United States v. Sajjad Mahar

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5005
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SAJJAD NAZAR MAHAR, a/k/a Ali Mahar, a/k/a Alli Mahar,
a/k/a Ali Maher, a/k/a Alli Maher,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:08-
cr-00281-RWT-1)
Submitted: June 30, 2011 Decided: July 11, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F.X. Becker, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. David
Ira Salem, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sajjad Nazar Mahar appeals the district court’s
judgment entered pursuant to his guilty plea to seventeen counts
of mail fraud, wire fraud and money laundering. Counsel for
Mahar has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), in which he reviews the proceedings but asserts
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Mahar has
filed a pro se supplemental brief contending that his guilty
plea was involuntary and alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel. Finding no error, we affirm.
Mahar first asserts that his guilty plea was
involuntary. We have thoroughly examined Mahar’s Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11 hearing and conclude based on his statements at the
hearing that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Absent
compelling evidence to the contrary, the “truth of sworn
statements made during a Rule 11 colloquy is conclusively
established.” United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221-22
(4th Cir. 2005); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74
(1977) (holding that a defendant’s declaration at the Rule 11
hearing “carr[ies] a strong presumption of verity”); United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119 (4th Cir. 1991) (concluding
that a defendant’s statement at a Rule 11 hearing that he was
neither coerced nor threatened was “strong evidence of the
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voluntariness of his plea”). We thus find that Mahar’s claims
in this regard are without merit.
Mahar next asserts that both trial and appellate
counsel were ineffective. Claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel generally are not cognizable on direct appeal. United
States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997). Rather, to
allow for adequate development of the record, a defendant must
bring his claims in a 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011)
motion. Id. An exception exists where the record conclusively
establishes ineffective assistance. United States v.
Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). Because the
record in this case does not conclusively establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, we find that Mahar’s claims are not
cognizable in this appeal.
We have examined the entire record in this case in
accordance with the requirements of Anders, and we find no
meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the district court. At this juncture, we deny
counsel’s motion to withdraw. This court requires that counsel
inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in
this court at that time for leave to withdraw from
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representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the
motion was served on the client. Finally, we dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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