United States v. Ronald Collins

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4596
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD COLLINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
Beckley. Irene C. Berger, District Judge. (5:18-cr-00068-1)
Argued: October 30, 2020 Decided: December 3, 2020
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson
and Judge King joined.
ARGUED: Shawn Angus Morgan, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, PLLC, Bridgeport, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Louie Alexander Hamner, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael B. Stuart,
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellee.
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted Ronald Collins of making false statements on an ATF form and
possessing a firearm after being “adjudicated as a mental defective.” He challenges only
his firearm conviction. Collins claims that Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019),
renders the indictment and jury instructions deficient, that the conviction runs afoul of the
Second Amendment, and that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Each
contention fails. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
A.
In 2013, officers in Raleigh County, West Virginia, arrested Collins for making
terroristic threats to a police officer. While in custody, Collins threatened to kill a state
court judge and the prosecuting attorney. At a state court hearing, the judge instructed
Collins to submit to a competency evaluation. The doctor found that Collins had bipolar
disorder. Following this evaluation, the court concluded that the State had proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that Collins was “psychotic with paranoia in the context of
irrational grandiosity” and so incompetent to stand trial. The court also found a substantial
likelihood that Collins could be restored to competency following inpatient commitment.
The court ordered that Collins be transported to Sharpe Hospital, where he would stay until
his competency was restored. See W. Va. Code § 27-6A-3(f).
Collins remained at Sharpe Hospital for six months. In November 2014, the state
court found he had become competent to stand trial and ordered him released from Sharpe
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Hospital. On September 11, 2015, prosecutors agreed to dismiss the charges against
Collins.
B.
On January 6, 2018, Collins completed an ATF Form 4473 in order to purchase a
9-milimeter handgun. On the ATF form, in response to a question asking whether he had
“ever been adjudicated as a mental defective” or “ever been committed to a mental
institution,” Collins checked the box under “No.” After a three-day waiting period, he
obtained the handgun.
A month later, the West Virginia State Police received a 911 call about a man
carrying a rifle in public. Trooper John Gilkeson found Collins walking on the side of a
road with what appeared to be a rifle (but turned out to be a BB gun). Trooper Gilkeson
ordered Collins to put the weapon down, handcuffed him, and asked if he had any other
weapons on him. Collins responded that he did, and Trooper Gilkeson found the loaded
handgun in his pocket. Trooper Gilkeson performed a criminal history check, which did
not turn up any convictions, and permitted Collins to leave with the handgun.
Later that day, Trooper Gilkeson learned that an ATF agent had been looking for
Collins because Collins was, in fact, prohibited from possessing a gun. Trooper Gilkeson
then obtained a search warrant for Collins’s residence and recovered the handgun. Police
subsequently arrested Collins.
A grand jury indicted Collins on one count of making “a false and fictitious written
statement on ATF Form 4473” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(2) (Count
One), and one count of possessing a firearm by a person who has been adjudicated as a
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mental defective or committed to a mental institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(4) and 924(a)(2) (Count Two). Collins moved to dismiss the indictment and to
strike that he had been “adjudicated as a mental defective” from Count Two. The district
court granted the motion to strike the words “adjudicated as a mental defective” from the
indictment but denied the motion to dismiss. A one-day trial was held on March 11, 2019;
the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to both counts. The district court sentenced Collins
to 60 months imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Collins now appeals.
II.
Collins primarily makes two challenges to his firearms conviction (Count Two)
based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rehaif v. United States. In Rehaif, the
Court expanded the knowledge requirement in § 922(g), holding that the Government must
prove that the defendant not only knew that he possessed a firearm, but also that he knew
he belonged to a class of persons barred from possessing that firearm. 139 S. Ct. at 2200.
The Supreme Court issued Rehaif on June 21, 2019 — after the jury had convicted Collins
on March 12, 2019, but before the court sentenced him on August 14, 2019. Collins
challenges both the indictment and the jury instructions on the ground that they omitted the
knowledge-of-status element recognized in Rehaif. We consider each of these arguments
in turn.
A.
We review the sufficiency of the indictment for plain error because Collins did not
challenge it before the district court. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002).
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Plain-error review requires that a defendant establish (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and
(3) that affects his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).
To affect substantial rights, the error must “have been prejudicial” and have “affected the
outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id. at 734. Only if a defendant establishes these
three elements can we grant discretionary relief. We may do so when the defendant is
“actually innocent” or the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 736 (citations omitted).
