United States v. Ralph Weathington, Jr.

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4094
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RALPH JEFFREY WEATHINGTON, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., Senior District Judge. (2:19-cr-00174-1)
Submitted: March 31, 2023 Decided: April 5, 2023
Before WYNN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Tim C. Carrico, CARRICO LAW OFFICES, LC, Charleston, West Virginia,
for Appellant. Lisa G. Johnston, Acting United States Attorney, Jeremy B. Wolfe,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Ralph Jeffrey Weathington, Jr., appeals his jury convictions and 188-month
sentence for distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), distribution of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and
possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, cocaine, and 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On appeal, Weathington claims
that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, refusing to sever
the charges, admitting unfairly prejudicial evidence, and concluding that his prior
conviction was a serious drug felony triggering application of enhanced statutory penalties.
We affirm.
In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review legal
conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d
370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021). “Because the district court denied [Weathington’s] motion to
suppress, ‘we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the [G]overnment.’”
United States v. Clarke, 842 F.3d 288, 293 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Kelly,
592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir. 2010)).
Under the exclusionary rule, “the introduction at criminal trial of evidence obtained
in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights” is generally prohibited. United
States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). “The
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches, and searches conducted without a
warrant are per se unreasonable.” United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir.
1996). However, voluntary consent to search “obtained . . . from the individual whose
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property is searched” is an exception to the warrant requirement. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (citation omitted). “In determining whether consent to search was
freely and voluntarily given, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent must
be examined.” Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 650.
Weathington argues that the district court should have suppressed evidence
recovered from an apartment because the apartment’s tenant did not consent to the initial,
warrantless search. In particular, he asserts that the court should not have credited a law
enforcement officer’s testimony that the tenant provided consent. However, because “it is
the role of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-
trial motion to suppress,” the court was entitled to credit the officer’s testimony,
particularly given that the tenant, who denied giving consent to search, admitted she had
lied to law enforcement officers. Pulley, 987 F.3d at 376 (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Furthermore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government
and “defer[ring] to [the] district court’s credibility determinations,” our review of the
record confirms that the tenant freely and voluntarily consented to the search. Id. Thus,
the warrantless search of the apartment did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and,
accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Weathington’s motion to suppress.
Next, Weathington asserts that the district court erred by refusing to sever the
charges against him. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to sever for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Zelaya, 908 F.3d 920, 929 (4th Cir. 2018). “Joinder of related
charges is broadly permitted to avoid needless duplication of judicial proceedings,” and a
defendant moving to sever properly joined offenses “bears the burden of demonstrating ‘a
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strong showing of prejudice.’” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 341 (4th Cir. 2008)
(quoting United States v. Goldman, 750 F.2d 1221, 1225 (4th Cir. 1984)) ). “[I]t is not
enough to simply show that joinder makes for a more difficult defense,” Goldman, 750
F.2d at 1225; rather, the defendant must show that “there is a serious risk that a joint trial
would compromise a specific trial right . . . or prevent the jury from making a reliable
judgment about guilt or innocence,” United States v. Qazah, 810 F.3d 879, 891 (4th Cir.
2015) (quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, Weathington fails to explain how the joinder of the related drug charges
against him made his defense more difficult, let alone how the joinder prejudiced him at
trial. He has therefore failed to make the strong showing of prejudice necessary to justify
severance. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying his motion to sever.
Weathington also claims that the district court erred by refusing to exclude evidence
of a handgun pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 403 allows a district court
to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger
of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid.
403. Our review of Rule 403 rulings is highly deferential, looking “at the evidence in a
light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its
prejudicial effect.” United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1990))). Accordingly, “a trial court’s
‘decision to admit evidence over a Rule 403 objection will not be overturned except under
the most extraordinary circumstances, where that discretion has been plainly abused.’”
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United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 132 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Udeozor, 515 F.3d at
265).
It is well established that firearms are “tools of the trade” in drug trafficking. United
States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 629 (4th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the handgun evidence
was relevant and probative of the elements of the offense—namely, whether Weathington
intended to distribute the drugs he possessed. Moreover, Weathington does not explain
how the admission of the handgun evidence had “an undue tendency to suggest decision
on an improper basis” such as “an emotional one.” United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991,
994 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining unfair prejudice). Thus,
Appellant fails to establish that the admission of the handgun created a danger of unfair
prejudice. We therefore find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to exclude the handgun evidence.
Finally, Weathington argues that the district court erred in concluding that his prior
state conviction triggered 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)’s enhanced mandatory minimum, a claim that
we review de novo. United States v. Valdovinos, 760 F.3d 322, 325 (4th Cir. 2014). A
defendant who commits “a violation [of § 841(a) punishable under § 841(b)(1)(A)] after a
prior conviction for a serious drug felony . . . has become final . . . shall be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of not less than 15 years.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). A “serious
drug felony” is defined as “an offense described in [18 U.S.C. §] 924(e)(2) . . . for which
– (A) the offender served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months; and (B) the
offender’s release from any term of imprisonment was within 15 years of the
commencement of the instant offense.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(57). An “offense described in
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[18 U.S.C. §] 924(e)(2)” includes “an offense under State law, involving . . . distributing
. . . a controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or
more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that Weathington’s prior conviction
qualifies as a “serious drug felony” under § 841(b). Therefore, the district court properly
determined that Weathington’s statutory mandatory minimum was 15 years’
imprisonment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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