United States v. Williams

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4662
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD WENDELL WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:08-cr-00116-RDB-1)
Submitted: July 29, 2010 Decided: August 25, 2010
Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Steven G. Berry, Bethesda, Maryland, for Appellant. John
Francis Purcell, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Williams pled guilty to knowingly possessing
and discharging a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
offense resulting in the death of another, and aiding and
abetting such conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 2
(2006). Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there are no meritorious issues,
but raising issues requested by Williams. According to counsel,
Williams claims the factual basis provided during the Rule 11
hearing was insufficient to support the conviction. He also
contends Williams claims counsel was ineffective for (1) not
fully explaining his role in the offense; (2) never explaining
to the district court or the Government that his role was minor;
(3) never giving him the chance to go to trial because he was
threatened with death; (4) not doing as good a job at defending
him as did the prosecuting attorney; (5) placing him in harm’s
way after he was housed in a facility containing persons he
implicated; and (6) never telling him what he needed to know
before he started cooperating with the police. Williams has
filed a pro se supplemental brief raising several issues, some
of which are included in counsel’s Anders brief. The Government
did not file a brief.
In order to sustain a § 924(c) conviction, the factual
basis had to establish Williams possessed a firearm in order to
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further the goals of the drug trafficking conspiracy, or that he
aided and abetted such conduct. See United States v. Lomax, 293
F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002). According to the factual basis,
Williams was a street level drug dealer for a neighborhood drug
conspiracy. On the day in question, he produced the firearm
that would be used in the murder. At the instruction of
another, he gave the firearm to a third person and then drove
that person and another person to the victim’s home. Having
already been a driver for a drive-by shooting, it was reasonably
foreseeable that the firearm he gave to the third party was to
be discharged with the intent to protect and further the drug
conspiracy, thus exposing Williams to the ten year statutory
minimum sentence. By providing the firearm to the third party,
driving him to the location, passing the location while the
victim was outside and returning the car to the location soon
thereafter, and then positioning the car so that the third party
was closest to the victim and was able to shoot the victim at
close range, we find Williams had the necessary knowledge and
intent to bring about the result. See United States v. Foster,
507 F.3d 233, 244-45 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing aiding and
abetting a § 924(c) offense); United States v. Arrington, 719
F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussing aiding and abetting).
Because Williams did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is
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reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). To establish plain error, he “must
show: (1) an error was made; (2) the error is plain; and (3)
the error affects substantial rights.” United States v.
Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-46 (4th Cir. 2009) (reviewing
unpreserved Rule 11 error). We have reviewed the Rule 11
hearing and find no error. The district court complied with the
requirements of Rule 11(b)(1). The court also assured itself
that the plea was voluntary and there was an independent factual
basis for accepting the plea. See Rule 11(b)(2), (3). Because
the factual basis was sufficient to sustain the § 924(c)
conviction and because Williams’ plea was knowing and voluntary,
we affirm the conviction.
Because Williams received the low end of the range of
imprisonment to which he agreed in the plea agreement, we are
without jurisdiction to review the reasonableness of the
sentence. The statute governing appellate review of a sentence
states that:
(c) Plea agreements. – In the case of a plea agreement
that includes a specific sentence under rule
11(e)(1)(C) * of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure–
*
Rule 11(e)(1)(C) was renumbered Rule 11(c)(1)(C) in the
2002 amendments to Rule 11.
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(1) a defendant may not file a notice of appeal
under paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection (a)
unless the sentence imposed is greater than
the sentence set forth in such agreement ...
18 U.S.C. § 3742(c) (2006). Paragraphs (3) and (4) of
subsection (a) of § 3742 allow an appeal of a sentence that is
greater than the Guidelines range, or a sentence for an offense
that does not have a Guidelines range and is plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Sanchez, 146 F.3d 796, 797 & n.1
(10th Cir. 1998). Thus, “[a] defendant receiving a sentence
under a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement may appeal only when his
sentence ‘was imposed in violation of law [or] was imposed as a
result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines[.]’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1), (2)
(2006)).
Here, Williams’ sentence was not imposed in violation
of law. The twenty-five year sentence was the bottom of the
agreed upon range of imprisonment and lower than the statutory
maximum of life. Williams agreed the sentence was an
appropriate disposition for his case. Nor is the sentence a
result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines. A
sentence imposed pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement
is contractual and not based upon the Guidelines. See United
States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 364 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating
that “[a] sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea arises
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directly from the agreement itself, not from the Guidelines”);
United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1997).
Because § 3742(c) bars review of sentences imposed pursuant to a
Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and none of the exceptions
apply, we lack jurisdiction to review Williams’ sentence. See
United States v. Prieto-Duran, 39 F.3d 1119, 1120 (10th Cir.
1994) (finding that § 3742(c)(1) bars appeal of sentence imposed
pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement where “government
agreed to forego filing a sentence enhancement information for
prior criminal activities under 21 U.S.C. § 851”). Accordingly,
we dismiss this portion of the appeal.
Insofar as Williams argues that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, such claims are not
cognizable on direct appeal unless the record conclusively
establishes ineffective assistance. United States v.
Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999). Instead, to
allow for adequate development of the record, a defendant
generally must bring his ineffective assistance claims in a 28
U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2010) motion. United States v.
King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997). Because Williams’
ineffective assistance claims are not conclusively established
by the record, we will not review the claims. We conclude that
Williams’ remaining arguments are without merit and not
warranting reversal.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues remaining for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and dismiss the
appeal from the sentence. This court requires counsel inform
Williams, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Williams requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Williams. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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