United States v. Griffin

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4629
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROLAND JOHN GRIFFIN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:10-cr-00060-REP-1)
Submitted: September 30, 2010 Decided: November 3, 2010
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Paul G. Gill,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Brian R.
Hood, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Roland John Griffin was convicted, following a bench
trial before a magistrate judge, of one count of driving under
the influence, in violation of 36 C.F.R § 4.23(a)(2) (2009). On
appeal, Griffin contends that there was insufficient evidence to
sustain his conviction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We review a district court’s decision to deny a Rule
29 motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v.
Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). A defendant claiming
insufficient evidence to support a verdict against him bears a
heavy burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067
(4th Cir. 1997). A verdict must be sustained “if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
verdict is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Smith, 451
F.3d at 216 (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is
“evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he [factfinder],
not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the evidence
and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented.” Beidler,
110 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Generally, a verdict is reversed for insufficient
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evidence only where the prosecution clearly failed to meet its
burden. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(2) prohibits “operating or being
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle” in a national
park area with a blood or breath alcohol level over .08.
Because Griffin does not dispute his intoxication, the only
issue is whether he was operating or in control of his truck
when National Park Service Ranger Charles Lochart arrested him.
“Operator” is defined as “a person who operates, drives,
controls, otherwise has charge of or is in actual physical
control of a mechanical mode of transportation or any other
mechanical equipment.” 36 C.F.R. § 1.4(a). The definition of
operator encompasses a broader range of behavior than just
driving. See United States v. McFarland, 445 F.3d 29, 32 (1st
Cir. 2006) (actual physical control exists when the vehicle’s
owner is conscious and seated behind the steering wheel with the
key in the ignition); United States v. Coleman, 750 F. Supp.
191, 193 (W.D. Va. 1990) (evidence of operation was sufficient
where driver was found in the driver’s seat of her car on the
surface of the roadway with the key in the ignition).
We conclude that the Government introduced sufficient
evidence that Griffin was operating the vehicle under the
influence. Ranger Lochart found Griffin in the driver’s seat of
his parked truck with the keys in the ignition and the engine
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running. Griffin engaged the electrical equipment in the truck
by operating the turn signal and the four-way flashers.
Moreover, Ranger Lochart’s testimony that Griffin stated that he
was having a problem with his turn signal and asked how fast he
had been driving when he was stopped, together with evidence
that Griffin’s vehicle was in a different location then it had
been when Griffin’s son left him alone in the vehicle, * suggests
that Griffin was, in fact, driving before Ranger Lochart arrived
on the scene.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
Griffin’s son, John, had been driving the truck, with
Griffin as his only passenger, when John parked the vehicle
along the side of a road and left on foot, leaving the keys in
the ignition, following an argument between the two men.
Testimony established that when Ranger Lochart encountered
Griffin his truck was parked at a location different from the
area where John had left it.
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