moved for a competency hearing
and a psychological evaluation the same day he made his initial
appearance in court. During that appearance in front of a
2
magistrate judge, Robinson refused to be represented by counsel
and refused to answer the judge’s questions. Thereafter,
Robinson became “aggressive” and had to be restrained by the
United States Marshals. Pursuant to Rule 12.2(c)(1)(A), the
district court found “reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent,” and thus ordered
that Robinson undergo a psychological evaluation to be followed
by a competency hearing. The district court denied Robinson’s
motion as “moot” given its sua sponte order.
Robinson received psychiatric evaluation at FCI
Butner, which filed its report on May 26, 2009. The report
concluded that Robinson suffered from no mental disease or
defect and was competent to stand trial. The report further
concluded that Robinson’s behavior prompting the evaluation was
the result of his views on the federal government and the
justice system, not from any mental disease, and that Robinson’s
condition was not expected to deteriorate. Following receipt of
the report, no competency hearing was held, and a jury trial was
conducted.
On appeal, Robinson makes a procedural competency
claim challenging the district court’s “fail[ure] to hold a
competency hearing after his mental competency was put in
issue.” Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Cir. 2000).
3
Robinson bears the burden to show that the district court
“ignored facts raising a ‘bona fide doubt’ regarding [his]
competency to stand trial.” Id. “‘Medical opinions are usually
persuasive evidence on the question of whether a sufficient
doubt exists as to the defendant’s competence’ to require a
competency hearing.” United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389,
398 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d
1286, 1290 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Because Robinson relies solely on his pre-evaluation
conduct in arguing that a hearing was necessary, we conclude
that there was no “bona fide doubt” as to Robinson’s competency
to stand trial in light of the Butner Report. The Butner Report
suggests that Robinson suffers from no mental disease or defect
and that his court outburst was simply due to a belief system
regarding justice in America. The Butner Report concluded
Robinson was competent and there was no likelihood that he would
become incompetent in the future. Moreover, Robinson’s behavior
during trial does not support a claim of incompetency. Robinson
engaged with the district court as necessary during the trial,
and at sentencing Robinson addressed the court in a respectful
manner and provided a lengthy allocution prior to sentencing.
In sum, given that the Butner Report found no evidence of a
mental disease or defect and that no other facts or
circumstances support Robinson’s claim of incompetency,
4
Robinson’s procedural right to a competency hearing was not
violated.
Next, Robinson argues that the district court
improperly admitted evidence of statements threatening
Robinson’s co-defendant, Anthony Jackson. After his arrest,
Jackson pleaded guilty and agreed to testify on the Government’s
behalf against Robinson. Then, prior to trial, Jackson sent
Robinson’s counsel a letter claiming that he had no knowledge of
any drug transactions involving Robinson and that any
correspondence or conversations between himself and Robinson
were not addressing drugs. The Government made reference to
Jackson’s letter to Robinson’s counsel during its opening
statement, and then, during its direct examination of Jackson,
the Government moved to introduce three letters sent to Jackson.
Jackson testified he viewed the letters as a threat to prevent
him from testifying against Robinson. The Government does not
dispute that the letters were sent not by Robinson but by some
of Jackson’s acquaintances in Florida to whom Jackson owed
money. Robinson objected to their admission, contending that
the letters were not relevant. The Government contended that
the letters helped complete the story of why Jackson sent a
letter to Robinson’s counsel indicating Robinson’s innocence.
The district court overruled the objection and admitted the
letters.
5
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for
abuse of discretion, United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 470
(4th Cir. 2007), and we will not “‘vacate a conviction unless we
find that the district court judge acted arbitrarily or
irrationally’ in admitting evidence,” United States v. Benkahla,
530 F.3d 300, 309 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Ham,
998 F.2d 1247, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993)). Before the district
court, Robinson argued that the threatening letters were not
relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401. Rule 401 provides
for the admission of relevant evidence, “evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R.
Evid. 401. “[R]elevance typically presents a low barrier to
admissibility.” United States v. Leftenant, 341 F.3d 338, 346
(4th Cir. 2003). Thus, evidence is relevant if it is “worth
consideration by the jury” or has a “plus value.” United States
v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 998 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Government argues that the letters are relevant
impeachment evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 607 provides
that “[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling the witness.” Fed. R. Evid.
607. Thus, although Jackson was the Government’s witness, the
6
Government was permitted to impeach him. Prior to trial,
Jackson sent Robinson’s counsel a letter substantially
exonerating Robinson. The Government used the three threatening
letters to complete the story behind that letter and impeach its
evidentiary value — the letters threatened Jackson if he
testified against Robinson at trial. Cf. United States v.
Stockton, 788 F.2d 210, 219 (4th Cir. 1986) (evidence of threats
against a witness admissible to impeach that witness’s
inconsistent statements at trial). Because the Government was
entitled to impeach Jackson, and because these letters do serve
to impeach Jackson’s letter exonerating Robinson, the letters
were relevant and admissible. *
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
We also reject Robinson's argument, made for the first
time on appeal, that the letters should have been deemed
inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because their
probative value was outweighed by the potential for prejudice.
7