United States v. Jeremy Davis

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4829
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JEREMY DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Columbia. J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (3:18-cr-00628-JMC-8)
Submitted: April 9, 2021 Decided: April 16, 2021
Before MOTZ, AGEE, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew Mackenzie, BARRETT MACKENZIE, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Peter M. McCoy, Jr., United States Attorney, Katherine Hollingsworth Flynn, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jeremy Davis appeals the district court’s judgment and sentence after accepting his
guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On appeal, he contends that the district court erred in granting the
Government’s motion to hold him in breach of the plea agreement by clearly erring in its
factual findings and failing to properly consider the materiality of his breach. We affirm.
“Plea agreements are grounded in contract law, and as with any contract, each party
is entitled to receive the benefit of his bargain.” United States v. Edgell, 914 F.3d 281, 287
(4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “While we employ traditional principles
of contract law as a guide in enforcing plea agreements, we nonetheless give plea
agreements greater scrutiny than we would apply to a commercial contract because a
defendant’s fundamental and constitutional rights are implicated when he is induced to
plead guilty by reason of a plea agreement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The party alleging a breach of the plea agreement must establish that breach by a
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Snow, 234 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2000).
When the breach is material, the injured party may suspend performance and cancel the
agreement. United States v. Scruggs, 356 F.3d 539, 543 (4th Cir. 2004). “Central to [the]
determination of the materiality of a breach is the extent to which the injured party will be
deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected.” United States v. Warner, 820 F.3d
678, 684 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he standard for assessing
the reasonable expectations of the parties is an objective one, and so [the defendant’s]
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subjective beliefs about the utility of his cooperation is simply not relevant to our inquiry.”
Scruggs, 356 F.3d at 544 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“When a claim of breach of a plea agreement has been preserved, we review the
district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of principles of contract
interpretation de novo.” United States v. Lewis, 633 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “We review an alleged error that was not properly preserved for
plain error only.” Id. (citation omitted). “A finding that the defendant breached a plea
agreement by failing to sufficiently cooperate with the Government is factual in nature,
and we review it for clear error.” United States v. Chase, 466 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted). “Questions regarding how a plea agreement should be interpreted are
legal questions, which we review de novo.” Id. (citation omitted).
Davis first contends the district court clearly erred in making three factual findings,
but two of his claims are not about any findings made by the court but are arguments made
for the first time on appeal about facts that he now claims the court should have considered.
We have reviewed the record and Davis’ arguments, and we find no clear error by the court.
He also contends the court clearly erred in finding he was not taking his medications in the
days leading up to the polygraph examination that the Government scheduled.
On the day of the examination, Davis claimed he could not sign the consent form,
which was a prerequisite for the examination, because he was taking medication; and the
form required him to certify that he had no condition that could impair the examination.
However, based on the plain language of the form and testimony from the examiner, the
district court found the form did not require him to make that certification; and his reading
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of the form was unreasonable. Moreover, the court found that his asserted justification for
refusing to sign the form was also “at best, an unreliable justification,” since prison records
showed that he was not “continually taking” his medications “in the days leading up to the
polygraph examination.” We have reviewed the records and find no clear error.
Finally, Davis contends the district court did not properly consider the materiality
of his breach, since he claims “[t]he Government suffered no loss because of Davis’s not
taking a polygraph examination.” We have reviewed the record and conclude that Davis
seeks to “improperly shift the focus from the benefits the Government reasonably expected
from the plea agreement” to his “perception of the possible utility of these benefits to the
Government,” Scruggs, 356 F.3d at 544; and the court did not err in finding his breach was
material, since he deprived the Government of a polygraph examination, i.e., the benefit of
its bargain, which it reasonably expected based on his promise in the plea agreement.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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