Booker v. South Carolina Department of Social Services

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-6473
PATRICK L. BOOKER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES; GREENVILLE
COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; BRANDY P. SULLIVAN; TAMMY CHILDS;
SHAWNEE PEEPLES; KELLY P. KAROW,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
GREENVILLE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge.
(8:12-cv-00985-TMC)
Submitted: August 29, 2014 Decided: September 9, 2014
Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Patrick L. Booker, Appellant Pro Se. Russell W. Harter, Jr.,
CHAPMAN, HARTER & HARTER, PA, Greenville, South Carolina; Paul
L. Agnew, Abbeville, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Patrick Booker, a South Carolina prisoner, filed a
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), alleging, in pertinent
part, that the South Carolina Department of Social Services
(“SCDSS”) and its agents, Brandy Sullivan, Shawnee Peeples, and
Tammy Childs, violated his substantive and procedural due
process rights when they temporarily removed his daughter, J.J.,
from the custody of her mother. The district court granted
summary judgment to each defendant and denied Booker’s
subsequent Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. Booker now appeals
both orders. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment. Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 607 (4th
Cir. 2010). Summary judgment shall be granted when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is
a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district
court should grant summary judgment unless a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence
presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice,
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nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the
nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Booker claimed that Peeples violated his due process
rights by taking emergency custody of J.J. in the absence of
prior notice, a court order, or exigent circumstances. However,
having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that Peeples
had an appropriately founded belief that J.J. and her siblings
were in immediate danger, namely of being re-exposed to
narcotics by their mother or other family members. See Weller
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. for the City of Balt., 901 F.2d 387,
391-92 (4th Cir. 1990). Under such circumstances, no prior
notice of the emergency removal was required. Id.Further, we agree with the district court that
Sullivan was entitled to absolute immunity from Booker’s claim
that she made intentional misstatements when preparing and
presenting a petition for J.J.’s retention in SCDSS’s custody.
Vosburg v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 138 (4th Cir.
1989). Although not addressed by the district court, we also
conclude that Sullivan’s absolute immunity extends to her
alleged failure to notify Booker of J.J.’s removal and the
resulting probable cause hearing. See Pusey v. City of
Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1993); see also
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Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.
1992).
Finally, we conclude that Booker’s claims regarding
Childs’ conduct in the wake of J.J.’s removal failed to suggest
a violation of his substantive due process rights and,
therefore, that Childs was rightly granted qualified immunity.
To survive summary judgment, Booker was required to produce
evidence that Childs was more than merely negligent but,
instead, unjustifiably intended to injure Booker’s right to
maintain a relationship with J.J. See Huggins v. Prince
George’s Cnty., 683 F.3d 525, 535 (4th Cir. 2012); Patten v.
Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 834 (4th Cir. 2001). Booker’s sparse,
factually unsupported allegations against Childs fell well
short.
Because the district court properly granted summary
judgment and did not abuse its discretion in denying Booker’s
Rule 59(e) motion, we affirm the district court’s orders. We
grant Booker’s motion for leave to file a supplemental pro se
brief and dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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