Misel v. Mazda Motor of America, Incorporated

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-2018
STEPHEN MISEL; TIFFANY MISEL,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INCORPORATED, a California
corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:09-cv-00457-F)
Submitted: February 18, 2011 Decided: March 28, 2011
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher W. Livingston, White Oak, North Carolina, for
Appellants. H. Toby Schisler, Amy L. Keegan, DINSMORE & SHOHL,
LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stephen and Tiffany Misel appeal the district court’s
order and judgment granting Mazda Motor of America, Inc.’s
(“Mazda”) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (“Rule
12(b)(1)”) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
The Misels filed suit against Mazda, alleging that it
violated the North Carolina New Motor Vehicles Warranties Act,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-15A (2010), and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2006) (“MMWA”), when it failed to
repair or replace the new car that the Misels purchased. The
Misels sought to recover the purchase price of the car less an
amount for reasonable use before the first attempted repair,
tripled pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-351.2, 20-351.3, for a
total of $66,405.15. Mazda moved to dismiss the Misels
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The district court granted
Mazda’s motion, holding that the Misels failed to satisfy the
MMWA’s $50,0000 amount in controversy requirement because the
aggregate of their MMWA claims was less than $50,000.
We review de novo a district court’s decision granting
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1). See Etape v. Chertoff, 497 F.3d 379, 382
(4th Cir. 2007). The district court should grant such a motion
“only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute
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and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”
Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The burden of
proving subject matter jurisdiction in response to a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the plaintiff, the party
asserting jurisdiction. Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299,
304 (4th Cir. 1995).
A plaintiff may file a MMWA suit for damages for
certain breach of warranty obligations in either state or
federal court. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (2006). Such a suit,
however, is not appropriately brought in a United States
district court
(A) if the amount in controversy of any individual
claim is less than the sum or value of $25;
(B) if the amount in controversy is less than the sum
or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and
costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be
determined in this suit; or
(C) if the action is brought as a class action, and
the number of named plaintiffs is less than one
hundred.
15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3).
The Misels concede that their claims do not meet the
$50,000 requirement unless they receive treble damages pursuant
to North Carolina law. The aggregate amount in controversy,
however, is not computed on the basis of pendent state law
claims. See, e.g., Ansari v. Bella Auto. Group, Inc., 145 F.3d
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1270, 1272 (11th Cir. 1998); Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748
F.2d 1058, 1071 (5th Cir. 1984); Collins v.
Computertraining.com, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 599, 602 (E.D. Va.
2005); Barnes v. West, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 737, 739 n.4 (E.D.
Va. 2003); Critney v. Nat’l City Ford, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d
1146, 1147-49 (S.D. Cal. 2003); Rose v. A & L Motor Sales, 699
F. Supp. 75, 77 (W.D. Pa. 1988). Therefore, the Misels do not
meet the MMWA’s aggregate amount in controversy requirement and
the district court could not exercise jurisdiction over their
suit.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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