United States v. Allen McNeil

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4538
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALLEN WENDELL MCNEIL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:18-cr-00436-D-1)
Submitted: October 28, 2020 Decided: November 10, 2020
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief Appellate Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Allen Wendell McNeil entered guilty pleas to possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D) (Count 1); possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count 2); and
possession of a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (Count 3). The district
court sentenced McNeil to concurrent terms of 54 months on Counts 1 and 3 and imposed
on Count 2 the mandatory minimum of five years, to be served consecutively, for a total
term of incarceration of 114 months. On appeal, McNeil challenges the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.
We review a criminal sentence imposed by a district court for reasonableness “under
a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51
(2007). This review entails consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. * Id. at 51. If the district court did not procedurally err, we
then assess the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Substantive reasonableness
review takes into account “the totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards
set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 176 (4th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, No. 20-5026, 2020 WL
*
We must review the procedural reasonableness of a sentence before considering
its substantive reasonableness, even when the parties do not raise a procedural challenge.
United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019). The record discloses that
the sentence is procedurally reasonable.
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5883437 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020). “Any sentence that is within . . . a properly calculated
Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. Such a presumption can only be rebutted
by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted). “[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion when determining the weight
to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th
Cir. 2011).
McNeil contends that the district court did not adequately take into account his
difficult upbringing and the length of his prior sentences for his state convictions, and he
asserts that a sentence below the Sentencing Guidelines range would have “been sufficient,
but not greater than necessary.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). McNeil’s arguments amount to a
disagreement with the weight the district court gave each of the § 3553(a) factors. We have
reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
balancing the § 3553(a) factors or in arriving at the chosen sentence. McNeil has failed to
overcome the presumption of reasonableness.
Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We deny McNeil’s motion to file a
pro se supplemental brief. See United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 569 n.1 (4th
Cir. 2011). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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