United States v. Anderson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4656
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TYSON ANDERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Chief
District Judge. (1:08-cr-00024-jpj-pms-9)
Submitted: July 27, 2010 Decided: August 13, 2010
Before KING, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles Gregory Phillips, PHILLIPS & PHILLIPS, Salem, Virginia,
for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney,
Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney,
Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Tyson Anderson of conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and
distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine
base and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2(2006), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006). The district court sentenced
Anderson to eighteen months of imprisonment and he now appeals.
Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, Anderson argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support the convictions. This court reviews a
district court’s decision to deny a Rule 29 motion for a
judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d
209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). A defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden. United
States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). The
verdict of a jury must be sustained “if, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, the verdict is
supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Smith, 451 F.3d at 216(citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he jury, not the reviewing court,
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weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any
conflicts in the evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reversal for
insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
In order to prove that Anderson conspired to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, the
Government needed to show (1) an agreement between two or more
persons, (2) that Anderson knew of the agreement, and (3) that
Anderson knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy.
United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (citations omitted). However, the Government need not
make this showing through direct evidence. In fact, “a
conspiracy may be proved wholly by circumstantial evidence.”
Id. at 858. A conspiracy therefore may be inferred from the
circumstances presented at trial. Id. Furthermore, although
the Government must prove all of the elements listed above
beyond a reasonable doubt, “[c]ircumstantial evidence sufficient
to support a conspiracy conviction need not exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence, provided the summation of
the evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id.3
In order to establish possession with intent to
distribute, the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Anderson (1) knowingly, (2) possessed the cocaine
base, (3) with the intent to distribute it. Burgos, 94 F.3d at
873. Possession can be actual or constructive. Id.Furthermore, “[l]ike conspiracy, [c]onstructive possession may
be established by either circumstantial or direct evidence.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that the Government provided substantial evidence from which the
jury could conclude that Anderson was guilty of the offenses for
which he was convicted. See id. at 862 (“[D]eterminations of
credibility are within the sole province of the jury and are not
susceptible to judicial review.”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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