United States v. Angelo Mejia

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4008
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANGELO MEJIA, a/k/a Los,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 20-4009
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANGELO MEJIA, a/k/a Los, a/k/a Lo, a/k/a Loco,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:17-cr-00054-RJC-DSC-1; 3:18-cr-
00082-RJC-DSC-1)
Submitted: January 31, 2023 Decided: March 24, 2023
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Before HARRIS and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Brandon R. Roseman, BRANDON ROSEMAN, PLLC, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Angelo Mejia pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (“case one”). Mejia
also pled guilty in a separate criminal case (“case two”) pursuant to a second written plea
agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 50 grams
of methamphetamine (actual), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, and
possession with intent to distribute heroin, and aiding and abetting, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The cases were consolidated for the
purposes of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 plea hearing. The district court sentenced Mejia to a
total term of 235 months’ imprisonment, which included 235 months on the cocaine
conviction and 120 months on the firearm conviction to be served concurrently to each
other and to the term of imprisonment in case two. In case two, the court sentenced Mejia
to 235 months on both counts to be served concurrently. Mejia noted an appeal in both
cases, and the appeals have been consolidated.
On appeal, Mejia argues that (1) counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing
him to enter into a contradictory plea agreement in case two and by withdrawing two
objections to sentencing enhancements at the start of Mejia’s sentencing hearing; (2) his
plea was not knowing and voluntary due to contradictory terms in his plea agreement; and
(3) the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019),
invalidates his § 922(g) conviction. We affirm the district court’s judgments.
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We do not review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel made on direct appeal
unless the record conclusively shows that counsel was ineffective. United States v.
Campbell, 963 F.3d 309, 319 (4th Cir. 2020). To succeed on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, Mejia must show that (1) counsel’s performance was constitutionally
deficient and (2) the deficient performance was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1964 (2017) (discussing
prejudice in context of guilty plea). Our review of the current record does not conclusively
establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, this claim should be raised, if at all,
in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 507–08 (4th Cir.
2016); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-07 (2003) (discussing
standard).
We turn next to the validity of Mejia’s guilty plea. Because Mejia did not move to
withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, we review the validity of his plea for plain
error. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). “Under the plain error
standard, this Court will correct an unpreserved error if (1) an error was made; (2) the error
is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Harris,
890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the guilty plea
context, a defendant establishes that an error affected his substantial rights by
demonstrating “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered
the plea.” United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 608 (2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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When accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in
which it informs the defendant of, and ensures that the defendant understands, the rights
he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the nature of the charges to which he is pleading,
and the possible consequences of pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States
v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The court must also ensure that the plea is
voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises extrinsic to the plea agreement
and that a factual basis exists for the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). “[A] properly
conducted Rule 11 plea colloquy raises a strong presumption that the plea is final and
binding.” United States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375, 377 n.1 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Based on our review of the Rule 11 hearing, we conclude that Mejia’s plea was
knowing, voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. The magistrate judge
reviewed the terms of Mejia’s plea agreements, including the stipulations made by the
parties regarding the Sentencing Guidelines, and ensured that Mejia had read, understood,
and agreed to these terms. We conclude that the terms of Mejia’s plea agreements are not
contradictory and do not render Mejia’s otherwise valid guilty plea unknowing and
involuntary. Therefore, the magistrate judge and the district court committed no error in
accepting Mejia’s guilty plea.
We finally turn to Mejia’s Rehaif challenge to his guilty plea. Because Mejia did
not raise this argument in the district court, our review is limited to plain error. See Greer
v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2099-100 (2021) (holding that unpreserved Rehaif claims
are subject to plain error review). In the context of a Rehaif error, the Supreme Court held
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in Greer that such an error “is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first
makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented
evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon.” Id. at 2100. “When a
defendant advances such an argument or representation on appeal, [we] must determine
whether the defendant has carried the burden of showing a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the district court proceeding would have been different.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Mejia does not argue that he did not know he was a felon, and we conclude that any
attempt to do so would be unconvincing in light of his criminal history, which includes a
felony possession of cocaine conviction for which Mejia was still on probation when he
committed the instant offenses. Therefore, Mejia has not demonstrated a reasonable
probability that the outcome of these proceedings would have been different had the district
court been aware of, and advised Mejia regarding, the knowledge-of-status element under
Rehaif. See United States v. Caldwell, 7 F.4th 191, 213 (4th Cir. 2021) (explaining that
defendant’s prior record of incarceration made it “virtually impossible to believe he did not
know he had been convicted of crimes punishable by” more than one year in prison).
Consequently, Mejia’s guilty plea remains valid after Rehaif.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgments. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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