United States v. Cogdill

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4347
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD FLOYD COGDILL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District
Judge. (6:94-cr-00474-HMH-5)
Submitted: September 24, 2008 Decided: November 10, 2008
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Loggins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. David Calhoun Stephens, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Floyd Cogdill appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing a sentence of
fifteen months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning
whether the district court abused its discretion in revoking
supervised release. Counsel also questions whether Cogdill’s
sentence is reasonable. Cogdill was notified of his right to file
a pro se supplemental brief, but did not do so, and the Government
elected not to file a responding brief.
Initially, Cogdill contends that the district court erred
in finding that he violated the terms of his supervised release by
committing a new crime. We review the district court’s decision to
revoke a defendant’s supervised release for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). The
district court need only find a violation of a condition of
supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3583(e)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). As Cogdill admitted that he
engaged in new criminal conduct while on supervised release, and
defense counsel disclosed that Cogdill pled guilty in state court
to possession of a controlled substance, we conclude the district
court’s decision to revoke supervised release was not an abuse of
discretion.
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Cogdill also contends that his sentence is unreasonable.
A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release will be
affirmed if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and is
not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We must initially determine the
reasonableness of the revocation sentence by generally following
the procedural and substantive considerations employed in a review
of original sentences, “with some necessary modifications to take
into account the unique nature of supervised release revocation
sentences.” Id. at 438-39. If the revocation sentence is not
unreasonable, it will be affirmed; however, if the sentence is in
some manner procedurally or substantively unreasonable, there must
be a determination of whether it is plainly so. Id. at 439.
During the revocation hearing, the district court had
available for its consideration the supervised release violation
worksheet which noted the advisory imprisonment range provided
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a) (2007). The
court heard argument from Cogdill’s counsel and discussed its
concern over the rapidity with which Cogdill returned to misconduct
similar to that committed in his past. While the court did not
specifically reference 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2008) when announcing its sentence, it is evident from the record
that the court looked to Cogdill’s history and characteristics, the
need for deterrence, and the need to protect the public from
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further crimes. See United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345
(4th Cir. 2006) (stating district court need not explicitly address
each § 3553(a) factor or refer to the statute); see also Rita v.
United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468-69 (2007). Therefore, because
Cogdill’s sentence was within the advisory range and below the
statutory maximum, we conclude the sentence was not unreasonable,
much less plainly so.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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