United States v. Jermaine Williams

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4320
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JERMAINE RODNEY WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:15-cr-00175-JAG-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2016 Decided: December 15, 2016
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gregory R. Sheldon, BAIN SHELDON, PLC, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Olivia L.
Norman, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a two-day trial, a federal jury convicted
Jermaine Rodney Williams of Count 1 of a three-count indictment,
which charged Williams with being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). The
facts underlying this charge occurred on December 21, 2013. The
district court subsequently sentenced Williams to 95 months in
prison and imposed a 3-year term of supervised release.
Williams timely appealed and raises four issue for our
consideration. As set forth below, we conclude these arguments
do not garner Williams any relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
Williams’ first assignment of error pertains to the denial
of his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. This motion
was predicated on a prior dismissal order entered by the
district court as related to the first indictment against
Williams. In that order, the court found that the prosecution’s
failure to bring Williams to trial within 70 days of indictment
violated Williams’ rights under the Speedy Trial Act, see 18
U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2012), and that the delay was attributable
to the Government and not excusable. The court ordered the case
dismissed, but did not specify whether the dismissal was with or
without prejudice.
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The Government thereafter sought and obtained a second
indictment—the indictment underlying the criminal judgment that
is before us on appeal—in which the Government charged Williams
with three crimes, two of which were the subject of the first
indictment. This second criminal case was assigned to a
different district judge. Williams moved to dismiss the second
indictment, arguing that the prior dismissal order was with
prejudice, thus precluding the Government from reindicting
Williams on these charges.
The district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss
at which it heard from both the prosecutor and Williams’ new
defense attorney and received supporting evidence. The court
thereafter analyzed the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3162(a)(2), which include “the seriousness of the offense; the
facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal;
and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this
chapter and on the administration of justice,” * and ruled that
the first dismissal order reflected a dismissal without
prejudice. Williams appeals this ruling, arguing that the court
*Although not dispositive, “the presence or absence of
prejudice to the defendant” is also “relevant for a district
court’s consideration,” and may be considered in conjunction
with the third factor. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326,
334 (1988).
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erred in so finding that the first dismissal order was without
prejudice.
The Speedy Trial Act provides that, if the defendant’s
trial does not begin within 70 days and the delay is not
excludable, the district court “shall” dismiss the indictment
with or without prejudice on motion of the defendant. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3162(a)(2); United States v. Henry, 538 F.3d 300, 304 (4th
Cir. 2008). Neither type of dismissal is “the presumptive
remedy for a Speedy Trial Act violation,” and in resolving
whether to dismiss a case with or without prejudice, the
district court must consider the specific factors set forth in
§ 3162(a)(2). Taylor, 487 U.S. at 334.
The Supreme Court has instructed that, when reviewing a
district court’s ruling on a Speedy Trial Act claim, “the
district court’s judgment of how opposing considerations balance
should not lightly be disturbed” so long as the court “properly
considered” the statutory factors and did not make any clear
error in its relevant factual findings. Id. at 337. Here, the
record confirms that the court, in interpreting the order
dismissing the first indictment, properly considered the
statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) and did not commit
clear error in its factual findings related to these factors.
We thus affirm the denial of Williams’ motion to dismiss the
second indictment on speedy trial grounds.
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II.
Williams next maintains that the Government’s evidence on
the count of conviction was legally insufficient as it did not
adequately prove Williams’ possession, actual or constructive,
of a firearm. We disagree.
We review the denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion de
novo. See United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir.
2005). When a Rule 29 motion was based on a claim of
insufficient evidence, the jury’s verdict must be sustained “if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
the Government, to support it.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528
F.3d 210, 244 (4th Cir. 2008) (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted). Substantial evidence is “evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. King, 628 F.3d 693, 700
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the
Government must establish that: (1) the defendant was a felon;
(2) he voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm; and
(3) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce. United States
v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 271 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
167 (2015). The trial transcript reveals that the Government
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produced sufficient evidence to establish each element of this
offense.
First, Williams stipulated that he had been convicted of a
felony when the underlying events occurred. Uncontradicted
testimony of Special Agent Joseph Bradley of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives established an
interstate nexus. Finally, Officer C. Byerly of the
Chesterfield County Police Department, who was driving the first
of several police vehicles pursuing Williams on December 21,
2013, observed Williams extend his arm out of his car window and
drop a firearm to the street. Williams was the lone occupant of
this vehicle. Byerly and another officer recovered the firearm
shortly after Williams was apprehended a few moments later.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government and resolving all evidentiary contradictions in the
Government’s favor, see United States v. Taylor, 659 F.3d 339,
343 (4th Cir. 2011), this testimony is sufficient to sustain the
jury’s guilty verdict, see United States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d
1185, 1190 (4th Cir. 1997).
III.
Williams asserts two challenges to his 95-month sentence.
First, Williams assigns error to the district court’s
application of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.2 (2015),
which resulted in a two-level increase in Williams’ base offense
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level. In evaluating the district court’s Guidelines
calculations, this court reviews the district court’s findings
for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United
States v. White, 771 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir. 2014).
Section 3C1.2 provides for a two-level enhancement “[i]f
the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or
serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing
from a law enforcement officer.” This enhancement “is intended
to capture behavior that could be viewed as an obstruction of
justice, and thus requires that a defendant be aware that he or
she is fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” United States
v. Shell, 789 F.3d 335, 347 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “[A]cts are considered reckless when [the
defendant] was aware of the risk created by his conduct and the
risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk
constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would exercise in such a situation.” United
States v. Carter, 601 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In overruling Williams’ objection to this enhancement, the
district court ruled that it was properly applied because, on
December 21, 2013, Williams led the police on a high-speed
chase, on a two-lane, business access road, during which
Williams’ top speed approached 70 mph. The court opined that
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traveling at this excessive rate of speed on such a small road,
which, the court observed, was very close to a main
thoroughfare, created a substantial risk of death or serious
bodily injury to any of the drivers, including Williams. We
readily conclude that these facts, which were established by the
officers’ trial testimony, support the enhancement and belie
Williams’ contention that he engaged only in “mere flight,”
which would be insufficient to warrant the enhancement. See id.We therefore conclude that the district court did not commit
clear error in applying this enhancement.
Finally, Williams maintains that, “pursuant to USSG
§ 4A1.3(b)(1), a criminal history category of VI substantially
over-represented the seriousness of his criminal history.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 19). Williams goes on to particularize his
various criminal convictions, and the points assigned thereto,
and asserts that the scored “convictions for driving on a
suspended operators’ license, marijuana possession and assault
and battery over-represent the seriousness of his criminal
history.” (Id. at 20).
To the extent that Williams’ argument could be construed as
a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence,
we find that he fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness
afforded his within-Guidelines sentence. See United States v.
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Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (providing
standard).
For these reasons, we affirm both the district court’s
order denying Williams’ motion to dismiss the indictment
underlying this prosecution and the criminal judgment imposed
following the jury trial. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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