United States v. Bradley Roberson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4939
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRADLEY CHARLES ROBERSON, a/k/a Fly Guy,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Greenville. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (4:19-cr-00024-BO-1)
Submitted: September 18, 2020 Decided: September 25, 2020
Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geoffrey W. Hosford, HOSFORD & HOSFORD, PC, Wilmington, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Bradley Charles Roberson appeals from his 84-month sentence imposed pursuant
to his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal, Roberson
asserts that the district court failed to adequately consider his arguments for a variance
sentence. We find that the district court procedurally erred in imposing sentence, and as
such, we vacate and remand for resentencing.
“A district court is required to provide an individualized assessment based on the
facts before the court, and to explain adequately the sentence imposed to allow for
meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” United
States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
explaining its sentence, the “court must address or consider all non-frivolous reasons
presented for imposing a different sentence and explain why it has rejected those
arguments.” United States v. Webb, 965 F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 2020) (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, an “explanation is sufficient if it, although
somewhat briefly, outlines the defendant’s particular history and characteristics not merely
in passing or after the fact, but as part of its analysis of the statutory factors and in response
to defense counsel’s arguments” in mitigation. United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 519
(4th Cir. 2017) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “The court’s explanation
should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that it has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.”
United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 782 (4th Cir. 2020) (brackets and internal quotation
marks omitted).
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While “it is sometimes possible to discern a sentencing court’s rationale from the
context surrounding its decision,” we “may not guess at the district court’s rationale,
searching the record for statements by the Government or defense counsel or for any other
clues that might explain a sentence.” United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 745 (4th Cir.
2019) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 206 (2019). Nor may we
“assume that the court has silently adopted arguments presented by a party.” United
States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Where the court fully addresses the defendant’s “central thesis” in mitigation, it need not
“address separately each supporting data point marshalled on its behalf.” Id. Nonetheless,
a district court’s failure to give “specific attention” to nonfrivolous arguments results in a
procedurally unreasonable sentence. Lewis, 958 F.3d at 245 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, Roberson briefly requested a variance based upon his military service and the
fact that he had secured a job upon his release. The district court did not address the facts
raised by Roberson in any way. Admittedly, Roberson’s arguments were not nuanced,
lengthy, or complex. However, while the court engaged with counsel and Roberson
concerning the facts and circumstances of the underlying crime and Roberson’s other
recent criminal behavior, the court did not provide any reasoning whatsoever for choosing
the sentence it did. Importantly, the court’s colloquy with Roberson and counsel did not
touch upon Roberson’s military background, his ability to legally make a living upon
release, or even the appropriateness of a downward variance. See Blue, 877 F.3d at 521
(noting that reviewing court may infer that district court considered defendant’s arguments
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if “the sentencing court engages counsel in a discussion about that argument”). Although
the Government seeks to draw inferences regarding the court’s intent, our assessment of
the record cannot replace the district court’s obligation to explain its rationale. Lewis, 958
F.3d at 244. The court’s statements, even viewed in context, do not make “patently
obvious” that the court “truly considered [Roberson’s] nonfrivolous arguments.” * Blue,
877 F.3d at 521. Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s failure to provide reasoning
constituted procedural error.
To avoid reversal, the Government must demonstrate that this procedural error was
harmless, which requires “pro[of] that the error did not have a substantial and injurious
effect or influence on the result.” Ross, 912 F.3d at 745 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In other words, the Government must show that Roberson did not receive a longer sentence
because of the district court’s failure to consider his nonfrivolous arguments. Here, the
Government contends that Roberson’s arguments were weak and did not support a
downward variance in light of Roberson’s continued criminal conduct despite prior
leniency. However, the district court did not actually comment on or draw conclusions
about any prior leniency, much less whether any prior leniency weighed against a
downward variance.
In United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 839-40 (4th Cir. 2010), we found the
district court’s error harmless because the court explained that it had considered the
*
While the Government asserts that Roberson’s arguments were “weak,” the
Government does not contend that they were frivolous.
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sentencing factors, “emphasized the need for specific and general deterrence,” and the
defendant’s arguments were “very weak.” Here, even assuming Roberson’s arguments
were weak, the district court made no statement as to whether it considered the relevant
statutory sentencing factors or adopted the Government’s arguments regarding prior
leniency and Roberson’s failure to change his behavior. Thus, we find that the Government
failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the district court’s error was harmless.
Accordingly, we vacate Roberson’s sentence and remand for resentencing. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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