United States v. Haught

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4780
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW IAN HAUGHT,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:09-cr-00005-FPS-JES-1)
Submitted: May 7, 2010 Decided: July 2, 2010
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brendan S. Leary, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Wheeling,
West Virginia, for Appellant. Betsy C. Jividen, Acting United
States Attorney, Randolph J. Bernard, John C. Parr, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Matthew Ian Haught was charged with a “straw purchase”
of a firearm in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and
924(a)(2), and with possession of a firearm by a person addicted
to heroin in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(3) and
924(a)(2). Haught was released on bond and later executed a
plea agreement whereby he pled guilty to Count Two of the
Indictment. Haught appeared before the district court on
June 23, 2009, and entered his guilty plea, which was accepted.
Immediately after the plea hearing, Haught met with
his probation officer. During that interview, the probation
officer asked Haught when he last used drugs, and Haught stated
that his last drug use was in January 2009. Before concluding
the interview, the probation officer directed Haught to report
to the probation office for a drug test before leaving the
federal building. Despite this explicit instruction, Haught did
not report to the probation office.
After missing his drug test on June 23, 2009, Haught
was instructed to report to the probation office on
June 26, 2009, for a rescheduled drug test. A urine specimen
obtained from Haught on June 26, 2009, tested positive for
marijuana, a finding that was later verified by an independent
laboratory.
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A petition was filed by Haught’s probation officer
requesting that his pre-trial release be revoked since he failed
to appear for a drug test on June 23, 2009, and subsequently
tested positive for marijuana on June 26, 2009. Following a
hearing, Haught’s pre-trial release was revoked.
The probation officer issued an addendum to the
Presentence Report asserting that Haught was not entitled to an
offense level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.
Haught filed an objection thereto; however, the district court
nevertheless determined that Haught was not entitled to an
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, and sentenced him
to 33 months’ imprisonment, which was at the low end of the
applicable guideline range. Haught appealed.
Whether an individual has accepted responsibility for
his crime is a factual question, which this court reviews for
clear error. United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239 (4th
Cir. 2007). A district court’s evaluation and determination
regarding a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility is entitled
to great deference on review and should not be disturbed unless
it is without foundation. United States v. Cusack, 901 F.2d 29,
31-32 (4th Cir. 1990).
Haught argues that the district court erred by denying
him an adjustment based on acceptance of responsibility. He
maintains that the lie he told his probation officer regarding
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his drug use was “immaterial,” that his disregard for the
probation officer’s instruction to take a drug test on June 23,
2009, was an “innocent mistake,” and that the district court
erred because the evidence established that Haught’s marijuana
use could have just as easily occurred before the entry of his
plea agreement as it could have after it. We find that Haught’s
arguments lack merit.
It is the defendant’s burden to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to an offense
level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. United
States v. May, 359 F.3d 683, 693 (4th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 935 (4th Cir. 1990). “A guilty plea
does not automatically entitle a defendant to a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility.” United States v. Kise, 369 F.3d
766, 771 (4th Cir. 2004). Moreover, this court has previously
found that continued criminal conduct, including drug use, after
a defendant has been charged may be a sufficient basis for a
court to deny a defendant an adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility. See United States v. Underwood, 970 F.2d 1336,
1339 (4th Cir. 1992).
Moreover, even if the timing of Haught’s drug use was
somehow relevant to whether or not he could show an entitlement
to an offense level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility,
Haught’s argument is a self-defeating one. According to Haught,
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the district court erred by failing to give him an adjustment
where the evidence showed that it was equally likely that he
used drugs before entering his guilty plea as it was that he
used them afterwards; however, Haught ignores the fact that it
was his burden to establish an entitlement to an adjustment.
Thus, to the extent that Haught needed to show that he used
drugs before pleading guilty, rather than afterwards, he has
failed to do so by a preponderance of the evidence, because, as
Haught argues, the evidence was in equipoise regarding the
timing of his drug use. *
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
As the Government points out, Haught has offered no
explanation or evidence as to when his drug use occurred.
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