United States v. Melvin Sanders

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4712
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MELVIN SANDERS, a/k/a Cool,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey,
District Judge. (2:13-cr-00049-JPB-JSK-3)
Submitted: April 29, 2015 Decided: June 19, 2015
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Scott Curnutte, CURNUTTE LAW, Elkins, West Virginia, for
Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States Attorney,
Andrew R. Cogar, Assistant United States Attorney, Clarksburg,
West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Melvin Sanders appeals his 120-month prison sentence after
pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute cocaine. The district court sentenced him
above his advisory Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months. On
appeal, Sanders contends that the district court procedurally
erred by failing to sufficiently justify its sentence or address
the parties’ arguments, and also that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary
to achieve the aims of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012). We affirm.
We review “the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) using an abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of
‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United States v.
Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). We “must first ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error, such
as failing to . . . adequately explain the chosen sentence—
including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines
range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence is procedurally
reasonable, we consider its substantive reasonableness,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances,
including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines
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range.” Id. “[I]f the sentence is outside the Guidelines
range . . . [we] may consider the extent of the deviation, but
must give due deference to the district court’s decision that
the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the
variance.” Id.
The district court “must make an individualized assessment
based on the facts presented when imposing a sentence,
apply[ing] the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific
circumstances of the case and the defendant, and must state in
open court the particular reasons supporting its chosen
sentence.” Lymas, 781 F.3d at 113 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “In imposing a variance sentence, the
district court must consider the extent of the deviation and
ensure that the justification is significantly compelling to
support the degree of the variance.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court’s explanation of
its sentence need not be lengthy, but the court must offer some
individualized assessment justifying the sentence imposed and
rejection of arguments for a higher or lower sentence based on
§ 3553.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The “court’s stated rationale must be tailored to the particular
case at hand and adequate to permit meaningful appellate
review.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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We have reviewed the record and conclude that the sentence
is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district
court made an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented, applied the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the
specific circumstances of the case and the defendant, and
adequately explained the particular reasons supporting its
sentence. Among other things, the court found that Sanders’s
criminal history category underrepresented his criminal history.
Sanders acknowledged that his criminal history was “extensive”
but argued that the recidivism rate for a person who is over 50
years old is “vanishingly small.” However, Sanders was over 50
when he committed the instant crime, and based on his repeated
pattern of returning to illegal activities after incarceration,
the court reasonably rejected Sanders’s argument and found that
the only way to protect the public and society from his illegal
activity was a long period of incarceration. We also conclude
that the 10-year prison sentence, which is 4.75 years above the
high end of the advisory Guidelines range, is substantively
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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