United States v. Michael Harris

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4231
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL ANTONIO HARRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (4:13-cr-00052-BO-1)
Submitted: November 20, 2014 Decided: November 24, 2014
Before KING and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dhamian A. Blue, BLUE STEPHENS & FELLERS LLP, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Antonio Harris pled guilty to possession with
intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine and was sentenced to
180 months of imprisonment. On appeal, counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but raising the
following issues: (1) whether Harris’ arraignment complied with
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; (2) whether the sentencing court properly
applied the career offender enhancement to Harris’ sentence; and
(3) whether the district court imposed a reasonable sentence.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
First, our review of Harris’ plea hearing reveals that
he knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty and that the proceeding
was generally conducted in compliance with Rule 11.
Accordingly, we find no reversible error. See United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525-26 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that when
a defendant does not seek to withdraw his guilty plea or
otherwise preserve any allegation of Rule 11 error, this court
reviews his plea colloquy for plain error).
Harris’ second and third issues allege sentencing
error, which we review for reasonableness using an abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The court first reviews for significant procedural
error, and if the sentence is free from such error, we then
2
consider substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51. Procedural
error includes improperly calculating the Sentencing Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines range as mandatory, failing to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, and failing to
adequately explain the selected sentence. Id. To adequately
explain the sentence, the district court must make an
individualized assessment by applying the relevant § 3553(a)
factors to specific circumstances of the case. United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). Substantive
reasonableness is determined by considering the totality of the
circumstances, and if the sentence is within the properly
calculated Guidelines range, this court applies a presumption of
reasonableness. United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295
(4th Cir. 2012).
We find no error in the district court’s imposition of
a career offender enhancement, as our review of the record
reveals that Harris had at least two prior qualifying drug
convictions needed for the enhancement. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (2013). Moreover, we find the
sentence was reasonable as it was within the correctly
calculated advisory Guidelines range of 155-188 months and was
imposed after the court expressly considered the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors. Strieper, 666 F.3d at 295.
3
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case, including the issues raised in Harris’ pro se
supplemental brief, and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Harris’ conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Harris, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Harris requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Harris. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4