United States v. Cynthia Williams-Singleton

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4145
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CYNTHIA WILLIAMS-SINGLETON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:19-cr-00127-MOC-DCK-1)
Submitted: January 26, 2021 Decided: March 2, 2021
Before HARRIS and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James W. Kilbourne, Jr., ALLEN STAHL & KILBOURNE, PLLC, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cynthia Williams-Singleton pleaded guilty to a single count of wire fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1343. The district court sentenced Williams-Singleton to 27
months’ imprisonment and subsequently denied Williams-Singleton’s Fed. R. Crim. P.
35(a) motion to correct her sentence. Williams-Singleton now appeals. Appellate counsel
has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal but identifying a host of potential sentencing errors.
Counsel also questions whether the district court erred by denying Williams-Singleton’s
Rule 35(a) motion and by imposing a forfeiture money judgment in the amount of
$458,772.88. We affirm.
I.
Counsel questions whether Williams-Singleton’s sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable. “We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) using an abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of ‘whether [the sentence is]
inside, just outside, or significantly outside the [Sentencing] Guidelines range.’” United
States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir.) (first alteration in original) (quoting Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 687 (2020). In performing
that review, we are obliged to first “evaluate procedural reasonableness, determining
whether the district court committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating
the Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
2
If “the district court has not committed procedural error,” we then assess the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Our substantive reasonableness review
“takes into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards
set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any sentence that is within
. . . a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable.
Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756
F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
A.
Counsel first asserts that the district court procedurally erred by applying an abuse
of trust enhancement pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.3 (2018). We
are satisfied, however, that the district court did not err in applying the enhancement. See
United States v. Brack, 651 F.3d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining standard of review).
The record establishes that Williams-Singleton “abuse[d] the authority” of her customer
service position to “use without authority . . . means of identification” of her victims.
USSG § 3B1.3 cmt. n.2(B). Specifically, Williams-Singleton used her position and her
victims’ identifying information to make unauthorized changes to their retirement accounts
that allowed her to steal their retirement benefits. See United States v. Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d
602, 611 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding that district court properly applied abuse of trust
enhancement where defendant used position to obtain patients’ identifying information and
3
utilized that information to file fraudulent claims). Accordingly, the district court properly
applied the abuse of trust enhancement.
B.
Next, counsel questions whether the district court incorrectly interpreted
§ 3553(a)(6) to require a sentencing court to “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities”
among only similarly situated defendants within the same district rather than throughout
the country. Counsel also asserts that the district court ignored certain national sentencing
statistics when sentencing Williams-Singleton.
Based on our review of the sentencing transcript, we conclude that the district court
adequately engaged Williams-Singleton’s sentence disparity argument. Moreover, the
district court appropriately determined that Williams-Singleton’s proposed
below-Guidelines-range sentence based on national sentencing statistics would not
generally deter others from executing a similar fraud scheme. See United States v.
Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 105-06 (4th Cir. 2012) (emphasizing that “each sentencing
proceeding is inescapably individualized” and that appellate court should not “isolate a
possible sentencing disparity to the exclusion of all the other § 3553(a) factors”). We thus
discern no error in the district court’s consideration of Williams-Singleton’s sentence
disparity contention.
C.
Counsel also questions whether the district court demonstrated bias against
Williams-Singleton based on her long-time residency in New York before she moved to
North Carolina and committed the wire fraud offense. We have recognized that a sentence
4
may not be enhanced based on the defendant’s home state. United States v. McCall, 934
F.3d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 2019). Although the district court commented on sentence
disparities across the country and criticized the efficacy of sentencing practices in certain
geographic regions, including New York, the court never tied its criticisms to
Williams-Singleton’s conduct or mentioned that she was from New York. We therefore
reject counsel’s suggestion that the district court was biased against Williams-Singleton
based on her state of origin.
D.
Counsel next contends that the district court erroneously sentenced
Williams-Singleton based on inaccurate information. We have explained that a criminal
defendant has a due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information. United
States v. Nichols, 438 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2006). Relatedly, the Supreme Court has
recognized that a sentencing court commits procedural error when it sentences a defendant
“based on clearly erroneous facts.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “A [factual] finding is clearly
erroneous when[,] although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
United States v. Wooden, 887 F.3d 591, 602 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Counsel first asserts that the Government falsely accused Williams-Singleton of
fabricating the involvement of a coconspirator in the wire fraud scheme and that the district
court relied on that false accusation in sentencing Williams-Singleton. We conclude,
however, that the record does not establish the falsity of the Government’s representation
5
that it lacked sufficient evidence of a coconspirator’s involvement in the wire fraud
scheme. Moreover, before imposing sentence, the district court was aware of the parties’
disagreement regarding the involvement of a coconspirator. Although the district court
never stated that a coconspirator does not exist, the court appropriately questioned the
accuracy of Williams-Singleton’s claim that a coconspirator devised the entire scheme.
