Deborah Weymouth v. County of Henrico, Virginia

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2409
DEBORAH WEYMOUTH, on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated; JAMES REDFORD, on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated; JAMES A. HUGHES,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
and
E. CARLTON KING, JR.; LARRY W. SPENCER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COUNTY OF HENRICO, VIRGINIA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:14-cv-00419-REP-RCY)
Submitted: July 28, 2016 Decided: August 31, 2016
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Harris D. Butler, Zev H. Antell, BUTLER ROYALS, PLC, Richmond,
Virginia; Craig J. Curwood, Philip J. Dean, CURWOOD LAW FIRM,
PLC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Joseph P. Rapisarda,
Jr., Lee Ann Anderson, Andrew R. Newby, Wade T. Anderson, COUNTY
OF HENRICO, Henrico, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
The Appellants, current and former Captains for the Henrico
Fire Division, appeal the district court’s order accepting the
magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant summary judgment in
favor of the County of Henrico, Virginia, on Appellants’ claims
for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-219 (2012) (FLSA). In our recent decision in Morrison v.
Fairfax, __ F.3d __, __, No. 14-2308, 2016 WL 3409651 (June 21,
2016), we considered for the first time the 2004 “first
responder regulation” that directly governs the question posed
in this appeal, and clarified the standard under which
firefighters may be deemed exempt under the FLSA. As the
district court’s order underlying this appeal pre-dated
Morrison, the district court did not have the benefit of our
analysis when it granted summary judgment.
Accordingly, we find it most prudent to vacate and remand
this case to the district court to allow it, in the first
instance, to apply the legal standard set forth in Morrison to
the factual record here, and to consider, if appropriate,
whether the parties are entitled to expand the record in light
of the guidance provided by Morrison. We, of course, express no
opinion as to the outcome of this matter. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal arguments are adequately
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presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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