Here, Collins has established the first two plain-error requirements. The indictment
erroneously did not instruct on the knowledge-of-status element in Count Two, as Rehaif
requires. This error is “plain” because it is “clear or obvious at the time of appellate
consideration.” United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
But Collins’s argument fails at Olano’s third prong because he cannot show that the
error was prejudicial. The Government charged Collins with two crimes: the false
statements crime in Count One and the firearms crime in Count Two. Count One alleged
that Collins knowingly made a false statement that he had never been committed to a
mental institution. To establish this, the Government presented ample evidence at trial that
Collins knew that he had been committed to a mental institution.
Indeed, Collins himself testified that he was the subject of an order involuntarily
committing him to a mental institution, Sharpe Hospital. He discussed going to Sharpe
Hospital after the court hearing and acknowledged that he did not go on his “own free will.”
The court order committing him to Sharpe Hospital was admitted into evidence. The
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Government also offered a complaint Collins previously filed against the West Virginia
prosecutor in his terroristic threats case that clearly evinced Collins’s knowledge that he
had been committed to Sharpe Hospital. Collins’s lawsuit centered on the events leading
to his commitment and stated that they “resulted in me being held at William H. Sharpe[]
Hospital.”
Because the jury found that Collins knowingly lied about whether he had been
committed to a mental institution as alleged in Count One, the Government’s failure to
separately allege Collins’s knowledge of his commitment in Count Two could not have
altered the jury’s verdict as to Count Two. Thus, Collins has not shown “a reasonable
probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (internal
quotations marks and citation omitted). 1 Accordingly, he has failed to demonstrate that
the erroneous omission of the knowledge-of-status element in Count Two caused any
prejudice, as required by Olano.
Our recent holding in United States v. Medley, 972 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2020), reh’g
en banc granted, No. 19-4789 (4th Cir. Nov. 12, 2020), does not alter this conclusion. In
Medley, we held that the Government’s failure to include Rehaif’s knowledge-of-status
element in an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) charge amounted to plain error. Id. at 410–11.
Because the indictment entirely omitted this element, we reasoned, Medley “did not receive
1
Collins also appears to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the
evidence does not prove that he knew he had been involuntarily committed, as required
after Rehaif. But as explained above, the Government presented ample evidence that
Collins knew of his status.
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(even constructive) notice; nor did he receive a sufficient description of the accusations
against him,” which we held necessary to satisfy “Olano’s third prong.” Id.
In contrast, Collins had notice of the accusations against him and a description of
these accusations. In Count One, the indictment alleged that Collins “did in connection
with the acquisition of a firearm knowingly make a false and fictitious written statement
on ATF Form 4473,” referring to his false statement that he had not been committed. The
allegation (and evidence) that Collins knowingly made this false statement mandates the
conclusion that Collins was provided with notice of the accusations against him and a
description of those allegations.
Moreover, the omission of the knowledge-of-status element in Count Two did not
“seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of the false
statements charge, Collins had the opportunity to — and did in fact — fully litigate whether
he knew he had been involuntarily committed. At trial, Collins’s testimony centered on
whether he knowingly lied on the ATF form. He repeatedly claimed that he did not believe
that he had made a false representation on the form, a claim that the jury rejected. 2 But
Collins never contended that he had not been committed.
2
Collins does seem to suggest that, because he assertedly did not know his
temporary commitment order would prohibit him from possessing a firearm, he did not
know of his status under § 922(g)(4). He bases this suggestion not on a contention that he
did not know of his status as a person who had been involuntarily committed, but rather
that he did not know that his commitment prohibited him from possessing a firearm. This
is a mistake of law argument, which is not a valid defense. See Lambert v. People of the
State of California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
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Because Collins had notice of the allegations against him and has not demonstrated
that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different without the indictment error,
his challenge to the indictment cannot survive plain-error review.
B.
Collins also argues that the district court committed reversible error in failing to
instruct the jury on Rehaif’s knowledge-of-status element. When, as here, a district court
erroneously omits an element of an offense from jury instructions, we reverse only if an
error results in harm to the defendant. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4 (1999). An
error is harmless when it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
In United States v. Brown, we explained that we can conclude an error caused no harm
when a “jury necessarily made th[e] findings notwithstanding the omission.” 202 F.3d
691, 700 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis omitted); see also Medley, 972 F.3d at 413.
