Craig Perry v. Mail Contractors of America, Inc.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1155
CRAIG LAMONT PERRY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MAIL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (3:12-cv-00405-GCM)
Submitted: September 30, 2014 Decided: October 9, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ross S. Sohm, THE LAW FIRM OF ROSS S. SOHM, PLLC, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael L. Wade, Jr., OGLETREE,
DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., Charlotte, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Craig Lamont Perry, an African-American, appeals the
district court’s order granting summary judgment to Mail
Contractors of America, Inc. (“MCA”), on Perry’s claim that he
was terminated from his position as a truck driver due to his
race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
Perry also appeals the court’s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e) motion. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment. Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 307 (4th
Cir. 2014). “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “At the summary judgment
stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those
facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A district court should grant summary
judgment unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). To defeat summary
judgment, “the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory
allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference
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upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.”
Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).
Because Perry produced no direct evidence of
discrimination, the district court properly considered his
claims under the burden-shifting framework established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277,
284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Under the McDonnell Douglas
framework for a claim of discriminatory discipline, an employee
must establish a prima facie case by showing “(1) that [he]
engaged in prohibited conduct similar to that of a person of
another race . . . , and (2) that disciplinary measures enforced
against [him] were more severe than those enforced against the
other person.” Lightner v. City of Wilmington, 545 F.3d 260,
264-65 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). If
the employee makes this showing, “the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the adverse employment action.” Hill, 354 F.3d at 285. If
the employer provides evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for
its action, the presumption of discrimination is rebutted, and
the employee — who bears the ultimate burden of persuasion —
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered
reason was a pretext for discrimination. Id.
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Here, we conclude that the district court correctly
found that Perry failed to establish a prima facie case.
Specifically, Perry did not identify a truck driver who was less
severely disciplined following a traffic accident sufficiently
similar to the one precipitating his own termination. See
Lightner, 545 F.3d at 264-65. Although Perry produced evidence
of numerous drivers who were in accidents that, like his own,
involved other vehicles, caused property damage, or resulted in
traffic citations, none of those factors were relevant to MCA’s
decision to immediately terminate Perry. Instead, Perry was
fired for failing to properly regulate his speed despite hazards
directly ahead of him in the roadway. A failure to slow down in
response to apparent traffic conditions, or a similarly culpable
error, was not present in any of the other accidents Perry
identified. The fact that the MCA employees responsible for
terminating Perry also immediately terminated a similarly
situated driver outside Perry’s protected class after he had a
materially indistinguishable accident further undermined Perry’s
attempt to establish a prima facie case. See Cook v. CSX
Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 510-12 (4th Cir. 1993).
Moreover, and assuming for the sake of argument that
Perry established a prima facie case, he does not contest that
MCA had a viable, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination,
and we conclude that the evidence clearly fell short of
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suggesting pretext. See Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980
F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). As we have explained,
“[r]egardless of the type of evidence offered by a plaintiff as
support for [his] discrimination claim . . . , the ultimate
question in every employment discrimination case involving a
claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the
victim of intentional discrimination.” Hill, 354 F.3d at 286
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Accordingly,
absent evidence that the allegedly discriminatory decisionmaker
knew of the aggrieved employee’s race, no reasonable jury could
conclude that the stated legitimate reason for the challenged
employment action was a pretext for discrimination. See
Matthews v. Waukesha Cnty., 759 F.3d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 2014);
Pearson v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 723 F.3d 36, 41-42 (1st Cir.
2013). Here, at best, Perry produced only a minutia of
circumstantial evidence that any of the decisionmakers involved
in his termination were ever aware of his race.
Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to
MCA and the denial of reconsideration. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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