United States v. Deangelo Jacobs

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4823
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEANGELO DONNELL JACOBS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:12-cr-00040-F-1)
Submitted: June 27, 2013 Decided: July 11, 2013
Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Deangelo Donnell Jacobs pled guilty, without the
benefit of a written plea agreement, to mailing a threatening
communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) (2006). He
was designated a career offender and sentenced to forty-six
months’ imprisonment, to be served consecutive to his
undischarged state court sentence. The court also imposed a
three-year term of supervised release. On appeal, Jacobs argues
that his sentence is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. We affirm.
We review Jacobs’ sentence for reasonableness,
applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007). This review requires
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. We first assess
whether the district court properly calculated the advisory
Guidelines range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006), analyzed any arguments presented by the
parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id.at 49–51; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th
Cir. 2010). If there is no procedural error, we review the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the
totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
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chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
If the sentence is within the defendant’s properly calculated
Guidelines range, we apply a presumption of substantive
reasonableness. United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 168 (4th
Cir. 2010); see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007)
(permitting appellate presumption of reasonableness for within-
Guidelines sentence).
We discern no procedural or substantive infirmity in
Jacobs’ sentence. The district court properly computed Jacobs’
Guidelines range, including the career offender designation,
provided Jacobs and his counsel ample opportunity to speak in
mitigation, and explained the sentence imposed by reference to
the § 3553(a) factors it deemed most relevant in this case.
Jacobs contends on appeal that the district court
procedurally erred by failing to address whether his career
offender designation overstated the seriousness of his conduct.
Jacobs complains that the court “relied almost exclusively on
[his] admittedly bad criminal record” without giving due
consideration “to the isolated and non-aggravated nature of his
offense conduct.” (Appellant’s Br. at 14).
We disagree. In the course of analyzing the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors and explaining the reasons for the selected
sentence, the district court adequately responded to counsel’s
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arguments in favor of a reduced sentence to be served in
conjunction with Jacobs’ state court sentence. The sentencing
court simply found that counsel’s arguments were not persuasive
when juxtaposed with Jacobs’ history of violent conduct and
demonstrated unwillingness to conform his behavior to the law,
as well as the need to deter other inmates from engaging in
similar acts. While we may have weighed the sentencing factors
differently if tasked with resolving the issue in the first
instance, we defer to the district court’s well-reasoned
decision. See United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th
Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion
when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a)
factors.”).
Jacobs relies on the same basic premise to argue that
his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable.
Our review of the record convinces us that a within-Guidelines
sentence was justified in light of the totality of circumstances
present in this case. We thus hold that the court did not abuse
its discretion in selecting this sentence. See United States v.
Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining
that, to rebut the presumption of substantive reasonableness,
defendant must show “that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the § 3553(a) factors” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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