Such is the case here. With respect to Count One, the district court instructed the
jury that it must find both (1) “that the written statement indicating that the defendant has
never . . . been committed to a mental institution, was false” and (2) “that the defendant
knew such statement was false at the time it was given.” The jury found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, Collins guilty under Count One. In doing so it necessarily found that
Collins knew he had been committed to a mental institution, satisfying the
knowledge-of-status element in Count Two.
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III.
Collins next contends that § 922(g)(4) as applied to him violates the Second
Amendment. We review such constitutional claims de novo. See United States v. Pruess,
703 F.3d 242, 245 (4th Cir. 2012).
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second
Amendment protects the right to bear arms for conduct falling within its scope. 554 U.S.
570, 626–27 (2008); see also United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010)
(noting that the threshold question under Heller is whether the statute regulates conduct
that comes within the scope of the Second Amendment). Heller emphasized that
regulations prohibiting the mentally ill from possessing firearms are “presumptively
lawful.” 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26. When a party makes an as-applied claim to a
presumptively lawful firearms regulation, he “must show that his factual circumstances
remove his challenge from the realm of ordinary challenges.” Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848
F.3d 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir.
2012)).
Collins contends that his commitment under W. Va. Code § 27-6A-3(f) does not fall
within the realm of ordinary § 922(g)(4) challenges because a different West Virginia
statute, W. Va. Code §§ 27-5-1 to -11, governs “final commitment proceedings.” In United
States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1999), we expressly rejected a similar argument.
The defendant in Midgett claimed that § 922(g)(4) only encompassed confinement
resulting from Virginia’s formal civil commitment process, and not commitment to a
mental institution for restoration of competency resulting from a court order. Id. at 145.
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We held that commitment to restore a person to competency fell “squarely within any
reasonable definition of ‘committed’ as used in § 922(g)(4).” Id. at 146. Collins’s
commitment to restore him to competency under W. Va. Code § 27-6A-3(f) similarly falls
squarely within the definition of committed as used in § 922(g)(4). Cf. Moore, 666 F.3d
at 316 (noting the “unanimous result reached by every court of appeals that § 922(g)(1) is
constitutional, both on its face and as applied”). Accordingly, Collins’s Second
Amendment claim fails.
IV.
Finally, Collins maintains his sentence was procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. We review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” United States v. Brewer, 520 F.3d 367, 372 (4th Cir. 2008). First, we review
for procedural error, including “failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors or failing
to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007)). If the sentence is procedurally sound, we then look to the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. “Substantive reasonableness examines the totality of
the circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding
that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v.
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
Collins argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district
court failed to consider the reasons he proffered as to why he should receive a shorter
sentence, like his repeated claims that he did not believe he was violating federal law by
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possessing a firearm. To be sure, “a district court should address the party’s arguments
and explain why [it] has rejected those arguments.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d
167, 174 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir.
2009)). But here, the district court plainly did so. It thoroughly considered Collins’s
argument and rejected it, explaining that Collins continuously maintained that he had “the
right to have a gun” and that he “did nothing wrong by lying on the firearms form in order
to get that gun.” The court concluded that Collins’s “disagreement with the law does not
excuse [him] from the obligation to follow it.”
Collins argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district
court deviated from the Sentencing Guidelines range and relied too much on certain factors
while failing to consider others. The court imposed a 60-month sentence, significantly
higher than his Guidelines range of 27 to 33 months. When a district court decides the
appropriate sentence falls outside of the Guidelines’ advisory range, it “must consider the
extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support
the degree of the variance.” United States v. Zuk, 874 F.3d 398, 409 (4th Cir. 2017)
(quoting United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 346 (4th Cir. 2010)).
The court did so here. It carefully explained its reasoning, referring to the § 3553(a)
factors. The court noted that Collins continued to act as though he “did nothing wrong.”
The court reasoned that Collins’s criminal record and mental health history reflected
“violent ideation, threatening behavior, and a lack of respect for the law.” The court also
found that Collins posed a danger to the public, since he had “talked about murdering police
officers, judges, and prosecutors” and had a “continuing interest in possessing weapons.”
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The court relied on Collins’s past actions, like his assault of his former attorney, to
conclude that the sentence imposed was necessary “to deter” Collins “to the extent that
deterrence is possible and to protect the public.” This extensive explanation demonstrated
an appropriate exercise of discretion in weighing the relevant factors, rendering the
sentence substantively reasonable.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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