The district court thoroughly explained its skepticism, emphasizing that
Williams-Singleton made unauthorized changes to retirement benefit accounts, including
naming herself as a beneficiary of those accounts; falsely reported that retirement account
holders had died so that funds from their accounts would be disbursed to bank accounts
under Williams-Singleton’s control; and withdrew large amounts of cash from the bank
accounts containing the fraud proceeds. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the district court
did not sentence Williams-Singleton on the basis of inaccurate information related to the
involvement of a coconspirator.
Next, counsel contends that the district court predicated its loss amount finding on
inaccurate information because Williams-Singleton has paid or will pay taxes on the
proceeds that she obtained from the wire fraud scheme, and the court did not consider those
tax payments when determining the loss amount. We conclude that Williams-Singleton
invited any such error when she stipulated to the loss amount contained in the presentence
report. See United States v. Herrera, 23 F.3d 74, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining invited
error doctrine). Consequently, Williams-Singleton may not now contest the loss amount
on appeal. Even if she could, however, we are satisfied that the district court did not plainly
err in accepting the loss amount stated in the presentence report. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
6
32(i)(3)(A) (providing that court “may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence
report as a finding of fact”); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343
(2016) (describing plain error standard).
E.
Consistent with Anders, we have otherwise reviewed the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of Williams-Singleton’s sentence and discern no error. Regarding
procedural reasonableness, the district court accurately calculated Williams-Singleton’s
advisory Guidelines range and gave each party the opportunity to present argument and
Williams-Singleton the opportunity to allocute. The district court also sufficiently
addressed defense counsel’s arguments for a below-Guidelines-range sentence, considered
the § 3553(a) factors, and provided a meaningful explanation for the sentence that it chose.
See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-51.
We are also satisfied that nothing in the record rebuts the presumption of substantive
reasonableness afforded to Williams-Singleton’s within-Guidelines-range sentence. See
Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306. The district court appropriately emphasized that
Williams-Singleton engaged in a complex fraud scheme over a lengthy period of time and
stole a substantial amount of money from her victims. The district court also properly
stressed that a sentence below the Guidelines range would not generally deter others from
perpetrating similar fraud schemes. See United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th
Cir. 2011) (recognizing that “district courts have extremely broad discretion when
determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors”). We therefore conclude
that Williams-Singleton’s sentence is substantively reasonable.
7
II.
Next, counsel asserts that the district court erred by denying Williams-Singleton’s
Rule 35(a) motion. Williams-Singleton contended therein that the district court committed
clear error during the sentencing hearing by relying on the Government’s alleged
misrepresentation that a coconspirator was not involved in the wire fraud scheme. Under
Rule 35(a), a district court “may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical,
technical, or other clear error” within 14 days of sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). “[T]he
scope of clear error correctable under Rule 35(a) is extremely narrow,” which comports
with Congress’ intent “to promote openness and finality in sentencing.” United States v.
Fields, 552 F.3d 401, 404-05 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Although courts take different approaches to Rule 35(a), all essentially agree that clear
error under the Rule requires some reversible error at the initial sentencing.” Id. at 404
(internal quotation marks omitted). We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 35(a)
motion for abuse of discretion. See United States v. McQuiston, 307 F.3d 687, 689 (8th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Stump, 914 F.2d 170, 172 (9th Cir. 1990).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Williams-Singleton’s Rule 35(a) motion. The district court appropriately found that the
Government had not made any misrepresentations during the sentencing hearing.
Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that Williams-Singleton had not
established “clear error” in her sentence that would warrant relief under Rule 35(a).
8
III.
Finally, counsel argues that the district court erred by failing to reduce the forfeiture
money judgment based on taxes that Williams-Singleton has paid or will pay on the
proceeds of her wire fraud scheme. Because Williams-Singleton consented to the amount
of the forfeiture money judgment, she may not now challenge that amount on appeal. See,
e.g., United States v. Malpeso, 126 F.3d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying invited error
doctrine to restitution challenge). Even assuming that Williams-Singleton could contest
the amount of the forfeiture money judgment, however, we discern no plain error in the
district court’s acceptance of the amount to which the parties consented, which represents
the proceeds that Williams-Singleton obtained from the wire fraud scheme. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(2) (defining “proceeds” subject to forfeiture); United States v. Blackman, 746
F.3d 137, 142-45 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying § 981(a)(2) to criminal forfeiture).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment
and the denial of Williams-Singleton’s Rule 35(a) motion. This court requires that counsel
inform Williams-Singleton, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Williams-Singleton requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
thereof was served on Williams-Singleton. We dispense with oral argument because the
9
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
10