United States v. Robert Martinez

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4294
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT ANTHONY MARTINEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:13-cr-00445-RBH-1)
Submitted: September 25, 2014 Decided: October 1, 2014
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, A. Bradley Parham, Assistant United States
Attorney, Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, David
A. O’Neil, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Thomas E.
Booth, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Anthony Martinez appeals from his conviction
and 162-month sentence after he entered a conditional guilty
plea to one count of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C)
(2012). Martinez asserts that the district court erred when it
denied his motion to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement
officers during their execution of an arrest warrant.
Specifically, Martinez argues that law enforcement violated the
knock-and-announce rule when they executed the arrest warrant
and, thus, he asserts that evidence seized by law enforcement
should have been suppressed. Finding no error, we affirm.
When considering a district court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de
novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.
McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1572 (2014). Where, as here, the district court denies the
suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d
531, 534 (4th Cir. 2013).
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. One element
of the reasonableness inquiry is the requirement that police
knock, announce their presence, and wait a reasonable time
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before entering a house to execute a search or arrest warrant.
See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929, 931-32 (1995). The
knock-and-announce rule serves three interests: (1) protecting
the safety of the occupants of a dwelling and the police by
reducing violence; (2) preventing the destruction of property;
and (3) protecting the privacy of the occupants. See Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
The knock-and-announce requirement is reflected in 18
U.S.C. § 3109, which provides that an officer “may break open
any outer or inner door or window of a house . . . to execute a
search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose,
he is refused admittance[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2012); see
United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 882 (4th Cir. 1994). * If
there is no breaking to gain entry, § 3109 is not violated.
Moreover, although an officer may not forcibly enter unless he
has been refused admittance, such a refusal need not be
expressly made — “the refusal may be constructive or reasonably
inferred from the circumstances.” Young, 609 F.3d at 353
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
*
While § 3109 refers only to search warrants, its standards
also govern the execution of arrest warrants. See Miller v.
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308–09 (1958); United States v.
Young, 609 F.3d 348, 353 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010).
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We have considered the parties’ arguments and have
reviewed the record and discern no reversible error. First, we
defer to the district court’s decision to credit the law
enforcement officer’s testimony that he did not break open
Martinez’s door, but instead hit the door with his fist and
forearm and announced police presence before the door swung
open. We also find no error in the district court’s alternative
finding that even if law enforcement did not comply with the
knock-and-announce rule, given the information known to law
enforcement at the time the arrest warrant was executed, it was
not unreasonable for law enforcement to enter Martinez’s
residence before knocking and announcing their presence.
Because we find no reversible error in the district
court’s decision to deny Martinez’s suppression motion, we
affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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