United States v. Miguel Rodriguez

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4463
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MIGUEL ANGEL RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a Cocho, a/k/a Yuyo, a/k/a
Enrique Guzman,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:14-cr-00109-FDW-1)
Submitted: June 21, 2016 Decided: June 23, 2016
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew B. Banzhoff, DEVEREUX & BANZHOFF, PLLC, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Miguel Angel Rodriguez appeals his conviction and 120-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or
more of a mixture and substance containing a detectible amount
of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). On
appeal, Rodriguez’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the
district court complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11 in accepting Rodriguez’s guilty plea and whether the
district court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Rodriguez was
notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but
has not done so. The Government has declined to file a response
brief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must
conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of,
and determines that the defendant comprehends, the nature of the
charge to which he is pleading guilty, the maximum possible
penalty he faces, any mandatory minimum penalty, and the rights
he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir.
1991). The court also must ensure that the plea is supported by
an independent factual basis and not the result of force,
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threats, or promises outside the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(b)(2), (3).
Because Rodriguez did not move to withdraw his guilty plea
or otherwise preserve error in the plea proceedings, we review
his plea colloquy for plain error. United States v. Massenburg,
564 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2009). To establish plain error,
Rodriguez must demonstrate that the district court erred, the
error was plain, and the error affected his substantial rights.
Henderson v. United States, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126
(2013). In the guilty plea context, an error affects a
defendant’s substantial rights if he demonstrates “a reasonable
probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered
the plea.” United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 427
(4th Cir. 2015) (alteration and internal quotation marks
omitted). Even if these requirements are met, we will “exercise
our discretion to correct the error only if it seriously affects
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 381
(4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record reveals that the district court
substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 11 in
conducting the plea colloquy. While the court made several
minor omissions during the colloquy, see Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1)(E), (G), (L), the record provides no basis to conclude
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that these errors affected Rodriguez’s substantial rights. See
Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d at 427. Because the court ensured
that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an
independent factual basis, we find the plea valid and
enforceable.
We review Rodriguez’s sentence for reasonableness, applying
“a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We first ensure that the court
“committed no significant procedural error,” such as improper
calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines, insufficient
consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, and
inadequate explanation for the sentence imposed. United States
v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If we find the sentence procedurally
reasonable, we also review its substantive reasonableness under
“the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We
presume that a within-Guidelines is substantively reasonable.
United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rodriguez bears the burden to rebut this presumption “by showing
that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
We discern no error in Rodriguez’s sentence. The court
properly calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range, considered
the parties’ arguments, and provided a reasoned explanation for
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the sentence it imposed, grounded in the § 3553(a) factors.
Further, Rodriguez fails to rebut the presumption of substantive
reasonableness accorded his within-Guidelines sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Rodriguez, in writing,
of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If Rodriguez requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Rodriguez.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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