Gage v. Cort Business Services

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1464
MAUREEN E. GAGE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CORT BUSINESS SERVICES, a/k/a Cort Furniture Rental,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:08-cv-03463-PJM)
Submitted: January 26, 2011 Decided: February 11, 2011
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Anne Sampson Gbenjo, THE GBENJO LAW GROUP, Houston, Texas, for
Appellant. Joseph A. Ciucci, DUANE MORRIS, LLP, Atlanta,
Georgia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maureen E. Gage appeals the district court’s judgment
denying her motions to alter or amend and reconsider its
judgment granting summary judgment to the Appellee, Cort
Business Services (“Cort”), in her Title VII discrimination and
retaliation suit. We affirm.
Gage raised claims in the district court that Cort
violated her rights by failing to accommodate her disability,
creating a hostile work environment, discriminating against her
because of her age and race, and retaliating against her. She
has confined her appeal only to the issue of retaliation.
Accordingly, she has abandoned appellate review of her remaining
claims.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s order
granting summary judgment and views the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Rowzie v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
556 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is
appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Summary judgment will be granted
unless “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party” on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
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Absent direct evidence of intentional discrimination,
Title VII claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 793 (1973). In order to state a prima facie claim of
discrimination, a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show
that: (i) she engaged in a protected activity; (ii) her
employer took an adverse action against her; and (iii) there is
a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse action. Ziskie v. Mineta, 547 F.3d 220, 229
(4th Cir. 2008). To satisfy the second element, a plaintiff
must show that a reasonable employee would have found the
challenged action materially adverse, which . . . means it well
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). If the plaintiff
makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the employer
to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the
adverse action. Baquir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 747
(4th Cir. 2006). If the employer makes such a showing, the
burden returns to the plaintiff to establish that this reason is
a pretext for discrimination. Id.The parties agree that Cort terminated Gage, and her
termination constitutes an adverse employment action within the
meaning of Title VII. Moreover, Gage clearly engaged in
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protected activity by making complaints to Cort human resources
officials that her supervisors were engaged in what she felt to
be harassment related to her injuries following a series of car
accidents. We have reviewed the record, however, and we
conclude that Gage has not drawn a causal link between the
protected activities and the adverse action. There was a
significant lapse in time between when Gage made her complaints
and when she was terminated, Cort has proffered a valid, non-
discriminatory rationale for her termination, and it is at least
arguable whether the Cort employees who made the decision to
terminate Gage were aware that she had engaged in protected
activity. In light of this record, we conclude that Gage has
not carried her burden to establish a prima facie case.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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