United States v. McLeod

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4487
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DONALD MCLEOD, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:01-cr-00042-F-1)
Submitted: November 16, 2010 Decided: December 10, 2010
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Donald McLeod, Jr., appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing a sentence
of thirty-six months’ imprisonment. McLeod alleges that his
sentence is plainly unreasonable. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
A district court has broad sentencing discretion upon
revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will affirm if
the sentence is within the applicable statutory maximum and is
not “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a
revocation sentence is “plainly unreasonable,” we first assess
the sentence for unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our
review of original sentences.” Id. at 438.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Chapter 7 policy statements
and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors relevant to a
supervised release revocation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)
(2006); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Although the district court
need not explain the reasons for imposing a revocation sentence
in as much detail as when it imposes an original sentence, it
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“still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks
omitted). A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if
the district court stated a proper basis for concluding the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence
is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we
“decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at
439.
We have carefully reviewed McLeod’s sentence and find
it to be procedurally and substantively reasonable. The
district court heard the parties’ arguments, explicitly
considered the Chapter Seven advisory policy statement range and
the pertinent 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and explained its
reasoning supporting the thirty-six month sentence. The
district court stated a proper basis for McLeod’s sentence —
namely, McLeod’s continuous criminal conduct involving
narcotics, and the downward departure awarded in McLeod’s
original sentence. Based on our conclusion that McLeod’s
sentence is neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable,
“it necessarily follows that” McLeod’s sentence is not “plainly
unreasonable.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment
revoking McLeod’s supervised release and imposing a thirty-six
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month prison term. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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